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The goal of this dissertation is to show how information asymmetries among market 
participants affect the way they operate in the financial markets. The first chapter 
investigates deal initiation in the context of mergers and acquisitions. We use 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) documents of the merging firms in our 
sample to discover which side (acquirer or target) initiated the deal. Our analysis 
indicates that target firms receive substantially lower premiums when they initiate the 
merger: abnormal returns to target firm stocks around the merger announcement date 
are 12 percentage points lower in such deals. When premiums are calculated over a 
longer time period, this difference increases to 27 percentage points. We argue that the 
information asymmetries between merging firms is the primary reason for this finding. 
Alternative explanations, such as financial distress and liquidity hypotheses, are 
considered as well. Our findings also relate to acquirer returns, synergy gains from 
mergers, characteristics of firms involved in buyer- and seller-initiated deals and the 
effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on premium differences across initiation groups. 
The second chapter examines how information asymmetries within the set of 
outside investors influence the investment and financing decisions of firms. In our 
model, some investors have access to private level information which is not publicly 
available to others. We show that this external information asymmetry systematically 
influences the equilibrium stock price, which in turn affects firm's payoff from equity 
 financing. In particular, firms are better off with equity financing when the 
information asymmetry among the set of outside investors is low.   
In the third chapter, we analyze past stock returns of the merging firms, and 
examine their role in explaining abnormal returns around the announcement of the 
merger to the public. We provide several hypotheses that link these two return 
variables, and discuss their relevance in our context.  
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DEAL INITIATION IN MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Hypothetical Scenario 1: In February 2007, after a discussion with several board 
members, Gordon Gekko, CEO of Teldar Paper Inc., contacted representatives of the 
company‟s investment bank, Sterling Group, to explore strategic opportunities. On 
February 27, 2007, Mr. Gekko authorized Sterling to approach several companies on 
his company‟s behalf in order to assess their interest in acquiring Teldar. During the 
first week of March 2007, Sterling contacted 10 parties, including Bud Fox, CEO of 
Fox Enterprises, to solicit interest in a possible strategic transaction with Teldar. 
Hypothetical Scenario 2: On February 27, 2007, Bud Fox, CEO of Fox Enterprises, 
contacted Mr. Gekko, CEO of Teldar Paper Inc., to arrange a meeting on March 10, 
2007, in New York. At that meeting, Mr. Fox indicated that Fox Enterprises would be 
interested in learning more about Teldar‟s business in order to assess interest in a 
possible business combination with Fox Enterprises. Mr. Fox and Mr. Gekko spoke 
several times throughout the month and Mr. Fox expressed interest in acquiring 
Teldar
1
. 
Which of these hypothetical scenarios would result in Teldar Paper getting a 
higher offer price from Fox Enterprises? In the first, Teldar decides to sell its business 
for an unspecified reason. For that purpose, the CEO contacts potential buyers through 
an investment bank. In the second, Teldar receives an unsolicited offer from Fox, 
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 The scenarios described are not based on factual information. 
 2 
though Teldar has no prior plans of selling its business. 
This paper analyzes the relation between deal initiation decisions of merging firms 
and the corresponding market reaction to their stock price at the time of the deal 
announcement. We argue that there is an information asymmetry between buyers and 
sellers on the quality of the target firm, and that initiation decisions are signals of this 
quality. This adverse selection problem leads buyers to downgrade their valuation of 
the targets when target firms initiate the deal. In the Teldar-Fox example above, we 
therefore expect Teldar to get larger premiums in the case in which Fox initiates the 
merger (Scenario 2). 
Existing merger databases, such as SDC Platinum (SDC), do not record which 
party initiated the deal. Using the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) system, we search the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) filings of 
the merging parties (DEFM14A, TO-T, S-4 documents) to find a sample of mergers 
for which we can identify the deal initiator. It is not possible to locate this information 
for every merger, for various reasons, including missing documents, very complicated 
deal histories, etc., though we are able to identify 260 buyer-initiated deals and 183 
seller-initiated deals between 1997 and 2006. 
We find that, at the time of the merger announcement to the public, target firms 
experience an average of 12 percentage point higher abnormal returns in buyer-
initiated deals, than in seller-initiated deals. When the return premiums are calculated 
over a longer time period, this difference jumps to 27 percentage points (both numbers 
are statistically significant at the 1% level). For a median-sized target firm in our 
sample ($173 million), these percentages amount to $20.7 million and $46.7 million, 
respectively.  
In addition to the information asymmetry hypothesis, we also consider the 
conjecture that firms in financial distress tend to search for potential buyers of their 
 3 
businesses. It is conceivable that the managers are more likely to initiate merger talks 
and sell their companies at a discount in distressed times, as shareholders and 
managers face significant costs when their firms go bankrupt. Also, even if the firms 
themselves are not in financial distress, major shareholders could have liquidity 
motives to sell their companies. Our findings indicate that target firms are indeed 
financially weaker in seller-initiated deals than in buyer-initiated deals, but the reality 
of being in financial distress has no effect on premiums paid.  
While target firms are paid significantly more in buyer-initiated deals, we find no 
evidence of overpayment by the buyer firms. The abnormal returns to buyer firms‟ 
stock at the announcement of the merger are -2% in both initiation groups. Synergies 
resulting from the merger show significant differences across initiation groups; +2.8% 
in buyer-initiated deals and +0.3% in seller-initiated deals. We also identify factors 
helping to explain deal initiation decisions by firms. Liquid (high cash holdings), large 
and high return-on-equity buyer firms tend to initiate deals more often. On the other 
hand, smaller target firms put themselves up for sale more frequently. Initiation has a 
weak power in predicting whether the announced deal will close successfully. 
However, controlling for other deal and financial firm characteristics, we find that 
seller initiation increases the chances of a successful close. Finally, we examine 
whether the differences in target firm premiums change over time. Multivariate 
analysis implies diminishing bid premium differences across initiation groups after 
2002. Here, we discuss the potential effect of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
in explaining this finding. 
The concept of deal initiation in mergers and acquisitions is important for several 
reasons. Some readers may have strong prior beliefs that buyer-initiated deals imply 
higher premiums paid to target firms. The results in this paper confirm and quantify 
this conjecture. Using a hand-collected dataset, we measure the significance and 
 4 
persistence of these premium differences. Second, this paper provides a fresh 
perspective on value creation and wealth transfers resulting from M&A‟s by 
examining the microstructure of the takeover market. Mergers and acquisitions are 
very significant events in their ability to reallocate capital among investors. This paper 
helps to identify which types of mergers create the most value and examines the nature 
of wealth transfers during this reallocation. Finally, we believe that an understanding 
of deal initiation could help to explain several other aspects of the merger process and 
raise interesting questions about the existing findings in the literature. These potential 
extensions and research questions are discussed in the conclusion. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we explain the hypotheses on the 
relationship between initiation decisions and abnormal returns to the target firms. 
Section 1.3 discusses relevant papers in the literature. Dataset formation and 
construction of variables is explained in Section 1.4. In Sections 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7, we 
analyze the power of initiation variables in explaining target premiums, buyer 
abnormal returns and synergistic gains, respectively. Section 1.8 identifies the types of 
firms involved in buyer- or seller-initiated deals. Section 1.9 of the paper has four 
parts. In the first part, we show that the difference in target firm premiums is not due 
to information leakage. In the second part, we analyze the predictive power of 
initiation for deal closing. Heterogeneity issues in our sample are discussed in part 
three of Section 1.9. The last section analyzes the effects of SOX on target firm 
premiums. Section 1.10 concludes. 
 
1.2 Hypotheses 
 
The first hypothesis is built on the theory relating to lemons markets. As stated in 
Genesove (1993), a market exhibits the Akerlof (1970) variety of adverse selection 
 5 
under four conditions:  
(i) Sellers know more about the quality of the good than buyers. This paper 
considers the market for firms. Sellers of firms, including target firm managers and 
advisors, have private information on the characteristics of their firms and thus assess 
the quality of their firms most accurately. Even though buyer firm managers have 
access to public data in the initial stages of merger talks, as well as private data in the 
due diligence process, target firm managers still possess superior information, such as 
unreported projections. 
(ii) Both buyers and sellers value quality. The goods sold in this market, shares of 
firms, are investment goods. The expected rate of return on high quality firms is larger 
than low quality firms, and high rates of return are desired by every investor, ceteris 
paribus.  
(iii) Prices are not determined by sellers. In the takeover market, price is most 
frequently determined by negotiation between the merging firms. However, even if the 
number of buyer firms negotiating with a target firm is low, there is outside 
competitive pressure. That is, target firms have outside options to start talks with other 
buyer firms, making the market competitive2. The extreme case is formal auctions, 
where prices are set by buyers. 
(iv) Institutions do not eliminate the information asymmetry problem (e.g. 
warranties and standardizations cannot fully protect the buyer). While some merger 
agreements involve the use of representations and warranties that survive deal closing 
and result in indemnification in the case of a breach by one the merging firms, 
associated costs (both legal and time) make their use limited. Earnouts, defined as the 
portion of payment contingent upon post-merger performance of the target firm, have 
the potential to help alleviate the information asymmetry between the merging parties. 
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 Aktas, De Bodt, and Roll (2008). 
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However, the costs of using these tools are significantly higher in the acquisition of 
publicly traded target firms, as the ownership of such firms is quite dispersed. 
We argue that there is an information asymmetry between the merging firms and 
that their initiation decisions are important signals, as they reflect hidden information. 
For example, a seller-initiated deal may raise questions about the motivations for the 
sale. Buyer firm managers will naturally ask: Why is this company selling itself? Are 
there problems we are unaware of? What are the immediate obstacles to operating 
independently? Are they overvalued? In effect, the suspicion that the target firm is a 
lemon leads the buyer to discount the price it is willing to pay
3
. On the other hand, in 
buyer-initiated deals, target firms have no prior intentions of being sold. The buyer 
firm simply approaches the target firm and asks if the target firm is interested in a take 
over. The likelihood of a target turning out to be a lemon is much less when a buyer 
chooses a firm and proposes a deal.  
The same type of information asymmetry arguments are discussed in the 
management literature. Kitching (1973)‟s survey data covers 407 acquisitions made in 
European countries between 1965 and 1970. The survey was administered to buyer 
firm managers who completed at least one acquisition during this period. Combining 
this survey with financial and accounting data, the author identifies several factors 
affecting the success of an acquisition. One of these factors, “availability of the target 
firm”, has an adverse effect on the success of the merger. That is, if the acquisition is 
made because the target firm was available, then the deal is more likely to be 
classified as a failure. Kitching explains this finding as follows: “If you buy a 
company because it approaches you („company was available‟), you are more likely to 
                                                 
3
 While selling decisions of target firms could signal bad news to buyer firms, there might be innocent 
and verifiable reasons for selling a business, such as retirement of a major shareholder in private firms, 
inability to access capital that is needed to expand, etc. However, we believe that these motivations are 
relatively rare in established publicly traded companies, which fully compose our dataset. 
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have a „lemon‟ on your hands than a „superstar‟” 4. 
When target shareholders approve a merger, they agree to sell their equity to the 
buyer firm all together. In that sense, this process resembles procedures in investment 
financing. There are significant differences between the two cases, though they both 
involve selling stock in the market. In the investment financing case, Myers and 
Majluf (1984) argue that only overvalued (lemon) firms issue equity, as the 
information asymmetry between firm managers and outside investors causes a 
discount in the stock prices of firms. High quality firms do not sell equity at a 
discount, preferring other sources of financing. If we apply the same argument to the 
takeover market, the party that shows a willingness to sell at the current market prices 
(target firms in seller-initiated deals) should be, on average, of lower quality. 
Therefore, premiums paid to such target firms are expected to be less than those for 
buyer-initiated deals
5
. 
There could be alternative explanations for our findings on premium differences 
across initiation groups. There is evidence in the literature that fire sales, as well as 
liquidity-motivated asset sales, are completed at lower premiums [Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992), Pulvino (1998), Officer (2007)]. Therefore, the liquidity needs of major 
shareholders in target firms could be a reason for observing lower premiums in seller-
initiated deals. This liquidity hypothesis claims that, if a major shareholder or the sole 
owner of a firm faces a liquidity crisis, they could decide to sell the firm as quickly as 
possible. Their need for immediate liquidity could entail a relative discount on the 
fundamental value of the firm‟s assets. However, adapting the liquidity hypothesis to 
                                                 
4
 Kitching (1973), Chapter 5, page 188. 
5 
Up to this point, we assumed that sellers know more about their business than buyers. In some cases, 
the reverse could also be true. When a buyer approaches a target firm for a merger, the target firm could 
question the reasons for buyer firm‟s interest: Why are they interested in buying us? Do they know 
something about our products/industry that we do not know? This could lead the target firm to ask a 
higher price in the negotiation process, implying the same premium difference across initiation types. 
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deal initiation is not obvious. An important condition must be met for the liquidity 
theory to apply to deal initiation: the shareholders in a liquidity crisis should have the 
power to sell the company. They are either majority shareholders with more than 50% 
of the stock, so that their decision to liquidate their position amounts to a sale of the 
company, or they are minority shareholders who can convince other shareholders to do 
so. As a proxy for liquidity needs for such shareholders, we use Venture Capital 
(VC)/Private Equity (PE) fund information in the SDC database. This results in a very 
small number of observations (24 out of 947 deals), as VC/PE funds tend to have 
stakes primarily in private firms, rather than in public. Hence, measuring the liquidity 
needs of shareholders is a major obstacle in testing the liquidity hypothesis. 
It is also possible that none of the shareholders experience a liquidity crisis, but 
that the firm itself does. The managers and shareholders of financially distressed firms 
face significant uncertainty about the fate of their firms. Thus, they can choose to 
avoid the costs of bankruptcy by selling the firm to a willing acquirer at a relative 
discount. As discussed in Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), these costs, such as the time 
spent in bankruptcy, the change in the value of the firm‟s assets over this period, 
attorney and accountant fees, etc., could amount to a significant portion of the firm‟s 
assets. While these costs incentivize both shareholders and managers to make an exit 
through an acquisition, the incentives of managers could be much stronger for an 
acquisition, as human capital risk is much harder to diversify. Such employment risks 
are studied in Gilson (1989), who report a higher turnover of senior management in 
financially distressed firms. In addition, the benefits of being taken over can provide 
incentives by itself [Hartzell, Ofek, Yermack (2004)]. We call this view the financial 
distress hypothesis.  
Both the information asymmetry and financial distress hypotheses predict lower 
premiums paid to target firms in seller-initiated deals. If the information asymmetry 
 9 
hypothesis is more relevant, we should observe premium differences for both 
financially distressed and liquid targets. If the financial distress hypothesis is correct, 
we should not. This will be our primary method to test the power of these hypotheses. 
 
1.3 Related literature 
 
Our study contributes to the empirical corporate finance literature in several ways. 
Most importantly, we are not aware of any other paper analyzing deal initiation in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions. The market microstructure literature has enjoyed 
the availability of trade initiation data in the last few decades, thanks to tick tests, 
resulting in a significant number of published papers. Even though the nature of 
intraday data (including quality and quantity) cannot be compared to the merger data, 
it provides a rough counterpart to our initiation-data-added merger database. Second, 
our analysis provides a direct test for Akerlof‟s lemons market theory. The papers in 
the economics literature compare the prices of traded goods to those of goods not 
traded, as a price differential among these groups is an implication of the theory
6
. 
Since traded (sold) target firms receive a control premium, and target firms not traded 
do not, it is impossible to follow the same route in this case. However, dividing the 
sample of traded target firms by willingness to trade (initiation decisions) eliminates 
the problem and yields an alternative test to the lemons market theory.  
Conceptually, the work most similar to ours is Oler and Smith (2008). In this 
recent working paper, the authors identify firms that publicly express interest in being 
taken over (labeled as “take-me-over”, or TMO firms) and analyze their 
characteristics. They argue that firms anticipating or experiencing financial distress 
                                                 
6
 Genesove (1993) analyze the used car market, Chezum and Wimmer (1997) the thoroughbred 
yearlings market and Gilligan (2004) the used aircraft market. 
 10 
look for a potential buyer first, and if these private negotiations fail to produce any 
such acquirer, firms publicly announce their willingness to be sold. The authors find 
that (i) these TMO firms tend to be financially stressed or pre-stressed compared to 
their benchmarks, (ii) making a TMO announcement increases the likelihood of 
receiving an offer, (iii) TMO firms underperform in the year after the TMO 
announcement, and (iv) firms that announce TMO experience positive abnormal 
returns provided that they are eventually taken over. Besides dissimilarities in 
methodologies and datasets, there are two main differences between this work and 
ours. First, there is a loose relation between initiation and TMO announcement 
decisions. While a TMO firm is more likely to initiate a deal, seller-initiated deals do 
not necessarily result in TMO announcements. As recognized by the authors, private 
negotiating processes, which include initiation decisions, typically precede TMO 
announcements. Second, our study analyzes buy and sell sides of the merger process, 
while TMO analysis focuses primarily on the sell side.  
Another related paper is Boone and Mulherin (2007), who differentiate between 
public and private measures of competition in the takeover market. The authors note 
that competition proxies reported in the merger databases (such as SDC) are 
misleading, as they indicate the number of bidders competing for the target firm 
around the public announcement of the deal to the public. They argue that the major 
negotiating processes take place privately, well before this public announcement is 
made. Using SEC documents of merging firms, they learn whether there is private 
competition in the first stages of the merger talks. In an “auction” the target firm is in 
touch with multiple bidder firms, while in a “negotiation”, the target firm is in touch 
with only one. As we explain in detail in the next section, our classification of deal 
initiation is not tightly related to the level of private or public competition. A seller 
could initiate a deal with the buyer without contacting other bidders. On the other 
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hand, in a buyer-initiated deal, the seller firm could subsequently decide to contact 
other parties. Therefore, there is not a one-to-one relation between the two measures. 
A third branch of literature relates diversity of opinion and information asymmetry 
measures to acquirer and target firm returns. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) 
show that abnormal returns to the acquiring firm are lower in equity deals when 
information asymmetries and diversity of opinion proxies for the acquirer are high. 
Cheng, Li, and Tong (2008) and Chatterjee, John, and Yan (2008) examine the 
information asymmetry measures of public target firms and relate them to target firm 
abnormal returns. They find that opaque and high diversity of opinion types of target 
firms (high information asymmetries) experience higher abnormal returns the day the 
merger is announced to the public. Note here that the proxies used in these papers 
measure also the information asymmetries between the firms and the market. In our 
setup, the initiation decision is a private signal to the merging firms at the beginning of 
merger negotiations, and it does not involve outside investors. Therefore, the nature of 
the information asymmetries in our paper is different than in these two papers.  
Direct information asymmetries between buyer and target firms are explored in 
two papers that discuss the use of earnouts in mergers. Datar, Frankel, and Wolfson 
(2001) and Kohers and Ang (2000) argue that merging firms can share risk by using 
contingent payments, especially when the information asymmetries between them are 
significantly high. As the authors recognize, the use of earnouts in the acquisition of 
public targets is quite limited
7
, as the ownership dispersion in public firms increases 
costs (renegotiation, potential lawsuits, etc.) associated with the use of earnouts. Since 
our sample includes only public targets, we are unable to match our analysis to theirs. 
However, if the use of earnouts were common in public targets, we would expect more 
frequent use of earnouts in seller-initiated deals than in buyer-initiated deals.  
                                                 
7
 Only 1 deal in our sample involves with an earnout payment.  
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Even though deal initiation has not been studied before in the M&A literature, the 
market microstructure literature has successfully used the trade initiation concept in 
uncovering facts and testing theories about the mechanics of the stock market. The 
original form of the intraday data, which is the primary source of information for most 
empirical microstructure papers, does not specify whether an executed trade is a result 
of a buy or a sell order. However, trades can be classified as buyer- or seller-initiated 
through the use of tick tests
8
. Learning whether a trade is a result of a buy or sell order 
helps to investigate interesting topics. One such topic relevant to our paper is the effect 
of large-block transactions on stock prices
9
. Although there are significant 
dissimilarities between the two types of trades
10
, deals in the takeover market could be 
viewed simply as block trades executed at a much larger scale. Keim and Madhavan 
(1996) show that the average price impact for a seller-initiated block trade is -4.32%, 
while it is +2.8% for a buyer-initiated block trade
11
. In their theoretical model, the 
actions of an informed trader with private information about the future stock payoff, is 
observed by all market participants. If the informed trader initiates a buy (sell) order, 
market participants infer that the private information that the informed trader 
possesses is positive (negative). Therefore, deal initiation carries brand new 
information about the stock payoff and permanently affects the stock price. From this 
perspective, our paper is analogous to theirs. We also claim that the private 
information possessed by merging parties is revealed through their deal initiation 
decisions. 
 
                                                 
8
 Lee and Ready (1991). 
9
 A block trade is often defined as a trade of 10,000 or more shares at one time. 
10
 For example, control rights (mergers result in a change of control), liquidity (blocks can be traded in a 
centralized stock market) and regulation (regulatory approval is needed in some merger deals). 
11
 Price impact is defined as the ratio of the stock price one day after the block transaction divided by 
the stock price one week before.  
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1.4 Data 
1.4.1 Sample formation 
 
The merger, accounting and return data come from SDC, Standard & Poor‟s 
COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases, 
respectively. The first step is to identify the M&A deals that are used in this analysis. 
The following restrictions are imposed in the SDC database: 
 „Deal value‟ is greater than $5 million; 
 Both the acquirer and the target are public companies located in the US; 
 The form of transaction is either „merger‟, or „acquisition of majority interest‟; 
 The deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟; 
 No financial or utility firms – for either acquirer or target firms; and 
 Announcement of the deal falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. 
The deal size restriction is to exclude very small firms from our analysis. Only US 
acquirers and targets are included in the sample (in order to find the initiation data 
from their SEC filings easily). Private targets are excluded from the sample, as price 
data are not available for such firms. The form of acquisition is restricted to the above 
criteria, to make it clear that the merger substantially changes the ownership of the 
merging firms. The sample includes completed and withdrawn deals. Financial and 
utility firms are also excluded from our sample, as accounting structures of financial 
firms differ from non-financials, and utilities in the US are mostly regulated. Finally, 
the sample consists of deals that are announced to the public between 1997 and 2006. 
As of May 6, 1996, all public companies are required to make their filings through 
EDGAR. We start our sample at the beginning of the calendar year (1997) following 
this date. 
Then, these filtered SDC data are matched with the CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
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databases, which yield a total of 947 data points. As a last step, we use the EDGAR 
database to search for the company filings for either the buyer firm or the target firm, 
to get the initiation data for each deal. If they exist, the initiation data are in the 
"Background of the Merger"
12
 section of the following documents:
13
  
 DEFM14A, definitive proxy statements relating to mergers and acquisitions; 
 PREM14A, preliminary proxy statements relating to mergers and acquisitions; 
 14D9, tender offer solicitation/reco. statements filed under Rule 14-d9; 
 TO-T, third party tender offer statements; and 
 S-4, registration of securities issued in business combination transactions. 
The background section summarizes past contact and negotiation between the 
buyer and the target firm, such as who the initiator of the merger is, how the managers 
of the firms first met, how the negotiations proceeded, what decisions the board of 
directors took, which investment banks were hired, etc.  
Even though the official SEC documents do not explicitly state the hidden agendas 
of merging firms, they are quite accurate in defining the actions taken during the 
takeover process. Our main source for determining the deal initiator mostly comes 
from the actions taken by these parties. If a target is interested in selling itself, then it 
considers “strategic alternatives” to operating as an independent company and 
typically hires an investment bank to evaluate its options. Then, this target firm 
directly, or through its investment bank, contacts potential buyer(s) and solicits 
interest for its business. In this type of deal, target firms have intentions of selling 
themselves without any prior offer from a bidder, and hence we designate these as 
“seller-initiated”. In a typical “buyer-initiated” deal, the target firm does not have any 
                                                 
12
 If the background section is missing, the "Material Contacts and Board Deliberations" section has this 
information. 
13
 Source: www.sec.gov. The SEC documents are filed before the deal closing. Therefore, it is possible 
that merging firms file documents with the SEC, but fail to close the deal. This means that we have the 
initiation information for both completed and withdrawn deals, conditional on data availability. 
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prior intentions of selling its business. A buyer firm, or their investment bank, 
approaches the top management of the target firm and expresses interest in a “strategic 
combination” with the firm. Target firm management then takes this offer to the board 
of directors and responds to the buyer firm with their decision. In some cases, target 
firms negotiate with the offering buyer firm on a one-to-one basis and end up being 
bought, and in some cases, they contact other firms that might be interested in a 
combination with the target firm. If a target firm is eventually bought by the buyer that 
made the very first offer, even if there were other bidders involved in the process, we 
classify it as a “buyer-initiated” deal.   
Unfortunately, initiation information is not available for each deal in our sample. 
In 96 deals, merging firms did not file documents with SEC, and in 408, we are unable 
to discern which party initiated the deal, even though merging firms filed documents 
with the SEC. Therefore, a total of 504 deals (out of 947) in our sample do not have 
initiation information
14
 
15
.  
In cases where the initiation information cannot be found, the history of 
negotiations is quite complicated. There are instances in which a third party (usually 
another bidder) is involved in the process, which makes initiation ambiguous. For 
example, a target receives an unsolicited offer from Firm A and then hires an 
investment bank that contacts potential buyers for the target, and the target firm ends 
up merging with Firm B. In this case, the initiation is not clear. Firm A‟s initial contact 
leads the target firm to initiate the deal with Firm B, so it cannot be classified as a 
seller-initiated deal. Similarly, it cannot be classified as a buyer-initiated deal, as Firm 
A does not merge with the target. There are other cases where the intentions of the 
                                                 
14
 In Section 1.9.3, we explain the source of missing data, and compare initiation and no-initiation 
groups.   
15
 In several deals, investment banks initiate talks between the merging firms. Since neither firm has 
prior intentions to merge, we do not classify these types of deals as buyer- or seller-initiated. 
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merging firms are unclear. The SEC document could read “The CEO‟s of Firm K and 
Firm L met in an industry convention and discussed the merits of a business 
combination involving the two companies”. That sentence does not designate any of 
the firms as a deal initiator. Therefore, we drop these types of transactions from the 
dataset and only focus on cases in which the buyer firm clearly initiates contact with 
the target and ends up buying it, or the target firm initiates contact with the buyer and 
ends up being bought by it. The former is classified as a buyer-initiated deal, and the 
latter is classified as a seller-initiated deal.  
 
1.4.2 Construction of variables 
 
We categorize our variables into three groups: return variables, initiation variables, 
and deal and financial characteristics of the merging firms. Variable names are 
italicized throughout the text. 
  
1.4.2.1 Return variables 
 
To measure the impact of the merger on the market valuation of the merging firms, we 
calculate, using the market model
16
, abnormal returns to the acquirer and the target 
stock around the announcement date. We use a 5-day event window size, over (-2,+2), 
to calculate the abnormal returns
17
. The return variables are denoted by a_CAR and 
t_CAR for the acquirer and target firm, respectively. 
The market reaction at the time of the merger announcement does not necessarily 
reflect the change in the target shareholder‟s wealth. For example, if the market 
                                                 
16
 We estimate market model parameters over (-316,-64) relative to the event day.  
17
 We also tried 3- and 11-day event window sizes. All of the results in this paper are robust to the 
choice of the event window size. 
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anticipates the merger announcement, arbitrage activity could drive the price of the 
target firm up prior to the announcement. Therefore, the event day abnormal returns 
may not fully reflect the wealth effect of the merger on the target firm shareholders. 
As an alternative measure, we define bid premium (bidpremium) as the buy-and-hold
18
 
abnormal returns in the target firm stock starting 63 trading days before the event date 
and ending at the deal closing date. If the deal is not completed, we truncate the period 
at +126 days
19
. 
To estimate the synergies created from the merger, we take the weighted average 
of buyer and target firm CAR‟s, with the weights being determined by the market 
value of equity of the buyer and target firms 6 trading days before the announcement 
of the merger (synergy). 
It is possible that there is more publicity involved in seller-initiated deals, as target 
firms or their investment banks usually contact many parties while searching for 
potential acquirers. This might decrease the surprise component of the market reaction 
to the announcement of the merger. We calculate the run-up in the merging firms‟ 
stock prices over the (-63,-6) period to capture information leakages before the merger 
announcement (t_runup). 
We explain in Appendix A.1 the details of the market model, as well as the 
construction of the variable bidpremium. 
 
1.4.2.2 Initiation variables 
 
Our sample consists of 947 observations. For the reasons stated earlier, 504 of them do 
                                                 
18
 The term “buy-and-hold” is more intuitive for post-merger abnormal return calculations, after the 
merging firms are identified. We use this term to distinguish it from the abnormal returns calculated 
from the market model. 
19
 Roughly 6 months. This restriction binds for mostly withdrawn deals, as completed deals typically 
close well before +126 days.  
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not have initiation information; these observations cannot be identified as buyer- or 
seller-initiated. These unclassified observations could actually be buyer-initiated, 
seller-initiated, neither or both, but due to the lack of information in their SEC 
documents (or they do not even have SEC documents), they cannot be properly 
classified. For these reasons, we create three different initiation dummy variables: 
initiation_b takes a value of 1 if the deal is buyer-initiated and 0 otherwise, 
initiation_s takes a value of 1 if the deal is seller-initiated and 0 otherwise, and 
initiation takes a value of 1 if the deal is buyer-initiated and 0 if seller-initiated. 
 
1.4.2.3 Deal and financial characteristics 
 
Short term market reactions to the announcement of mergers have been extensively 
examined in the M&A literature, to assess the resulting wealth creation or transfer 
from mergers. Several firm and deal characteristics are shown to influence cross 
sections of abnormal returns of merging firms. The list of factors include deal 
characteristics such as the method of payment [Travlos (1987), Chang (1988)], form 
of acquisition [Jensen and Ruback (1983), Huang and Walkling (1987)], asset 
relatedness [Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)], hostility [Schwert (2000)], 
competition [Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988)], relative size [Asquith, Bruner, and 
Mullins (1983)], toehold [Betton and Eckbo (2000)], termination fees [Officer (2003)], 
and financial characteristics of the merging firms such as Tobin‟s Q [Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1991) and Servaes (1991)], leverage [Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell 
(1993)], cash flow [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989)], cash holdings [Harford 
(1999)], and size [Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)]. 
In addition to the variables above, our analysis includes sales growth, 
price/earnings, return on equity, R&D, capital expenditures and dividend/price ratios 
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of the merging firms
20
. We keep the set of control variables large so that initiation 
dummies do not capture the effects of omitted variables. To test the relevance of the 
financial distress hypothesis, we compute liquidity, Altman‟s Z [Altman (1968)] and 
current ratios of target firms. For the liquidity hypothesis, we create dummy variables 
to capture significant family and VC/PE ownership in target firms. In Appendix A.2, 
we explain how the set of deal and financial characteristics are constructed using SDC 
and COMPUSTAT data. 
 
1.4.3 Data summary 
 
In Table 1.1, we summarize return, initiation, deal and financial variables. 59% of the 
identified deals are initiated by buyer firms. This percentage drops to 28% if 
unidentified deals are included in the sample. These numbers do not show a great 
variation in the time series; only in the years 2001 and 2003 do seller-initiated deals 
outnumber buyer-initiated deals. The number of buyer and seller-initiated deals with 
respect to years is displayed in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 For a discussion of the financial characteristics of the merging firms, see Sorensen (2000). Sales 
growth, R&D and capital expenditures proxy for merging firm‟s future growth opportunities. 
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Figure 1.1 
Deal Initiation with respect to years. 
This figure shows the distribution of buyer- and seller-initiated deals over years. We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following 
restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or 
„acquisition of majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement date falls in 
between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC 
filings of the merging firms. 
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A comparison of buyer and target firm financial characteristics reveals that buyer 
firms are financially stronger than target firms. Buyer firms are larger, and they have 
higher cash flow, sales growth, Tobin‟s Q, return on equity and price earnings ratios 
than target firms. The average CAR to buyer (target) firm stock around the 
announcement date of the merger is -2% (+24.6%), and the weighted average of these 
percentages, synergies, is +2.1%. When a longer time period is used to measure 
premiums, target firm stock prices appreciate an average of 42.5%. Finally, the 
average run-up in target firms‟ stock price is 9%.  
 
Table 1.1 
Descriptive statistics 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. a_CAR (t_CAR) is the abnormal 
returns to the acquirer (target) firm centered 5 days around the announcement of the merger. synergy is defined as 
the weighted average of buyer and target firm abnormal returns, where weights are determined by the market value 
of buyer and target firm equity calculated 6 trading days before the announcement of the merger.  t_runup is the 
abnormal returns to target firm stock over (-63,-6). The normal returns are calculated using the market model with 
an estimation window of (-316,-64). bidpremium is the buy-and-hold return of the target firm stock starting at day -
63 and ending at the deal closing day (or +126, if closing day is greater than +126). initiation is 1 if the deal is 
classified as buyer-initiated, and 0 if seller-initiated. initiation_b is 1 if the deal is buyer-initiated and 0 otherwise. 
initiation_s is 1 if the deal is seller-initiated and 0 otherwise. Due to space limitations, the definition and calculation 
of deal and financial variables are explained in Appendix A.2. 
       
 N mean median std. dev min max 
PANEL A. RETURN VARIABLES             
a_CAR 947 -0.020 -0.015 0.108 -0.848 0.696 
t_CAR 947 0.246 0.201 0.285 -0.770 2.638 
synergy 947 0.021 0.007 0.173 -0.337 4.227 
bidpremium 947 0.425 0.332 0.726 -1.065 7.880 
t_runup 947 0.090 0.065 0.372 -2.276 2.293 
PANEL B. INITIATION VARIABLES             
initiation 443 0.587 1 0.493 0 1 
initiation_b 947 0.275 0 0.447 0 1 
initiation_s 947 0.193 0 0.395 0 1 
PANEL C. DEAL CHARACTERISTICS             
percentcash 947 0.404 0.179 0.441 0 1 
tender 947 0.227 0 0.419 0 1 
asset_related 947 0.644 1 0.479 0 1 
hostile 947 0.027 0 0.163 0 1 
unsolicited 947 0.072 0 0.258 0 1 
competition 947 0.088 0 0.283 0 1 
completed 947 0.879 1 0.327 0 1 
rel_size 945 0.265 0.125 0.399 0 4.953 
toehold 947 0.032 0 0.175 0 1.000 
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Table 1.1 continued       
       
a_termfee 945 0.004 0 0.011 0 0.092 
t_termfee 926 0.049 0.042 0.067 0 1.051 
financial_seller 946 0.025 0 0.157 0 1.000 
family_seller 946 0.001 0 0.033 0 1.000 
PANEL D. BUYER CHARACTERISTICS             
a_tobinq 947 2.835 1.945 3.596 0.213 58.041 
a_booklev 947 0.458 0.449 0.237 -0.040 1.973 
a_cashflow 918 0.072 0.093 0.168 -2.528 0.556 
a_salesgrowth 910 0.305 0.124 0.736 -0.901 7.198 
a_mvequity 947 19,601.24 2,093.73 55,235.42 7.810 615,078.6 
a_liquidity 947 0.475 0.475 0.234 0 0.983 
a_PE 915 19.240 18.730 40.130 -195.40 198.330 
a_ROE 910 0.065 0.125 0.534 -4.580 4.380 
a_R&D 932 0.061 0.028 0.107 0 1.846 
a_capex 947 0.062 0.042 0.074 0 0.885 
a_dividend 947 0.005 0.000 0.011 0 0.124 
PANEL E. TARGET CHARACTERISTICS             
t_tobinq 931 2.137 1.496 2.180 0.123 28.395 
t_book_lev 931 0.452 0.421 0.279 0 2.964 
t_cashflow 873 -0.007 0.066 0.265 -2.289 0.555 
t_salesgrowth 879 0.196 0.087 0.563 -1.000 3.531 
t_mvequity 947 1,230.902 173.38 5,019.97 1.48 76,595.34 
t_liquidity 931 0.558 0.591 0.257 0 0.995 
t_cash 931 0.240 0.130 0.250 0 0.960 
t_current 912 3.140 2.240 3.220 0.130 40.650 
t_Altmanz 904 5.074 3.098 11.069 -26.074 153.839 
t_PE 869 9.260 9.940 27.480 -98.570 99.010 
t_ROE 881 -0.050 0.038 0.547 -4.708 4.744 
t_R&D 920 0.092 0.028 0.149 0 1.274 
t_capex 931 0.063 0.043 0.075 0 0.991 
t_dividend 947 0.003 0 0.010 0 0.156 
 
We compare deal and financial variable means across initiation groups in Table 
1.2. hostile and unsolicited variable means are significantly higher in buyer-initiated 
deals
21
. Note a deal is classified as hostile in the SDC database if the deal is 
unsolicited and target management resists the offer. Therefore, hostile is a subset of 
unsolicited
22
. The variables unsolicited and initiation are positively correlated; 
                                                 
21
 In theory, there should be no unsolicited or hostile deals in the seller-initiated group. The mean for 
the unsolicited variable in Table 1.2 is 0.0054, meaning that 1 seller-initiated deal out of 183 is 
classified as unsolicited. We checked the SEC documents of the merging firms for this deal and did not 
find any reason as to why SDC classifies it as unsolicited. 
22
 Another important point with the unsolicited and hostile variables is that the occurrence of these 
events is infrequent, compared to other time periods. For example, around 10% of the sample in 
Schwert (2000) is classified as hostile, while this ratio is only 2.7% in our sample. The chosen time 
period might play a role in this disparity, since his sample from 1975 to 1996 contains the 1980s, an 
active period for hostile takeovers. 
 23 
whenever the deal is classified as seller-initiated, unsolicited will be 0 as the target 
firm contacts the buyer firm first. Seller-initiated deals start with the consent of the 
target firm management and are therefore never classified as unsolicited. However, 
when the deal is buyer-initiated, unsolicited can be either 0 or 1, as unsolicited 
measures the event around the announcement day. For example, a deal is buyer-
initiated if Firm A initiates contact with the target first. If the target firm agrees to be 
taken over, the unsolicited variable will be 0. However, if Firm A unexpectedly makes 
an offer to the target firm and announces this to the public, then unsolicited would be 
recorded as 1. 
Buyer firms in buyer-initiated deals are both larger and have higher return on 
equity than those in seller-initiated deals. Target firms in buyer-initiated deals appear 
financially stronger than target firms in seller-initiated deals. They have higher cash 
flow and Tobin‟s Q ratios, as well as significantly larger market capitalizations. The 
two tests we run, the sample equality of means t-test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test, 
yield different results for sales growth, price-earnings and return on equity ratios. 
However, these ratios are consistently larger for target firms in buyer-initiated deals. 
Also, Altman‟s Z score is significantly larger for targets in the buyer-initiated group. 
This measure is a proxy for bankruptcy risk, where values below 3 represent a high 
risk zone for firms. As Table 1.2 shows, the median Altman‟s Z value for targets in 
seller-initiated deals is 2.79, compared to 3.34 for targets in buyer-initiated deals. We 
discuss the effect of Altman‟s Z on premiums in the following section. 
VC/PE ownership in target firms does not vary across initiation groups. On 
average, 2% of the target firms have these types of financial shareholders. The 
magnitude of this variable makes it hard to test the liquidity hypothesis properly, 
forcing us to focus on testing the remaining two hypotheses.  
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Table 1.2 
Data summary by initiation groups 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006.  This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. Due to space limitations, the 
definition and calculation of deal and financial variables are explained in Appendix A.2. Two sample mean 
comparison test and Wilcoxon rank sum test results are reported in the t-value and z-value columns, respectively. 
We do not run the Wilcoxon rank sum test on dummy variables. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * 
for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. 
 
         
 Buyer-Initiated (B) Seller-Initiated (S) Difference (B-S) 
PANEL A. DEAL 
VARIABLES 
N mean median N mean 
media
n 
t-value z-value 
percentcash 260 0.476 0.403 183 0.442 0.321 0.7738 0.792 
tender 260 0.308 0.000 183 0.251 0.000 1.2934 - 
asset_related 260 0.654 1.000 183 0.667 1.000 -0.2797 - 
hostile 260 0.046 0.000 183 0.000 0.000 2.9690*** - 
unsolicited 260 0.073 0.000 183 0.005 0.000 3.4114*** - 
competition 260 0.046 0.000 183 0.066 0.000 -0.8879 - 
completed 260 0.923 1.000 183 0.945 1.000 -0.9177 - 
rel_size 259 0.204 0.105 183 0.202 0.091 0.0629 0.6 
toehold 260 0.019 0.000 183 0.016 0.000 0.2203 - 
a_termfee 259 0.003 0.000 183 0.003 0.000 0.3181 1.19 
t_termfee 255 0.048 0.043 177 0.057 0.046 -1.5353 -0.871 
seller_financial 259 0.019 0.000 183 0.021 0.000 -0.1868 - 
PANEL B. BUYER 
CHARACTERISTICS                 
a_tobinq 260 2.920 2.110 183 2.640 1.940 1.03 1.5 
a_book_lev 260 0.464 0.460 183 0.451 0.440 0.6238 0.885 
a_cashflow 254 0.099 0.104 176 0.076 0.103 1.9441* 1.25 
a_salesgrowth 250 0.280 0.103 176 0.324 0.125 -0.6012 -0.442 
ln_a_mvequity 259 8.220 8.170 183 7.620 7.380 2.99*** 3.20*** 
a_liquidity 260 0.492 0.502 183 0.459 0.460 1.54 1.43 
a_PE 252 22.520 21.450 177 20.980 18.730 0.4055 1.17 
a_ROE 253 0.123 0.140 175 -0.002 0.120 2.90*** 2.32** 
a_R&D 258 0.056 0.034 177 0.060 0.030 -0.5541 -0.005 
a_capex 260 0.058 0.043 183 0.069 0.043 -1.5572 0.326 
a_dividend 260 0.006 0.000 183 0.005 0.000 1.0644 1.52 
PANEL C. TARGET 
CHARACTERISTICS               
t_tobinq 256 2.150 1.560 177 1.870 1.390 1.8476* 1.979** 
t_book_lev 256 0.439 0.404 177 0.474 0.414 -1.2453 -0.666 
t_cashflow 240 0.017 0.075 165 -0.055 0.049 2.4874** 2.745*** 
t_salesgrowth 237 0.179 0.098 165 0.152 0.036 0.5949 2.404** 
ln_t_mvequity 255 5.620 5.570 177 4.900 4.850 4.45*** 4.26*** 
t_liquidity 256 0.562 0.560 177 0.588 0.580 -1.0709 -1.18 
t_cash 256 0.242 0.141 177 0.251 0.142 -0.3443 -0.374 
t_current 252 2.940 2.330 174 3.360 2.330 -1.2511 -0.13 
t_Altmanz 251 5.130 3.340 173 3.770 2.790 1.714* 2.77*** 
t_PE 235 11.960 13.300 169 8.260 6.350 1.3337 2.28** 
t_ROE 240 -0.033 0.061 164 -0.099 0.017 1.28 2.164** 
t_R&D 252 0.089 0.029 175 0.104 0.036 -1.0273 0.143 
t_capex 256 0.064 0.046 177 0.064 0.042 -0.1132 0.648 
t_dividend 260 0.003 0.000 183 0.004 0.000 -0.4351 0.738 
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1.5 Target firm analysis 
1.5.1 Univariate analysis 
 
As a first step, we compare mean premiums across initiation groups. The results are 
summarized in Table 1.3. Panel A of this table shows the results for t_CAR, and Panel 
B shows the results for bidpremium. In each panel, we test whether subsample 
premium means are equal to zero. 
The main observation from this table is that buyer- and seller-initiated deals differ 
significantly in terms of premiums paid to the target firm. The simple relation between 
initiation and premium measures is positive: target firm returns are significantly higher 
if the deal is initiated by the buyer. In particular, t_CAR averages 32.1% in buyer-
initiated deals and 20.9% in seller-initiated deals. The mean difference in premiums, 
11.2 percentage points, is significant at the 1% level. The difference still persists 
across initiation groups when deals are further categorized with respect to method of 
payment and mode of acquisition. 
Panel B of Table 1.3 shows sample averages of our second measure, bidpremium. 
There are two things to note from this panel. First, the levels of bid premiums are 
higher than t_CAR, as it includes run-ups and mark-ups in the target stock price. 
Second, significance levels of t-tests are lower relative to the t_CAR measure, which 
could reflect the volatility of the information environment over a longer time period.  
The first row of Panel B reveals that the average bid premium is 56.59% in buyer-
initiated deals and 36.6% in seller-initiated deals. The difference, 19.9 percentage 
points, is significant at the 1% level. In all equity deals, this difference jumps to a 
significant 38.5%, while there is no significance in difference in all cash deals. 
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Table 1.3  
Abnormal returns of the merging firms with respect to initiation groups 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, 
form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the 
merging firms. t_CAR (a_CAR) is the abnormal returns to the target (buyer) firm centered 5 days around the announcement of the merger. synergy is defined as the weighted 
average of buyer and target firm abnormal returns, where weights are determined by the market value of buyer and target firm equity calculated 6 trading days before the 
announcement of the merger. The normal returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of (-316,-64). bidpremium is the buy-and-hold return of 
the target firm stock starting at day -63 and ending at the deal closing day (or +126, if closing day is greater than +126). all is the whole dataset. all equity takes a value of one 
for deals in which 100% equity is used. all cash takes a value of one for deals in which 100% cash is used. tender takes a value of one for tender offer deals, all other offers 
are classified as a merger. Each sub-sample is tested against the null that average premiums in that sub-sample are equal to zero. For Panel A, C and D, t-values are estimated 
using cross-sectional and time series variation of abnormal returns. These calculations follow from Brown and Warner (1985). For Panel B, t-values are estimated using cross 
sectional variation only. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. 
 
         
 N B initiated t-value N S initiated t-value Difference (B-S) t-value 
Panel A. t_CAR                 
all 252 0.321*** 52.133 181 0.209*** 22.818 0.112*** 10.172 
all equity 77 0.262*** 20.220 65 0.136*** 8.920 0.125*** 6.274 
all cash 82 0.413*** 38.919 58 0.287*** 16.183 0.126*** 6.122 
tender 76 0.427*** 38.136 46 0.262*** 14.302 0.166*** 7.725 
merger 176 0.275*** 38.068 135 0.191*** 18.189 0.084*** 6.616 
Panel B. bidpremium               
all 260 0.5659*** 13.071 183 0.3666*** 8.2534 0.1992*** 3.1303 
all equity 79 0.6553*** 5.6354 65 0.2695*** 3.466 0.3857*** 2.6352 
all cash 87 0.5506*** 10.0465 59 0.4381*** 6.5012 0.1124 1.2979 
tender 80 0.5827*** 9.4933 46 0.4448*** 7.002 0.1379 1.4638 
merger 180 0.5583*** 9.9064 137 0.3403*** 6.1542 0.218*** 2.7035 
Panel C. a_CAR                
all 260 -0.0192*** -4.8492 183 -0.0203*** -3.7235 0.0011 0.1695 
all equity 79 -0.0531*** -5.7808 65 -0.0444*** -3.8862 -0.0086 -0.5921 
all cash 87 0.0036 0.6278 59 -0.0042 -0.5231 0.0079 0.7901 
tender 80 0.0051 0.7482 46 0.0083 0.9049 -0.0032 -0.2857 
merger 180 -0.0300*** -5.7296 137 -0.0300*** -4.4516 0 -0.0013 
PANEL D. synergy         
all 262 0.0285*** 7.529 186 0.0038 0.5077 0.0246*** 2.881 
all equity 79 -0.0049 -0.5927 68 -0.0204 -1.0912 0.0154 0.7552 
all cash 88 0.0241*** 4.4087 59 0.0113 1.4872 0.0127 1.3536 
2
6
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Table 1.3 continued         
         
tender 82 0.0607*** 8.3234 46 0.0222*** 2.561 0.0384*** 3.388 
merger 180 0.0138*** 2.8535 140 -0.0021 -0.2188 0.0159 1.4574 
 
2
7
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1.5.2 Multiple regression results 
 
Univariate analysis suggest that target firms receive higher premiums in buyer-
initiated deals. The remaining question is whether this difference in returns persists in 
a multiple regression analysis. To see how well initiation dummies explain t_CAR and 
bidpremium in cross-sections, we run several regressions controlling for the effects 
that are shown to influence these returns
23
. 
Table 1.4 summarizes multiple regression results for t_CAR and bidpremium. 
There are three different regressions for each dependent variable, where the 
regressions differ in specification of the initiation dummy variables. 
As for the set of relevant control variables in the multiple regression, we include 
the percent of cash used in the deal (percentcash), a dummy for tender offer deals 
(tender), a dummy for same industry deals (asset_related), a dummy for large number 
of public competitors for the target (competition), a dummy for unsolicited deals 
(unsolicited), a dummy for eventually successfully completed deals (completed) and 
finally the relative size of the target to the buyer firm (ln_rel_size). With respect to the 
financial variables, we use Tobin‟s Q (a_tobinq), book leverage (a_book_lev) and cash 
flow (a_cashflow) measures for the buyer firm. We use a larger set of target firm 
controls, including Tobin‟s Q (t_tobinq), book leverage (t_book_lev), cash flow 
(t_cashflow), one year sales growth (t_salesgrowth), Altman‟s Z score (t_Altmanz), 
size (ln_t_mvequity), one year return on equity (t_ROE), R&D expenses (t_R&D), 
                                                 
23
 We analyze the effect of initiation on premiums using simple regression. There can be endogeneity 
concerns – premiums reversely affecting initiation decisions – but we have several arguments for not 
using a simultaneous equations (SEM) model. First, the question at hand does not seem to be a good fit 
for an SEM because we do not have a structural model to speak of. Second, if an SEM were written, it 
should include most of the deal variables as endogenous variables. For example, form of the deal 
(tender vs. merger) and premiums could also affect each other. An SEM should therefore include most 
of the deal variables, but this becomes infeasible as there are numerous variables to be included in such 
a model. 
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capital expenditures (t_capex) and dividend yield (t_dividend)
24
. Year and industry 
dummies are also included in the regression, though they are not reported. 
Most of the variables included in the regression model have been previously 
shown to influence target firm premiums. The remaining variables, especially those 
for the target firms, are included to address potential concerns about the true effects of 
initiation dummies on premiums. For example, excluding growth variables will result 
in biased results if buyers tend to initiate deals with growing or growth-potential target 
firms and pay larger premiums to them. For this reason, we include proxies for the 
growth opportunities of the target firm, such as sales growth and R&D and capital 
expenses.  
 
Table 1.4  
Cross-sectional regression analysis of target firm abnormal returns 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. t_CAR stands for cumulative 
abnormal returns to the target firm 5 days around the announcement of the merger. To calculate abnormal returns, 
we use the market model, parameters of which are estimated over (-316,-64). bidpremium is the buy-and-hold 
return of the target firm stock starting at day -63 and ending at the deal closing day (or +126, if closing day is 
greater than +126). initiation is 1 if the deal is classified as buyer-initiated, and 0 if seller-initiated. initiation_b is 1 
if the deal is buyer-initiated and 0 otherwise. initiation_s is 1 if the deal is seller-initiated and 0 otherwise. Due to 
space limitations, the definition and calculation of deal and financial variables are explained in Appendix A.2. t-
values are in parentheses, below the reported coefficients. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, 
** for 5% and *** for 1%. Regressions include year and industry dummies (not reported). 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COEFFICIENT t_CAR t_CAR t_CAR bidpremium bidpremium bidpremium 
       
initiation 0.126***   0.280***   
 (3.814)   (3.820)   
initiation_b  0.0905***   0.179***  
  (4.177)   (3.167)  
initiation_s   -0.0863***   -0.185*** 
   (-3.460)   (-2.846) 
percentcash 0.0524 0.0493* 0.0517* -0.163 -0.0696 -0.0648 
 (1.131) (1.821) (1.901) (-1.586) (-0.983) (-0.915) 
tender 0.0943** 0.0919*** 0.103*** -0.00689 -0.0509 -0.0285 
 (2.177) (3.426) (3.848) (-0.0720) (-0.726) (-0.407) 
                                                 
24 We exclude hostility dummy from our regressions, due to (i) its low frequency, and (ii) its high correlation w
ith the
 unsolicited 
variable. Buyer 
firm size is also excluded, as it creates a set of linearly dependent variables together with relative size 
and target firm size (their logarithms). 
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Table 1.4 continued       
       
asset_related 0.0548 0.035 0.0379* 0.0503 0.0936* 0.0994* 
 (1.588) (1.646) (1.779) (0.660) (1.686) (1.790) 
competition -0.0927 -0.104*** -0.114*** 0.184 0.0688 0.0491 
 (-1.209) (-2.736) (-3.014) (1.084) (0.695) (0.497) 
unsolicited -0.0147 0.0384 0.0275 0.193 0.351*** 0.327*** 
 (-0.183) (0.924) (0.655) (1.087) (3.233) (2.990) 
completed -0.0239 -0.0161 -0.00808 0.109 0.368*** 0.384*** 
 (-0.342) (-0.487) (-0.243) (0.705) (4.256) (4.442) 
ln_rel_size -0.0269** -0.0281*** -0.0309*** -0.0773*** -0.0730*** -0.0787*** 
 (-2.431) (-4.307) (-4.713) (-3.159) (-4.279) (-4.606) 
a_tobinq -0.0109 0.00263 0.00235 0.0119 0.00611 0.0055 
 (-1.015) (0.785) (0.696) (0.503) (0.697) (0.626) 
a_book_lev -0.113 -0.0689 -0.0727 0.0875 -0.0563 -0.0647 
 (-1.365) (-1.502) (-1.579) (0.479) (-0.470) (-0.539) 
a_cashflow 0.103 -0.057 -0.0435 0.503 0.0837 0.11 
 (0.700) (-0.890) (-0.678) (1.540) (0.499) (0.657) 
t_tobinq -0.0287 -0.0173** -0.0180** 0.0613 -0.00789 -0.00939 
 (-1.581) (-1.965) (-2.041) (1.528) (-0.344) (-0.409) 
t_book_lev -0.168** -0.0234 -0.0274 -0.173 -0.0679 -0.0748 
 (-2.113) (-0.540) (-0.629) (-0.989) (-0.599) (-0.659) 
t_cashflow -0.107 -0.0363 -0.0332 0.11 0.192 0.197 
 (-1.053) (-0.551) (-0.502) (0.488) (1.116) (1.141) 
t_salesgrowth 0.0241 0.0226 0.0167 -0.301*** -0.146*** -0.159*** 
 (0.651) (1.169) (0.859) (-3.683) (-2.889) (-3.125) 
t_Altmanz -0.00111 0.000111 0.0000167 -0.0146* -0.0046 -0.00477 
 (-0.297) (0.061) (0.009) (-1.774) (-0.966) (-1.001) 
ln_t_mvequity 0.00375 -0.0164** -0.0154** -0.0556** -0.0512*** -0.0495*** 
 (0.305) (-2.405) (-2.254) (-2.045) (-2.874) (-2.779) 
t_ROE -0.0155 0.0118 0.00929 0.0536 0.0466 0.0415 
 (-0.445) (0.614) (0.480) (0.693) (0.925) (0.823) 
t_R&D -0.0827 -0.0465 -0.0486 -0.161 0.281 0.275 
 (-0.497) (-0.442) (-0.461) (-0.437) (1.021) (1.001) 
t_capex 0.301 0.215 0.228* -0.0263 0.373 0.401 
 (1.062) (1.577) (1.671) (-0.0420) (1.049) (1.127) 
t_dividend 0.683 0.667 0.998 -0.0908 -0.719 -0.021 
 (0.537) (0.685) (1.019) (-0.0323) (-0.283) (-0.00824) 
Constant 0.634** 0.508* 0.592** 0.839 0.668 0.836 
 (1.997) (1.847) (2.150) (1.195) (0.930) (1.164) 
Observations 372 796 796 372 796 796 
R-squared 0.239 0.197 0.191 0.265 0.196 0.194 
 
Regression results indicate that initiation has a significant effect on target firm 
premium measures, and this effect persists in different specifications of the 
econometric model. From regression (1) of Table 1.4, where only the initiation 
dummy variable is used, we see that target firm CAR‟s are 12.6 percentage points 
higher when the deal is initiated by the buyer. The effect of initiation is significant at 
the 1% level. As mentioned in Section 1.4, initiation data is missing for almost half of 
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the deals in our sample, resulting in a sample size of 372 when the initiation variable 
is used. Definitions of initiation_b and initiation_s let us increase the sample size 
significantly. The coefficient of initiation_b in regression (2) is 0.0905, implying that 
buyer-initiated deals earn an average of 9.05 percentage point higher abnormal returns 
relative to non-buyer-initiated deals. By construction, these non-buyer-initiated deals 
include seller-initiated deals and all other cases for which we have no initiation 
information. To see how seller initiation affects abnormal returns, we use initiation_s 
in regression (3). Target firm CAR‟s around the announcement day is 8.63 percentage 
points lower when the targets themselves initiate the deal. This coefficient is also 
significant at the 1% level.  
Besides initiation variables, method of payment (percentcash), form of acquisition 
(tender), public competition for the target firm (competition), relative size of the target 
firm to the buyer firm (ln_rel_size), target firm Tobin‟s Q (t_tobinq) and its size 
(ln_t_mvequity) have strong explanatory power for target firm CAR‟s in regressions 
(2) to (3). The same industry deal dummy (asset_related) has weaker statistical power. 
Target firm abnormal returns are higher when the payment is in cash, which is 
consistent with existing findings. Received cash is not tax free for the target firm 
shareholders, so a premium should be paid to make them indifferent between cash and 
stock
25
.  Consistent with Jensen and Ruback (1983), returns to the target firms are 
larger in tender offers (around 10 percentage points here). Target firms receive around 
3.8 percentage point higher premiums if the buyer firm is in the same industry as the 
target firm. Public competition for target firms has a surprising negative effect (around 
-10 percentage points), which is contrary to earlier findings in the literature, such as 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988). The competition measure is negatively correlated 
with deal closing and CAR, meaning that it is more likely that the announced deal will 
                                                 
25
 Travlos (1987). 
 32 
not close successfully if there is competition for a target firm. In return, this results in 
lower announcement day premiums for the target. Relative size of the target firm 
compared to the buyer firm has a negative effect on target firm premiums: for every 
10% increase in relative size, premiums go down by around 0.3 percentage points. 
There is mixed evidence on the sign of this variable, and Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz (2004) provide a brief discussion on this issue. Target firm‟s Tobin‟s Q measure 
also has a negative effect on CAR‟s: a unit change in Tobin‟s Q causes premiums to 
go down by almost 1.8 percentage points. Finally, our results suggest that, when the 
absolute size of the target firm goes up by 10%, premiums go down by around 0.15 
percentage points. We should keep in mind that the relative size of the target firm is 
controlled for in these regressions. Hence, an increase in target size must be matched 
by an increase in buyer firm size. Therefore, we can infer that larger buyer firms are 
paying higher premiums to the target firms, as discussed in Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2004).  
The results for regression (1) of Table 1.4 differ from those for regressions (2) to 
(3). Variables significant in those regressions become insignificant in (1), and vice 
versa. For example, percentcash, asset_related, competition, t_tobinq and 
ln_t_mvequity lose their effect on t_CAR while t_book_lev becomes significant. The 
difference between regression (1) and regressions (2) to (3) is the sample size. It is 
likely that the initiation sample is different than non-initiation (no information) 
sample. We discuss these issues in Section 1.9.3.   
In columns (4) to (6), we report multiple regression results where bidpremium is 
used as the premium measure. As regressions (5) and (6) show, premiums paid to the 
target firms are 18 percentage points larger in buyer-initiated deals compared to non-
buyer-initiated deals and 18.5 percentage points lower in seller-initiated deals 
compared to non-seller-initiated deals. These estimates are significant at the 1% 
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significance level. When the initiation dummy is used in the regression, as shown in 
(4), the difference in bid premiums becomes 28 percentage points. The t-value for this 
coefficient is 3.82 and it is significant at the 1% level.  
Since bid premiums are calculated over longer time periods than are CAR‟s, they 
capture different aspects of premiums. As Table 1.4 shows, the important variables in 
explaining bid premiums are different than the variables explaining CAR‟s. Along 
with initiation dummies, unsolicited and completed dummies, relative size, sales 
growth and target firm size variables have significant effects on bid premiums. The 
same industry dummy again has weaker statistical power. The first point that comes to 
attention in these regressions is the effect of completion of the deal. As discussed in 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983), positive abnormal returns to target firm stocks at the 
announcement date revert back to normal levels in ultimately unsuccessful deals. In 
other words, target firms‟ stock prices return to pre-bid levels if the deal fails to close. 
According to their findings, this adjustment can take between 6 and 24 months. Our 
bid premium measure truncates at 126 trading days, which corresponds to almost 6 
months. This explains the magnitude and significance level of the completed dummy 
variable: bid premiums are larger by around 40 percentage points in successfully 
closed deals. The second point is that the coefficient on the unsolicited variable is 
around 0.35 and is uniformly significant across different specifications of the 
econometric model. In Schwert‟s (2000) analysis, which covers takeovers from 1975 
to 1996, the unsolicited variable had a negative influence on bid premiums. More 
recent papers, such as Boone and Mulherin (2007), report positive and significant 
coefficients on the unsolicited variable, suggesting that the effect of hostility on 
premiums has changed over time. Finally, bid premiums go down by around 1.5 
percentage points if sales growth goes up by 10 percentage points. 
Both the information asymmetry and the financial distress hypotheses predict that 
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target firms receive lower premiums when they initiate a merger. This means that the 
coefficient on the initiation dummy would be positive in a regression where the 
dependent variable is the target firm premium. However, the basic version of the 
financial distress hypothesis implies that targets in financial distress would receive 
lower premiums than targets that are not. Therefore, under this hypothesis, (i) if 
premiums were to be regressed on financial distress measures (such as Altman‟s Z), 
these measures would be economically and statistically significant, and (ii) if 
premiums were to be regressed on initiation variables alone, initiation variables would 
be significant, as they capture the effect of financial distress measures (omitted 
variable bias). We do not find evidence in favor of these claims. For instance, if the 
initiation variable is removed from regression (1), the coefficient on t_Altmanz is not 
significant. The primary reason is that there is little correlation between t_Altmanz and 
t_CAR. Liquid target firms (Altman Z scores greater than 3) receive 23.5% premiums, 
while illiquid firms (scores less than 3) receive 25%. 
Another way to distinguish between the information asymmetry and the financial 
distress hypotheses is to introduce interaction variables in the above regressions. 
When an interaction variable, in the form of initiation*Altman‟s Z, is added to a 
regression, its regression coefficient measures how much the effect of initiation on 
target firm returns change with respect to their Altman‟s Z score. In other words, the 
interaction term lets us to observe the effect of each variable on the other‟s marginal 
effect on premiums. We re-run all of the six regressions with this extra interaction 
term and show the results in Table 1.5. In all regressions, except the second one, the 
interaction term has no statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. In the 
first regression, the coefficient of the interaction variable is -0.0064, and the initiation 
variable is 0.153. This means the premium difference between buyer and seller-
initiated deals diminishes 0.0064 percentage points for every unit change in their 
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Altman‟s Z scores. In the fourth regression, where the dependent variable is the bid 
premium, the interaction variable has a coefficient of -0.012 and the initiation variable 
0.329. These results tell us that only a minor portion of the premium difference is 
explained by the financial distress variable; otherwise the coefficient of the interaction 
variable would be a statistically significant larger number.  
 
Table 1.5 
Cross-sectional regression analysis of target firm abnormal returns with interaction 
variables 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. t_CAR stands for cumulative 
abnormal returns to the target firm 5 days around the announcement of the merger. To calculate abnormal returns, 
we use the market model, parameters of which are estimated over (-316,-64). bidpremium is the buy-and-hold 
return of the target firm stock starting at day -63 and ending at the deal closing day (or +126, if closing day is 
greater than +126). initiation is 1 if the deal is classified as buyer-initiated, and 0 if seller-initiated.  initiation_b is 1 
if the deal is buyer-initiated and 0 otherwise. initiation_s is 1 if the deal is seller-initiated and 0 otherwise. All 
regressions contain the same controls as in Table 1.4 though they are not reported. t-values are in parentheses, 
below the reported coefficients. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 
1%. Regressions include year and industry dummies (not reported). 
 
       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COEFFICIENT t_CAR t_CAR t_CAR bidpremium bidpremium bidpremium 
initiation 0.153*** 
  
0.329*** 
  
 
(3.99) 
  
(3.88) 
  
initiation * 
t_Altmanz 
-0.0064 
  
-0.012 
  
 
(-1.37) 
  
(-1.15) 
  
initiation_b 
 
0.113*** 
  
0.215*** 
 
  
(4.43) 
  
(3.2) 
 
initiation_b * 
t_Altmanz  
-0.0052* 
  
-0.008 
 
  
(-1.68) 
  
(-0.99) 
 
initiation_s 
  
-0.098*** 
  
-0.205*** 
   
(-3.52) 
  
(-2.82) 
initiation_s * 
t_Altmanz   
0.0032 
  
0.0055 
   
(0.96) 
  
(0.62) 
t_Altmanz 0.0024 0.0007 -0.003 -0.008 -0.0036 -0.0053 
 
(0.54) (0.4) (-0.17) (-0.8) (-0.74) (-1.1) 
Observations 372 796 796 372 796 796 
R-squared 0.243 0.199 0.192 0.267 0.196 0.194 
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1.6 Buyer firm analysis 
 
In Section 1.5, we show that buyer-initiated deals result in higher payments to target 
firms, as measured by abnormal returns around the announcement of the merger and 
bid premiums. But does this mean that there is a wealth transfer from buyer firm 
shareholders to target firm shareholders in buyer-initiated deals? In other words, do 
buyer firms overpay when they initiate deals?  
In Panel C of Table 1.3, we compare buyer firm CAR‟s across initiation groups, 
with respect to method of payment and form of acquisition. The full sample results 
suggest that buyer firms experience a negative 2% return in both buyer- and seller-
initiated deals. In line with other papers in the literature, the use of stock in the merger 
results in a more negative reaction than using cash. As discussed in Myers and Majluf 
(1984), stock issuance of the better-informed managers could signal opportunistic 
motives behind the offer. We observe -5.3% abnormal returns in the buyer-initiated 
deals, when only stock is used as a method of payment. Similarly, in seller-initiated 
deals, buyers experience a 4.4% drop in their stock prices when they use all equity to 
pay the target firm shareholders. The form of acquisition seems to have a significant 
effect on buyer firm premiums, but initiation groups do not show any difference. In 
mergers, buyers experience a negative 3% abnormal return, while the returns are not 
distinguishable from zero in tender offers. In summary, initiation does not seem to 
have a significant effect on buyer firm abnormal returns, though we run multiple 
regressions nevertheless. 
Multiple regression results are displayed in Table 1.6. We run three regressions, 
(1) to (3), using different initiation variables in each. The last regression, (4), excludes 
all initiation variables. Specification of our econometric model follows from earlier 
findings in the literature and also how well the variables fit into the regression. 
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Table 1.6  
Cross-sectional regression analysis of buyer firm abnormal returns 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. The dependent variable, a_CAR 
stands for cumulative abnormal returns to the buyer firm 5 days around the announcement of the merger. To 
calculate abnormal returns, we use the market model, parameters of which are estimated over (-316,-64). initiation 
is 1 if the deal is classified as buyer-initiated, and 0 if seller-initiated. initiation_b is 1 if the deal is buyer-initiated 
and 0 otherwise. initiation_s is 1 if the deal is seller-initiated and 0 otherwise. Due to space limitations, the 
definition and calculation of deal and financial variables are explained in Appendix A.2. t-values are in parentheses, 
below the reported coefficients. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 
1%. Regressions include year and industry dummies (not reported). 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COEFFICIENT a_CAR a_CAR a_CAR a_CAR 
     
initiation -0.00247    
 (-0.251)    
initiation_b  -0.00152   
  (-0.182)   
initiation_s   -0.00393  
   (-0.407)  
percentcash 0.0262* 0.0287*** 0.0287*** 0.0287*** 
 (1.917) (2.769) (2.768) (2.768) 
tender 0.0144 0.00927 0.00918 0.00909 
 (1.132) (0.899) (0.894) (0.886) 
asset_related 0.00756 0.00489 0.00494 0.00486 
 (0.726) (0.594) (0.600) (0.590) 
competition -0.0197 0.0058 0.0062 0.00605 
 (-0.804) (0.392) (0.421) (0.411) 
unsolicited 0.0308 0.0216 0.0208 0.0215 
 (1.270) (1.349) (1.297) (1.345) 
completed -0.00771 0.0115 0.0116 0.0114 
 (-0.346) (0.892) (0.898) (0.886) 
ln_rel_size -0.0116*** -0.0128*** -0.0129*** -0.0128*** 
 (-2.969) (-4.242) (-4.266) (-4.249) 
a_tobinq 0.00564* -0.000991 -0.001 -0.000988 
 (1.697) (-0.752) (-0.760) (-0.751) 
a_book_lev -0.00682 0.0185 0.0184 0.0185 
 (-0.281) (1.054) (1.046) (1.052) 
a_cashflow 0.0222 -0.0377 -0.0382 -0.0381 
 (0.514) (-1.156) (-1.172) (-1.171) 
a_salesgrowth -0.00713 0.00598 0.00602 0.00598 
 (-1.122) (1.121) (1.128) (1.121) 
ln_a_mvequity -0.00869** -0.00786*** -0.00794*** -0.00790*** 
 (-2.325) (-3.095) (-3.130) (-3.118) 
a_R&D -0.251*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.189*** 
 (-3.084) (-3.634) (-3.653) (-3.646) 
t_tobinq 0.00507 0.00361 0.0036 0.00362 
 (1.051) (1.188) (1.187) (1.192) 
t_cashflow 0.0088 -0.0149 -0.0156 -0.0151 
 (0.370) (-0.770) (-0.807) (-0.781) 
t_salesgrowth -0.000499 0.00917 0.00898 0.00921 
 (-0.0446) (1.194) (1.167) (1.200) 
t_Altmanz -0.00257*** -0.00186*** -0.00186*** -0.00186*** 
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 (-2.701) (-3.039) (-3.036) (-3.040) 
Constant -0.106 -0.135 -0.13 -0.134 
  (-1.157) (-1.290) (-1.236) (-1.287) 
Observations 370 794 794 794 
R-squared 0.181 0.137 0.137 0.137 
 
As Table 1.6 shows, initiation dummy variables have no explanatory power in 
explaining buyer firm CAR‟s. In regressions (1) to (3), initiation variables have a 
negative sign, meaning that buyer firm CAR‟s are lower in buyer-initiated deals, but 
their effects are not distinguishable from zero.   
Out of all control variables, percent of cash used in the deal, relative size and 
Altman‟s Z score of target firms, and finally absolute size and R&D expenses of buyer 
firms are significant. As discussed above, buyer and target firm CAR‟s are larger 
when cash is used in the deal. Our results indicate that, if the percent of cash used in 
the deal increases by 10 percentage points, buyer firm CAR‟s go up by around 0.28 
percentage points. Relative size of the target firm has a negative but smaller impact: 
every 10% increase in relative size of the target firm results in a 0.13 percentage 
points decline in buyer firm CAR‟s. As Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) 
show, larger buyer firms tend to overpay, and the sign of the buyer size variable is 
therefore negative. The coefficient of Altman‟s Z score is negative, meaning that 
buyer firms‟ abnormal returns are higher when they acquire financially distressed 
targets. In our regressions, the coefficient on buyer firm size is around -0.008, 
implying that every 10% increase in buyer firm size results in a 0.08 percentage points 
decline in buyer firm CAR‟s. The R&D variable is consistently significant in all 
different specifications of the model, so we include this measure into our model. A 10 
percentage point increase in the R&D spending of buyer firms results in a 1.9 
percentage point decline in returns. Our sample includes the deals consummated 
between 1997 and 1999, when valuations in the technology industry were very high. 
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Therefore, the most likely explanation of this coefficient is the low quality of 
acquisitions made by these cash rich high tech companies.  
In summary, initiation does not seem to have an effect on buyer firm abnormal 
returns around the announcement of the deal. Target firms receive significantly higher 
premiums in buyer-initiated deals, but this extra payment does not seem to come out 
of buyer firms. If it did, we would have observed significantly lower premiums to 
buyer firms in buyer-initiated deals.  
 
1.7 Synergies 
 
If buyer firms do not overpay when they initiate the deal, then buyer-initiated deals 
could be more synergistic in nature, as target firms are paid more in those types of 
deals.  
In Panel D of Table 1.3, we report synergy gains by initiation groups. For the 
entire sample of deals, synergies are 2.85% in buyer-initiated deals and 0.38% in 
seller-initiated deals. The difference in deal synergies is 2.46% and is statistically 
different from zero at the 1% level. Tender offer deals seem to be the driving force 
behind this result. In tender offers, the portfolio of merging firms earns 6% in buyer-
initiated deals and 2.22% in seller-initiated deals. Tender offers have been shown to 
result in higher buyer and target firm abnormal returns, and hence higher synergies
26
. 
The relation between initiation, synergies and the use of tender offers can be best 
explained by the Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) model. The authors argue that buyer 
firms initiate a tender offer when there are high synergies between the merging firms. 
This way, they maximize their chances of acquiring the target, as they are more 
confident to win the auction resulting from the tender offer. Low synergy bidders 
                                                 
26
 Jensen and Ruback (1983). 
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prefer a bargaining (merger) process, due to the fact that they will lose the auction if a 
tender offer is launched. According to this hypothesis, a high synergy bidder initiates a 
deal using a tender offer. In line with this theory, we find higher synergies in tender 
offers (compared to mergers). Furthermore, we find higher synergies in buyer-initiated 
deals within tender offer deals. 
 
Table 1.7  
Cross-sectional regression analysis of synergies 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. The dependent variable, synergy, 
stands for weighted average of buyer and target firm abnormal returns accumulated 5 days around the 
announcement day. The weights are calculated using the market value of equity of the merging firms 6 days before 
the announcement. To calculate abnormal returns, we use the market model, parameters of which are estimated 
over (-316,-64). initiation is 1 if the deal is classified as buyer-initiated, and 0 if seller-initiated. initiation_b is 1 if 
the deal is buyer-initiated and 0 otherwise. initiation_s is 1 if the deal is seller-initiated and 0 otherwise. Due to 
space limitations, the definition and calculation of deal and financial variables are explained in Appendix A.2. 
highacq_q_lowtar_q is 1 if the acquirer firm's Tobin's Q is greater than its industry average and target firm's 
Tobin's Q is below its industry average. For this variable, we classify industries using 4-digit SIC codes. t-values 
are in parentheses, below the reported coefficients. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 
5% and *** for 1%. Regressions include year dummies (not reported).  
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COEFFICIENT synergy synergy synergy synergy 
     
initiation 0.0219**    
 (2.166)    
initiation_b  0.00603   
  (0.455)   
initiation_s   -0.0244  
   (-1.624)  
percentcash 0.0360*** 0.0394** 0.0404** 0.0396** 
 (2.651) (2.428) (2.491) (2.444) 
tender 0.0169 0.0459*** 0.0467*** 0.0466*** 
 (1.272) (2.783) (2.849) (2.841) 
asset_related 0.0147 0.00895 0.00958 0.00912 
 (1.430) (0.706) (0.757) (0.720) 
competition -0.0351 -0.0440* -0.0437* -0.0451* 
 (-1.465) (-1.877) (-1.875) (-1.934) 
unsolicited 0.0452* 0.00977 0.00612 0.0102 
 (1.856) (0.378) (0.236) (0.394) 
completed -0.00268 -0.0442** -0.0424** -0.0439** 
 (-0.128) (-2.195) (-2.107) (-2.182) 
ln_rel_size 0.00998*** 0.0102*** 0.00990*** 0.0101*** 
 (3.407) (2.758) (2.679) (2.736) 
ln_t_mvequity -0.00515 -0.00970** -0.0100*** -0.00948** 
 (-1.519) (-2.522) (-2.620) (-2.485) 
highacq_q_lowtar_q 0.0108 -0.0162 -0.0163 -0.0162 
 (0.802) (-0.988) (-0.995) (-0.990) 
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t_book_lev 0.00618 -0.00347 -0.00219 -0.00402 
 (0.321) (-0.149) (-0.0942) (-0.173) 
t_Altmanz -0.00153** -0.000978 -0.001 -0.00099 
 (-2.111) (-1.601) (-1.646) (-1.623) 
Constant 0.15 0.24 0.244 0.245 
  (1.479) (1.357) (1.388) (1.390) 
Observations 423 902 902 902 
R-squared 0.148 0.086 0.089 0.086 
 
Multiple regression results are displayed in Table 1.7. Our set of dependent 
variables includes all deal variables, size and book leverages of the target firms and a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a high Tobin‟s Q buyer merges with a low 
Tobin‟s Q target. We classify a firm‟s Tobin‟s Q as high if it is greater than the mean 
Tobin‟s Q in that firms‟ industry (defined by the 4-digit SIC code). The specification 
of this econometric model is intended to capture (i) the synergies created from market 
power or collusion versus synergies from reduction of cost of capital (i.e., 
conglomerates), using the variable asset_related
27
 and (ii) the synergies created from 
the better use of target firm assets in place, using the variable highacq_q_lowtar_q
28
. 
In addition, we control for the leverage of the target firm, as low leverage levels could 
attract financial types of buyers rather than strategic buyers. As before, regressions in 
the table differ by the definition of the initiation variable. We use initiation, 
initiation_b and initiation_s in regressions (1) through (3), respectively. The last 
regression (4) is run without an initiation variable.   
Only in regression (1) does the initiation variable show significance. When the 
deal is initiated by the buyer, synergies are on average 2.19 percentage points higher. 
This result is significant at the 5% level. However, regressions (2) and (3) fail to carry 
this result to samples where we distinguish buyer-initiated from non-buyer-initiated 
and seller-initiated from non-seller-initiated. The signs of these variables are as 
                                                 
27
 See Eckbo (1983) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) for a detailed exposition.  
28
 Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989).  
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predicted, but their significance levels are now lower. Of the remaining variables, 
percent of cash, tender offer, competition and deal completion dummy variables, 
relative and absolute size of the target firm are significant. The same industry deal 
dummy (asset_related) has a positive sign, but its effect on synergies seems to be 
weak. Also, it looks like the match between high Q buyer and low Q target is 
unimportant for synergies.  
 
1.8 Determinants of deal initiation 
 
In previous sections, we showed that buyer- and seller-initiated deals differ in the 
premiums paid to the target firm shareholders and the synergies created in the deal. 
The next natural question is: what firm characteristics do we typically observe in 
buyer or seller-initiated deals? For example, what types of firms decide to sell 
themselves, even if there is no indication of interest? What types of buyers go for the 
target firms that are known to be on the market? The answers to these questions could 
be valuable in understanding differing bid premiums across initiation groups.  
In order to explain initiation behavior, we need to consider the motives behind the 
decisions of merging firms. A target firm could decide to sell itself for several reasons. 
Fierce competition in the industry could lead to a declining business, hammering sales 
growth or profitability. In such deteriorating business conditions, a target firm could 
decide to seek alternatives to remaining independent. Serious litigation hurdles could 
be another reason to sell a business. The target firm could have a significant need for 
capital and be incapable of generating it on its own. Retirement or diversification 
could be good reasons for selling a private business. Finally, the market conditions 
could be very favorable for a sale. If the stock price of the firm appreciated beyond 
reasonable levels, a sale would be easily justified.  
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Product or geographical expansion is the first reason that comes to mind in 
considering buyer motivations for an acquisition. Buyer firms usually make 
acquisitions to fulfill a strategic plan, and expanding business in some direction can be 
a good reason for an acquisition. Buyer firms could also decide to acquire to reduce 
the competition (i.e., a key competitor) that they are facing. Their operations could 
generate unexpected levels of cash, and their best investment could be to acquire 
another business. Finally, market conditions or the current level of buyer firm stock 
price could be very suitable for an acquisition (alternatively, target firm stock price 
could trade at a discount in the market). 
The relevance of some of the above reasons for buying/selling a business can be 
empirically tested. For example, if cash rich firms indeed acquire more often, then we 
can compare cash levels of acquiring and non-acquiring firms. This will test the cash 
holdings hypothesis. Other reasons, such as diversification motives of private business 
owners, are harder to test due to data availability. Owners do not report their reasons 
for selling/buying a business in SEC documents.  
Note here that motivation for initiating a deal cannot be conceptually disentangled 
from the motivations to merge. If we were to predict targets and buyers, we would 
have used almost the same controls as we would for predicting initiation
29
. However, 
the set of targets (or buyers) that initiate a deal could be different than the set of firms 
that do not. In other words, initiation decisions could be a manifestation of 
unobservable reasons for a merger. For instance, if a firm privately knows that one of 
its competitors is developing a superior product, then it might start looking for 
potential buyers for its business before this information becomes public. As an 
outsider, a potential buyer may not have this information, but it might conclude that 
                                                 
29
 Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) and Comment and Schwert (1995) study the characterization of 
target firms.  
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the target firm has some adverse private information of which outsiders are unaware. 
Our goal is to uncover common measurable factors that lead to deal initiation 
decisions.    
We wish to emphasize that we predict initiation conditionally: the goal is to find 
the likelihood of a buyer or a target firm initiating a deal, given that the firm is 
involved in a deal. An unconditional study however, would discover the probability of 
a target initiating a deal. The latter way is harder to pursue because of the low 
frequency of initiation data in the universe of all firms. This difficulty has been 
addressed by Palepu (1986) in a related context. Another obstacle to an unconditional 
study in our context is the number of layers the firms are sorted on. In the first layer, 
the firms are presumably sorted with respect to their merging decisions, and in the 
second, they are presumably sorted with respect to their deal initiation decisions. 
Focusing our analysis on merging firms will remove the first layer and yield a more 
homogenous set of firms for analyzing initiation decisions. We know that there are 
dissimilarities between merging and non-merging firms
30
, so an unconditional analysis 
can fail to capture the true initiation effects. 
The set of control variables include Tobin‟s Q, book leverage, cash flow, sales 
growth, liquidity, return on equity, capital expenditure and absolute sizes of buyer and 
target firms. We also include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the buyer 
firm makes six or more acquisitions in our sample. Serial acquirers can use the same 
method every time they make an acquisition (e.g., always buy targets that are on the 
market); this dummy controls for this behavioral pattern.  
 
 
 
                                                 
30 
Sorensen (2000).
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Table 1.8  
Logistic regression model for predicting deal initiation 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. There are three dependent 
variables; initiation is 1 if the deal is classified as buyer-initiated, and 0 if seller-initiated; initiation_b is 1 if the 
deal is buyer-initiated and 0 otherwise; initiation_s is 1 if the deal is seller-initiated and 0 otherwise. 
multiple_acquisition_6 is 1 if the acquirer firm makes 6 or more deals in our sample and zero otherwise. Due to 
space limitations, the definition and calculation of deal and financial variables are explained in Appendix A.2. 
t_ind2 takes a value of 1 if the target firm's 1-digit SIC code is 2. year_98 is 1 if the deal is announced in year 
1998. Remaining industry and year dummy variables are defined similarly. p-values are in parentheses, below the 
reported coefficients. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
COEFFICIENT initiation initiation_b initiation_s 
    
multiple_acquisition_6 -0.513 -0.568 -0.19 
 (0.318) (0.106) (0.658) 
a_tobinq -0.0431 -0.0475 -0.0362 
 (0.621) (0.275) (0.479) 
a_book_lev 1.638** 0.463 -0.938* 
 (0.018) (0.277) (0.064) 
a_cashflow 1.869 2.479** 0.18 
 (0.167) (0.014) (0.829) 
a_salesgrowth -0.0316 0.0854 0.0705 
 (0.855) (0.506) (0.608) 
a_liquidity 2.288*** 1.490*** -0.892 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.109) 
a_ROE 0.877** 0.164 -0.459** 
 (0.030) (0.335) (0.025) 
a_capex -3.633 -1.651 1.636 
 (0.134) (0.325) (0.266) 
ln_a_mvequity 0.0156 0.144** 0.133** 
 (0.851) (0.011) (0.038) 
t_tobinq 0.014 -0.0327 -0.0712 
 (0.923) (0.673) (0.473) 
t_book_lev -1.129* -0.445 0.351 
 (0.065) (0.269) (0.405) 
t_cashflow 0.968 0.783 -0.504 
 (0.192) (0.177) (0.354) 
t_salesgrowth 0.0328 -0.17 -0.34 
 (0.914) (0.385) (0.122) 
t_Altmanz -0.0252 -0.00696 0.0097 
 (0.386) (0.706) (0.621) 
t_ROE -0.196 -0.15 -0.0479 
 (0.486) (0.416) (0.815) 
t_capex 1.103 0.727 -0.773 
 (0.646) (0.598) (0.610) 
ln_t_mvequity 0.319*** 0.0283 -0.243*** 
 (0.002) (0.660) (0.001) 
t_ind2 -0.226 -0.0335 -0.00905 
 (0.776) (0.947) (0.986) 
t_ind3 -0.323 -0.247 -0.182 
 (0.656) (0.604) (0.707) 
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t_ind4 0.603 0.162 -0.559 
 (0.457) (0.770) (0.363) 
t_ind5 1.535 -0.326 -1.511** 
 (0.108) (0.562) (0.030) 
t_ind7 0.244 0.297 -0.22 
 (0.744) (0.534) (0.648) 
t_ind8 0.189 0.209 -0.00077 
 (0.815) (0.706) (0.999) 
year_98 1.062** 0.379 -0.665* 
 (0.019) (0.239) (0.067) 
year_99 0.902** 0.395 -0.789** 
 (0.043) (0.214) (0.030) 
year_00 0.404 0.0296 -0.48 
 (0.414) (0.935) (0.216) 
year_01 0.193 -0.161 -0.332 
 (0.706) (0.670) (0.385) 
year_02 1.679*** 0.408 -1.167** 
 (0.007) (0.314) (0.021) 
year_03 0.306 -0.234 -0.329 
 (0.584) (0.579) (0.431) 
year_04 1.077* 0.139 -1.042** 
 (0.069) (0.721) (0.029) 
year_05 -0.0491 -0.257 -0.251 
 (0.930) (0.536) (0.559) 
year_06 0.371 -0.265 -0.553 
 (0.538) (0.528) (0.232) 
Constant -3.192*** -2.972*** 0.394 
  (0.008) (0.000) (0.623) 
Observations 373 794 794 
 
Regression results are shown in Table 1.8. Each of the three columns in the table 
has different dependent variables: initiation, initiation_b and initiation_s. Let us first 
look at buyer firm characteristics. In regression (1), where the dependent variable is 
initiation, book leverage, liquidity and ROE of the buyer firm are significant. 
Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) argue that managerial incentives are more 
aligned with shareholder incentives in high leverage firms. If we take buyer initiation 
as a good quality, then we can explain the sign of the leverage ratio in (1); managers 
maximizing shareholder value initiate their own deals rather than settle for the targets 
on the market. A 10 percentage point increase in buyer firm leverage leads to a 3.8 
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percentage point increase in predicted probability of buyer initiation
31
. Liquidity also 
has a positive sign on the probability of buyer initiation. Predicted probability of a 
buyer-initiated deal goes up by 5.4 percentage points when the liquidity of the buyer 
goes up by 10 percentage points. If efficient firms tend to generate high cash flows 
and accumulate cash more quickly, we would observe a positive coefficient of 
liquidity on initiation
32
. Similarly, financially strong firms have high ROE ratios, and 
they seem to start deals by themselves. In regression (2), cash flow and size have 
significant and positive coefficients. The literature contains evidence that buyer firms 
with excess cash flows are involved in worse acquisitions, but this finding is limited to 
low Q firms only
33
. Cash flow could also be high for high quality firms (with well-run 
managements and good investment opportunities), so the positive coefficient of cash 
flow (a marginal effect of 0.44) is not surprising in that regard. Similarly, the size of 
the buyer firm could be a proxy for the quality, even though there is evidence that 
larger firms tend to do worse acquisitions
34
. 
In regressions (1) to (3), we do not observe much explanatory power of target firm 
characteristics in predicting deal initiation. The size of the target firm seems to have a 
positive influence on buyer initiation; as the size of the target increases, the probability 
of buyer initiation goes up. Specifically, a 10% increase in the target firm size causes a 
0.69 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of buyer initiation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 These marginal effects are not reported in the table, as they can be calculated using the sample means 
of explanatory variables.  
32
 On the other hand, Harford (1999) finds that cash rich firms do worse acquisitions.  
33
 Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991). 
34
 Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). 
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1.9 Discussion 
1.9.1 Information leakage 
 
When seller firms initiate a deal, they typically hire investment banks and contact 
several parties during the sale process, including buyer firms. If the market learns prior 
to the materialization of the deal that the target firm is seeking to sell itself, the 
difference in the announcement day abnormal returns has a very simple explanation; 
the deal is predicted in seller-initiated deals, and the market reaction around the 
announcement day is therefore small.  
To test this hypothesis, we include in our regressions a run-up variable measuring 
the appreciation in the target firm stock price prior to the merger. As noted in Schwert 
(1996), on average target firm stock price starts to appreciate 60 days before the 
announcement of the merger. For that reason, we define the variable t_runup as the 
cumulative abnormal returns over (-63,-6) trading days relative to the merger 
announcement day and include it in our regressions. Furthermore, we create a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if “Date Announced” (DA) and “Date Originally 
Announced” (DOA) fields in the SDC database match. DA is the first public 
disclosure of the intent to merge by the firms in that deal, while DOA is the date when 
the target company is first publicly disclosed as a possible takeover candidate. This 
dummy variable intends to capture whether a target firm had prior attempts to sell 
itself. 
The mean run-up in the target firms‟ stock price is 10% in buyer-initiated deals 
and 11.5% in seller-initiated deals. These percentages are not statistically different 
from each other. Furthermore, adding the run-up variable and restricting our sample to 
the same DA and DOA deals do not change our regression results. The premiums paid 
to the target firm, measured by t_CAR, still show significant differences with respect 
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to the initiation groups
35
. The run-up variable has a negative but insignificant 
coefficient, while initiation dummy variables still have highly significant coefficients, 
with the same magnitudes as in Section 1.5.2. We therefore do not find any support for 
the information leakage hypothesis as explained above: the differences in abnormal 
returns are not due to sluggish target stock price appreciation in buyer-initiated deals 
prior to the deal announcement date.  
 
1.9.2 Prediction of successful closing of takeover attempts 
 
The sample of deals includes both completed and withdrawn deals. Therefore, it is 
possible to test whether deal initiation has any power in predicting successful closings 
of deals announced. It would be particularly interesting to see whether seller-initiated 
deals tend to close more often than buyer-initiated deals. Target firms receive 
significantly lower premiums in seller-initiated deals, so it is possible that the 
shareholders of these firms do not approve such deals proposed by managers. On the 
other hand, target managers willingly initiate merger talks in seller-initiated deals, and 
this decision could be the best option for target firm shareholders. Buyer-initiated 
deals provide greater premiums for target firm shareholders, though they can be 
unwelcome offers to target managers, especially if they are hostile.  
Several papers in the literature have built models that predict successful closing of 
the deal, and our set of controls is a collection of the variables in these models
36
. 
These variables include deal and financial variables used in previous sections, as well 
as toehold and termination fees.  
                                                 
35
 Since the time periods over which t_runup and bidpremium variables are calculated partially overlap, 
we include t_runup as an explanatory variable only in CAR regressions.  
36
 Our regressions directly include toehold [Betton and Eckbo (2000)], target and buyer firm 
termination fees [Officer (2003)], hostility [Schwert (2000)] and indirectly include buyer firm size 
[Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)]. 
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Logistic regression results are summarized in Table 1.9. As in previous sections, 
each of the three regressions uses a different initiation dummy variable to predict 
successful closings of the announced deal. All regressions share a common dependent 
variable, completed, that takes a value of 1 if the announced deal is eventually 
completed. 
 
Table 1.9  
Logistic regression model for predicting successful closing of announced takeovers 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. The dependent variable, completed 
is 1 if the announced deal closes successfully. initiation is 1 if the deal is classified as buyer-initiated, and 0 if 
seller-initiated. initiation_b is 1 if the deal is buyer-initiated and 0 otherwise. initiation_s is 1 if the deal is seller-
initiated and 0 otherwise. t_CAR stands for cumulative abnormal returns to the target firm 5 days around the 
announcement of the merger. To calculate abnormal returns, we use the market model, parameters of which are 
estimated over (-316,-64). Due to space limitations, the definition and calculation of deal and financial variables are 
explained in Appendix A.2. p-values are in parentheses, below the reported coefficients. Significance levels are 
denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. Regressions include year and industry dummies (not 
reported).  
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
COEFFICIENT completed completed completed 
    
initiation -1.545*   
 (0.088)   
initiation_b  0.247  
  (0.469)  
initiation_s   0.59 
   (0.171) 
t_CAR -0.16 -0.838 -0.709 
 (0.901) (0.133) (0.205) 
percentcash 0.524 0.292 0.31 
 (0.569) (0.448) (0.423) 
tender -0.282 0.854** 0.886** 
 (0.758) (0.042) (0.034) 
asset_related 0.759 0.780*** 0.777*** 
 (0.258) (0.008) (0.008) 
competition -4.581*** -2.169*** -2.241*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
unsolicited 0.0445 -1.349*** -1.270*** 
 (0.967) (0.001) (0.002) 
ln_rel_size -0.748** -0.530*** -0.533*** 
 (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) 
toehold 1.212 -0.842 -0.882 
 (0.534) (0.157) (0.135) 
t_termfee 26.48** 22.19*** 21.89*** 
 (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
a_termfee 45.67 23.24* 23.03* 
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Table 1.9 continued    
    
 (0.151) (0.086) (0.090) 
a_tobinq -0.00731 0.0534 0.0549 
 (0.981) (0.485) (0.478) 
a_cashflow 3.355 0.294 0.302 
 (0.195) (0.690) (0.684) 
t_tobinq 0.668 0.0426 0.0491 
 (0.142) (0.707) (0.667) 
t_cashflow 1.697 -0.27 -0.192 
 (0.384) (0.742) (0.814) 
t_salesgrowth -0.975 -0.264 -0.271 
 (0.125) (0.234) (0.223) 
t_liquidity -3.287* -0.733 -0.798 
 (0.082) (0.282) (0.243) 
ln_t_mvequity -0.124 0.124 0.132 
 (0.598) (0.185) (0.160) 
Constant 14.80*** 12.99*** 13.19 
     
Observations 337 836 836 
 
In regression (1), we find a coefficient of -1.54 for the initiation variable, which is 
significant at the 10% level. This coefficient translates to a -1.2 percentage point 
marginal effect of buyer initiation on the predicted probability of deal closing. That is, 
buyer-initiated deals have a 1.2 percentage point lower probability of closing than 
seller-initiated deals. However, regressions (2) and (3), where initiation_b and 
initiation_s variables are used, respectively, indicate that initiation has no effect in 
predicting closing of deals.   
 
1.9.3 Comparison of initiation group with no-initiation group 
 
As previous regressions indicate, there seem to be differences in initiation and no-
initiation groups. That is, the sample of firms for which the initiation data could be 
found is potentially different than the sample of firms for which the initiation data 
cannot be found. For example, if these two groups were identical, we would expect 
similar magnitudes and significance levels for the control variables in regressions (1) 
 52 
and (2) in Table 1.4
37
. However, this is not the case: the competition variable is 
significant in regression (2) but not in (1); book leverage of the target is significant in 
(1) but not in (2), etc. This suggests a potential sample switching problem, which we 
analyze in this section. 
As a first step, we examine the source of missing data. The initiation data cannot 
be found due to two reasons: neither of the merging firms files forms with the SEC, or, 
even if they do, the documents do not specify which party initiated the deal. In 96 out 
of 504 no-initiation deals (19%) in our sample, merging firms do not file documents 
with the SEC. The reason for that could be (i) the deal was called off after the 
announcement (not completed) or (ii) merging firms need not file documents with 
SEC even if the deal is consummated
38
. In Table 1.10, we summarize deal and 
financial characteristics of merging firms with respect to initiation groups. The first 
column is for the “initiation group”, the deals for which initiation data could be found. 
The next is for the “no-initiation group”, which has two sub-groups: “no SEC 
document” and “no initiation data”. The last column shows the differences in means 
across these subgroups. This table reveals much about the source of differences among 
initiation groups. First, “initiation” and “no SEC document” groups differ in terms of 
deal completion. 93.2% of the announced deals are completed in the first group, while 
only 34.3% in the latter. Apparently, the SDC database records the intention to merge, 
but merging firms do not file any documents with the SEC if the deal is called off. 
Also, in these types of deals, the magnitude of publicized competition is much higher 
(22.9% versus 5.4% in “initiation” group).  
                                                 
37
 The other possibility is the multicollinearity between initiation variables and other control variables. 
However, correlation tables indicate that this is unlikely. 
38
 In Chapter 2 (Structuring the Transaction – Non-Tax Considerations) of their book, Kling and Nugent 
(2007) summarize the cases in which stockholder approval is needed in an acquisition. If a public 
acquirer is not issuing stock, or issuing less than 20% of its outstanding stock in a transaction, it need 
not obtain stockholder approval, hence it need not submit documents to SEC. Also, target firm 
shareholders need not vote in “short form” mergers. 
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Table 1.10 
Deal and financial characteristics of merging firms with respect to their initiation data 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, 
form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the 
merging firms. „Initiation group‟ is the subsample of deals for which the deal initiator is identified. In „no SEC document‟ group, the SEC documents of the merging firms 
could not be located in the EDGAR database. In „no initiation data‟ group, the documents are located, but the deal initiator could not be identified in the text. Due to space 
limitations, the definition and calculation of deal and financial variables are explained in Appendix A.2. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% 
and *** for 1%.    
 Initiation group No-initiation group Differences 
  initiation  no SEC   no initiation       
 N (I) N document (II) N data (III) (I-II) t-value (I-III) t-value 
PANEL A: DEAL CHARACTERISTICS                     
percentcash 443 0.461 96 0.327 408 0.358 0.134 2.67*** 0.103 3.43*** 
tender 443 0.284 96 0.083 408 0.199 0.201 4.19*** 0.086 2.92*** 
asset_related 443 0.659 96 0.583 408 0.642 0.076 1.40 0.017 0.518 
hostile 443 0.027 96 0.072 408 0.017 -0.045 -2.21** 0.010 0.97 
competition 443 0.054 96 0.229 408 0.090 -0.175 -5.71*** -0.036 -2.06** 
unsolicited 443 0.045 96 0.302 408 0.046 -0.257 -8.43*** -0.001 -0.099 
completed 443 0.932 96 0.343 408 0.946 0.589 17.19*** -0.014 -0.83 
poison 443 0.020 96 0.021 408 0.002 -0.001 -0.032 0.018 2.42** 
ln_rel_size 431 -2.650 93 -1.340 400 -2.330 -1.310 -6.34*** -0.320 -2.58*** 
PANEL B: BUYER CHARACTERISTICS                     
a_tobinq 443 2.800 96 2.020 408 3.050 0.780 2.65*** -0.250 -0.94 
a_book_lev 443 0.458 96 0.534 408 0.440 -0.076 -2.92*** 0.018 1.16 
a_cashflow 430 0.089 95 0.033 393 0.061 0.056 2.98*** 0.028 2.79*** 
a_salesgrowth 429 0.460 95 0.378 392 0.480 0.082 0.34 -0.020 -0.131 
ln_a_mvequity 442 7.970 95 6.930 408 7.670 1.040 4.39*** 0.300 1.99** 
a_liquidity 443 0.470 96 0.420 408 0.482 0.050 2.12** -0.012 -0.28 
PANEL C: TARGET CHARACTERISTICS                     
t_tobinq 433 2.040 95 1.620 403 2.350 0.420 2.4** -0.310 -2.02** 
t_book_lev 433 0.453 95 0.494 403 0.440 -0.041 -1.29 0.013 0.63 
t_cashflow 405 -0.012 91 0.029 377 -0.010 -0.041 -1.32 -0.002 -0.14 
t_salesgrowth 411 0.217 92 0.386 379 0.229 -0.169 -1.16 -0.012 -0.171 
ln_t_mvequity 432 5.320 94 5.590 400 5.340 -0.270 -1.35 -0.020 -0.094 
t_liquidity 433 0.573 95 0.481 403 0.560 0.092 3.19*** 0.013 0.70 
1
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Second, the complicated nature of the deal may preclude the availability of 
initiation data for deals with SEC documents. As mentioned in Section 1.4.1, deals can 
take very interesting forms, especially when many buyers are involved in the process. 
This is reflected in the competition variable, which shows differences among 
“initiation” and “no initiation data” groups. Only 5.4% of “initiation” group deals 
involve a second bidder, while this ratio is 9% in the “no initiation data” group. As the 
number of buyer firms competing for the same target increases, initiation data become 
harder to find. 
  
1.9.4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
There could be many different components of information asymmetry between buyers 
and sellers of a good. In the case of mergers and acquisitions, verifying the quality of 
the target firm could be a major consideration during the negotiation process. If buyer 
firms cannot reliably validate whether the certification put forth by target firms is 
correct, then they could choose to insure themselves by offering lower purchasing 
prices to the target firms. 
SOX is intended to enhance the quality of disclosure practices of public firms
39
. 
Therefore, we would expect the information asymmetry between acquirer and target 
firms on the quality of documentation to be less severe after 2002 (assuming that SOX 
is effective). It is therefore legitimate to ask whether SOX had any effect on the 
premiums paid to the target firms with respect to initiation groups. 
To test this hypothesis, we add several interaction terms to our previous 
regressions that measure the effect of initiation before and after 2002. Table 1.11 
                                                 
39
 This act enforces several rules such as external auditor independence, management responsibility for 
the accuracy and completeness of financial statements and more efficient internal control mechanisms.  
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summarizes our results. In regressions (1) to (3), we use t_CAR as our dependent 
variable and bidpremium in (4) to (6). The coefficients of the interaction terms (e.g., 
init_after2002 in regression (1)) measure the additional effect of initiation after the act 
was passed in 2002. The interaction variables have negative and significant 
coefficients in regressions (4) and (5), meaning that the bid premium differences for 
buyer-initiated deals eroded after 2002. The remaining regressions show no 
significance for the interaction term, but the signs of these interaction variables are 
consistently negative (except when the initation_s variable is used).  
 
Table 1.11  
Cross-sectional regression analysis of target firm abnormal returns with time 
interaction variables 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. t_CAR stands for cumulative 
abnormal returns to the target firm 5 days around the announcement of the merger. To calculate abnormal returns, 
we use the market model, parameters of which are estimated over (-316,-64). bidpremium is the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns of the target firm stock starting 63 days before the announcement of the merger and ending at the 
deal closing date. If the deal closing day exceeds +126, we truncate the buy-and-hold period at this date. initiation 
is 1 if the deal is classified as buyer-initiated, and 0 if seller-initiated. after2002 is 1 if the deal is announced after 
2002. init_after2002 is an interaction variable, where initiation is multiplied with a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 for deals announced after 2002. initiation_b is 1 if the deal is buyer-initiated and 0 otherwise. initiation_s is 1 
if the deal is seller-initiated and 0 otherwise. Due to space limitations, the definition and calculation of deal and 
financial variables are explained in Appendix A.2. t-values are in parentheses, below the reported coefficients. 
Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. Regressions include industry 
dummies (not reported).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COEFFICIENT t_CAR t_CAR t_CAR bidpremium bidpremium bidpremium 
       
initiation 0.143***   0.347***   
 (3.853)   (4.115)   
init_after2002 -0.054   -0.296*   
 (-0.794)   (-1.912)   
after2002 -0.0366 -0.021 -0.0499** 0.197 0.111 0.008 
 (-0.661) (-0.809) (-2.027) (1.558) (1.628) (0.123) 
initiation_b  0.108***   0.263***  
  (4.294)   (3.979)  
init_b_after2002  -0.0572   -0.272**  
  (-1.219)   (-2.200)  
initiation_s   -0.104***   -0.212*** 
   (-3.592)   (-2.771) 
init_s_after2002   0.0541   0.126 
   (1.030)   (0.905) 
percentcash 0.0593 0.0603** 0.0616** -0.187* -0.0798 -0.0777 
 (1.344) (2.286) (2.324) (-1.859) (-1.147) (-1.110) 
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tender 0.0862** 0.0812*** 0.0958*** 0.0292 -0.0192 0.0156 
 (2.067) (3.084) (3.643) (0.307) (-0.277) (0.224) 
asset_related 0.0527 0.0333 0.0363* 0.0606 0.0972* 0.102* 
 (1.568) (1.602) (1.739) (0.791) (1.772) (1.855) 
competition -0.0974 -0.106*** -0.116*** 0.11 0.0403 0.0222 
 (-1.328) (-2.856) (-3.112) (0.661) (0.411) (0.226) 
unsolicited -0.0158 0.0359 0.0233 0.21 0.410*** 0.379*** 
 (-0.202) (0.878) (0.564) (1.179) (3.793) (3.476) 
completed -0.0139 -0.0221 -0.012 0.0617 0.361*** 0.383*** 
 (-0.205) (-0.687) (-0.370) (0.399) (4.251) (4.477) 
ln_rel_size -0.0271** -0.0295*** -0.0316*** -0.0901*** -0.0804*** -0.0835*** 
 (-2.492) (-4.626) (-4.945) (-3.647) (-4.775) (-4.939) 
a_tobinq -0.00679 0.0029 0.00243 0.0164 0.00854 0.00756 
 (-0.646) (0.883) (0.736) (0.685) (0.986) (0.867) 
a_book_lev -0.13 -0.0843* -0.0833* 0.2 -0.019 -0.0186 
 (-1.624) (-1.871) (-1.834) (1.093) (-0.160) (-0.155) 
a_cashflow 0.0218 -0.0781 -0.0627 0.513 -0.00213 0.0335 
 (0.154) (-1.243) (-0.996) (1.593) (-0.0129) (0.201) 
t_tobinq -0.0300* -0.0141** -0.0159** 0.0359 -0.018 -0.0226 
 (-1.964) (-2.103) (-2.363) (1.034) (-1.016) (-1.269) 
t_book_lev -0.173*** -0.0342 -0.0343 -0.106 -0.102 -0.103 
 (-2.604) (-0.904) (-0.903) (-0.700) (-1.016) (-1.024) 
t_cashflow -0.136 -0.0651 -0.0663 0.116 0.247 0.228 
 (-1.420) (-1.027) (-1.045) (0.530) (1.474) (1.361) 
t_salesgrowth 0.0172 0.0106 0.00589 -0.325*** -0.152*** -0.162*** 
 (0.476) (0.565) (0.312) (-3.949) (-3.065) (-3.239) 
t_liquidity -0.166* -0.0485 -0.0317 -0.464** -0.151 -0.112 
 (-1.870) (-0.940) (-0.612) (-2.296) (-1.110) (-0.819) 
ln_t_mvequity -0.00671 -0.0160** -0.0142** -0.0865*** -0.0592*** -0.0545*** 
 (-0.539) (-2.362) (-2.090) (-3.053) (-3.300) (-3.037) 
t_ROE -0.0113 0.00942 0.00799 0.0693 0.0439 0.0451 
 (-0.330) (0.491) (0.416) (0.886) (0.868) (0.889) 
t_R&D -0.0468 -0.0639 -0.0689 0.264 0.591** 0.574** 
 (-0.290) (-0.623) (-0.670) (0.717) (2.183) (2.110) 
t_capex 0.0125 0.148 0.172 -0.108 0.301 0.346 
 (0.047) (1.125) (1.303) (-0.179) (0.867) (0.990) 
t_dividend 0.438 0.457 0.822 -0.378 -0.638 0.299 
 (0.363) (0.487) (0.870) (-0.138) (-0.258) (0.120) 
Constant 0.814*** 0.665** 0.715*** 0.961 0.835 0.873 
  (2.615) (2.436) (2.625) (1.356) (1.160) (1.212) 
Observations 380 817 817 380 817 817 
R-squared 0.223 0.181 0.175 0.202 0.165 0.156 
 
In regression (1), we see that buyer-initiated deals have 14.3 percentage points 
larger CAR‟s than seller-initiated deals before 2002, and only 8.9 (14.3-5.4) 
percentage points after 2002. When the variable initiation_b is used in regression (2), 
we see a 10.8 percentage point difference before 2002 and 5.1 (10.8-5.7) percentage 
points after 2002. The picture is very similar in regressions (4) and (5), where bid 
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premium is used as a dependent variable. The premium difference in regression (4) is 
34.7 percentage points before 2002 and 5.1 after, while it is 26.3 and -0.9 percentage 
points, respectively, in regression (5). 
As Table 1.12 shows, there is not a clear turnaround of simple sub-sample mean 
premiums after SOX. Premiums paid to the target firms in year 2004 are higher in 
seller-initiated deals. For all remaining years, including years after 2002, buyer-
initiated deals dominate seller-initiated deals. We also note that sample sizes after 
2002 shrink significantly, reducing the informational content of the data and 
increasing the sample variance. 
 
Table 1.12  
Premiums paid to target firms with respect to years and initiation groups 
We draw our sample from the SDC database using the following restrictions: deal value is greater than $5 million, 
both acquirer and target are public firms located in the US, form of transaction is either „merger‟ or „acquisition of 
majority interest‟, deal status is „completed‟ or „withdrawn‟, no financial or utility firms and the deal announcement 
date falls in between 1/1/1997 and 12/31/2006. This sample is then matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. Deal initiation data comes from the SEC filings of the merging firms. The first column, N, shows 
number of buyer and seller-initiated deals with respect to years. t_CAR stands for cumulative abnormal returns to 
the target firm 5 days around the announcement of the merger. To calculate abnormal returns, we use the market 
model, parameters of which are estimated over (-316,-64).  bidpremium is the buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the 
target firm stock starting 63 days before the announcement of the merger and ending at the deal closing date. If the 
deal closing day exceeds +126, we truncate the buy-and-hold period at this date. The numbers in the table are the 
means of these variables. 
         
 N   t_CAR   bidpremium 
 Buyer-init. Seller-init.  Buyer-init. Seller-init.  Buyer-init. Seller-init. 
1997 31 30  0.23 0.14  0.58 0.29 
1998 39 20  0.29 0.16  0.36 0.08 
1999 51 21  0.34 0.2  0.81 0.63 
2000 27 23  0.34 0.24  0.65 0.44 
2001 20 28  0.47 0.26  0.45 0.4 
2002 21 11  0.47 0.3  0.64 0.1 
2003 15 19  0.43 0.25  0.91 0.73 
2004 19 8  0.18 0.28  0.22 0.35 
2005 19 12  0.27 0.12  0.47 0.22 
2006 18 11  0.22 0.17  0.35 0.12 
At first sight, the limited evidence on the decrease in bid premium differentials 
could be attributed to SOX, as it is one of the major events in financial markets that 
year. One can argue that SOX provided a more transparent environment for the due 
diligence process of buyer firms, removing the informational disadvantage. Thus, 
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there would be no reason for higher premiums paid to target firms in buyer-initiated 
deals after 2002. However, this statement comes with a caveat. The enactment of SOX 
in July 2002 follows the U.S. dot-com bubble and its subsequent collapse. The period 
before 2000 is characterized by high valuations and market volatility. Those kinds of 
market conditions could result in information asymmetries unrelated to frictions in 
documentation quality. Buyers could be extremely cautious about firms trying to sell 
themselves during this period, as this might be a strong signal for overvaluation. This 
could result in larger discounts in target firm premiums in seller-initiated deals.   
In summary, we find some evidence that target firms received larger premiums in 
buyer-initiated deals before 2002, and not after 2002. It remains unclear whether this 
change can be attributed to SOX. There are several layers of information symmetry 
and SOX attempts to reduce only a subset of them. Because the enactment of SOX 
follows the burst of the dot-com bubble and the economic crises surrounding 9/11, it is 
hard to disentangle their effects on M&A markets. 
 
1.10 Conclusion 
 
This paper shows that target firms receive significantly lower premiums when they 
decide to sell themselves, without prior solicitations. Average premiums paid to target 
firms, measured by CAR‟s around announcement dates, are 12 percentage points 
lower in seller-initiated deals. Our conjecture is that buyer firms are suspicious of 
firms selling themselves, as self-sale brings the target firm‟s quality into question. We 
cannot fully test the liquidity hypothesis due to data availability. However, preliminary 
evidence against this hypothesis is found in target firms receiving significantly higher 
premiums in buyer-initiated deals compared to seller-initiated deals in the period of 
1997 - 1999, a highly liquid period for market participants. As for the financial 
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distress hypothesis, we find that target firms are financially weaker in seller-initiated 
deals than in buyer-initiated deals, but being in financial distress does not affect the 
premiums paid to them.      
 Even though target firms are paid more in buyer-initiated deals, there is no 
overpayment from buyer firm shareholders to target firm shareholders in these types 
of deals. Buyer firms in both initiation groups experience an average of a 2% drop in 
their stock prices around the day of the merger announcement.  We observe 
synergistic gains in buyer-initiated deals, especially when the buyer acquires the target 
in a tender offer.  
Large, liquid and high return-on-equity buyer firms initiate deals more frequently. 
Larger target firms do not decide to sell themselves very often, relative to smaller 
target firms. There is some evidence that seller-initiated deals tend to close more often 
after they are publicly announced. This is most likely due to the consent of the target 
firm managers in this type of deal, as opposed to hostile deals in which there may be 
managerial resistance to the merger. Finally, we show that higher premiums paid to 
target firms in buyer-initiated deals weakened after 2002. Whether the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002 is the main cause of convergence in premiums across initiation groups 
remains an open question. 
There are potential limitations to these findings. First, although the set of control 
variables is large and includes various deal and financial characteristics of the merging 
firms, it is possible that initiation dummies capture the effect of an omitted variable. 
Second, it is legitimate to question whether the results in this paper are applicable to 
different time periods. Information asymmetries could be manifested only in high 
valuation and volatility periods (such as the sample period considered), and this might 
be the primary cause for premium differences. 
Deal initiation data could add new perspectives to the ongoing debates in several 
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areas of the M&A literature. For example, it would be interesting to examine the 
relationship between the level of private competition [Boone and Mulherin (2007)] 
and deal initiation in takeover markets. When a seller decides to sell itself, how many 
potential buyers do they contact? Does negotiation with a single buyer imply lower 
premiums? In buyer-initiated deals, do target firms usually contact other potential 
buyers after receiving an initial offer?  
Another potentially interesting field able to make use of the deal initiation data 
could be earnings management. Erickson and Wang (1999) document earnings 
management practices of acquirers in stock-for-stock mergers. Is earnings 
management more common in buyer-initiated deals? Do target firms manage earnings 
before they decide to sell themselves? What other kinds of enhancements do target 
firms use prior to contacting potential buyers?  
It would also be interesting to analyze the existence of premium differences across 
initiation groups for the set of firms that are excluded from our sample, such as 
financial institutions and (separately) utility firms. Private firms, which do not exist in 
our sample, could be an appropriate sample to test the information asymmetry 
hypothesis. For example potential buyers could be very cautious about a private firm 
selling itself rather than a public firm selling itself. Private firms are more likely to be 
opaque entities compared to public firms, releasing minimal information to outside. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CORPORATE FINANCING AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS WHEN 
INVESTORS HAVE INFORMATION THAT OTHER INVESTORS DO NOT 
HAVE 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
One of the central questions in corporate finance is the optimality of investment and 
financing decisions of firms. In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
show that financing decisions of firms are irrelevant for maximizing firm value in 
frictionless markets. Several authors point out that the underlying assumptions leading 
to this result could be too strict in some cases, hence capital structure decisions of 
firms may matter for firm value. For example, Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
themselves recognize the trade-off between the tax advantage of debt financing and 
the financial distress costs it brings. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the 
objectives of the managers and the shareholders do not always coincide, and financing 
decisions could mitigate or exacerbate such frictions. 
 In addition to the trade-off and agency hypothesis of corporate financing, Myers 
and Majluf (1984) (hereinafter MM) and Myers (1984) note that markets are not 
always characterized with perfect information. In particular, there are information 
asymmetries between the managers of the firm and outside investors which have 
significant consequences for the choice of financing. The managers of the firm have 
access to inside information and hence know more about the quality of the firm than 
outside investors. This adverse selection problem, as described in Akerlof (1970), 
results in a pecking order for financing: firms first use financing tools that are least 
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sensitive to asymmetric information and then move onto other sources of financing. 
The pecking order theory therefore suggests that firms use cash, then debt and finally 
equity to finance their operations. 
 In this paper, we add another layer of information asymmetry into the original MM 
model. We analyze financing decisions of firms when there is information asymmetry 
among the set of outside investors. In other words, we consider cases in which outside 
investors have differential information about the quality of the firm that they are 
investing in. Note here that the original MM model assumes that the set of outside 
investors are homogenous and the only information asymmetry is between the 
managers of the firm and outside investors. As in Agarwal and O'Hara (2007), we call 
the information asymmetry among the set of outside investors the extrinsic 
information asymmetry (EIA) and the information asymmetry between the firm and 
investors the intrinsic information asymmetry (IIA). 
 There are different ways to incorporate EIA in the original MM setup. It would be 
very convenient from the modelling perspective to assume that the investors have 
static heterogenous beliefs. However, it is more powerful and realistic to have 
investors that have differential information in equilibrium, rather than assuming it in 
the first place. We therefore use a model in which investors learn from every 
information source available to them and update their beliefs accordingly. The type of 
model used in this paper is first introduced by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and used 
in several other contexts (e.g. Easley and O'Hara (2004) and Veldkamp (2006)). 
Similar to these papers, there are two types of investors in our model: uninformed 
investors receive only public information about asset payoffs while informed investors 
receive additional private signals. Therefore, informed investors have a better estimate 
of the underlying payoff distribution than the uninformed. However, uninformed 
investors are not limited to public level information in forming their beliefs. They also 
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use the equilibrium price to learn about the private information held by the informed 
investors. In other words, the price that arises in this partially revealing rational 
expectations equilibrium reveals a portion of the private information held by informed 
investors. 
 The EIA between investors is measured by the proportion of the number of public 
signals to the total number of signals. If there is more private information available to 
informed investors, then the EIA between investors is higher. We prove that if the EIA 
measure is higher, then the equilibrium stock price is lower. This aspect of our model 
is very similar to the arguments put forth in Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002) and 
Easley and O'Hara (2004). If there is less public information available to uninformed 
investors, they hold less of the stock as they know that their information is not as 
accurate. The drop in their demand causes the equilibrium stock price to go down. 
This result has a direct implication for corporate financing. If a firm needs to finance a 
real investment project that costs a fixed amount, then financing it through equity 
would be more costly, as the firm needs to sell equity at a lower price. Therefore high 
EIA results in a low stock price, which in turn reduces the payoff of the firm from 
equity financing. 
Introducing EIA into the MM model is important for several reasons. Most 
importantly, our paper shows how the EIA between investors affect the financing 
decisions of firms. In their empirical study, Agarwal and O'Hara (2007) show that 
firms with high EIA, measured by Probability of Informed Trading (PIN)
40
, have 
higher leverage ratios. Using an index of information asymmetry, Bharath, 
Pasquariello and Wu (2006) provides empirical evidence that higher EIA leads to 
higher leverage ratios. Our paper thus provides a theoretical basis for their results. 
 Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we explain the model in detail. 
                                                 
40
 For more on PIN, see Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002). 
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This includes firm's and investors' optimization problems, the information structure 
and the timing of events in this economy. We also show that a partially revealing 
rational expectations equilibrium exists for this economy. In Section 2.3, we go over 
our main result, which is the effect of EIA on financing decisions of firms. We discuss 
several aspects of our modelling choice in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2.2 A model of extrinsic information asymmetry 
 
Our model is based on three periods. In the first period, the firm chooses how many 
shares to issue and sell in the market, for the purpose of financing a real project. In the 
second period, investors form their optimal portfolios conditional on their information 
sets and the number of shares issued by the firm in the first period. In the last period, 
investors learn the realization of the random stock return and consume their terminal 
wealth. Besides the firm and investors, there is an investment bank providing 
consulting services to the firm in choosing the number of shares to issue in period one. 
 
2.2.1 The firm 
 
The firm faces a real investment project, which costs 𝐸 > 0 dollars and returns a 
random 𝑏  dollars, net of 𝐸. The project can't be divided into smaller pieces. That is, 
the firm either invests 𝐸 to finance the project or not at all. We assume that the firm 
has no internal resources or capacity to issue debt to finance the project. Therefore, 
equity financing is the only option for the firm. The firm has a net value of 𝑎 > 0 
dollars prior to investing in the project. 𝐸and 𝑎 are known to all parties in the model, 
whereas the realization of 𝑏 , denoted by 𝑏, is only known to the manager. 
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 In period one, the firm hires an investment bank to determine how many shares it 
needs to sell in period two to finance the project. That is, the manager would like to 
find 𝑆, the number of shares to be sold in period two, such that the net proceeds from 
equity offering, (1 − 𝜅)𝑃(𝑆)𝑆, equals 𝐸. Here, 𝑃(𝑆) is the stock price in period two 
when 𝑆 shares are sold in the market, and 0 < 𝜅 < 1 is the underwriting fee of the 
investment bank in percentage terms. 
 The firm maximizes the payoff of existing shareholders in the final period, 
(𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑆0 − 𝑆). The total number of shares, 𝑆0, is normalized to 1. As a result, 
the manager faces the following problem in period one, 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑆∈ℝ Π =  𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏  1 − 𝑆  
 𝑠. 𝑡  1 − 𝜅 𝑃 𝑆 𝑆 = 𝐸 (2.1) 
 0 < 𝑆 < 1 
 We denote the solution to this problem as 𝑆∗. Note here that the existing 
shareholders' payoff can be set in another way. If the firm issues new shares without 
taking away from the existing shareholders, then the objective function of the firm 
should be written as (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)[𝑆0/(𝑆0 + 𝑆)]. Our specification assumes that the 
total number of shares of the firm is fixed at 𝑆0, meaning that the existing shareholders 
sell a portion of their shares to raise capital in the market. While these two objective 
functions are technically different from each other, there is little conceptual distinction 
between the two. We use the one in (2.1) due to its technical ease. 
 
2.2.2 Investors 
 
In the beginning of the second period, each investor learns 𝑆∗, the number of shares 
the firm is selling. Combining this information with their knowledge of 𝐸,𝑎 and 
signals on 𝑏 , they form their optimal portfolios. Investors, all of whom have Constant 
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Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility functions, are of two types; informed and 
uninformed. There is a total of 𝑁 > 0 investors and 0 < 𝜆 < 1 proportion of them are 
informed
41
. The investors are identical except for their information sets. Uninformed 
investors receive a total of 𝐼1 > 0 independent public signals about 𝑏 . Given 𝑏, these 
signals are distributed normal; 𝑠𝑖|𝑏 ∼ 𝑁(𝑏, 1/𝛾) where 𝛾 > 0 is the precision of the 
signal. In addition to the 𝐼1 public signals, informed investors receive 𝐼2 − 𝐼1 > 0 
independent private signals. Let 𝛼 = 𝐼1/𝐼2 denote the proportion of signals that are 
public. The common prior for 𝑏  is, 𝑏  ~ 𝑁(𝑏 , 1/𝜌), with 𝜌 > 0. 
 There are two assets in the market; the riskless asset and the stock of the firm. 
Each investor is endowed with 𝑊0 > 0 amount of the riskless asset. The riskless asset 
pays off 1 dollar for each dollar invested, while the risky stock pays off a random 
𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏  dollars42. The difference between informed and uninformed investors' 
portfolios comes through 𝑏 ; informed investors have better information about the 
distribution of 𝑏 , as they receive more signals than the uninformed investors. 
 The investors' problems are, 
 Max d,m∈ℝ E e
−δW 1 I  
 s. t P S∗ d + m ≤ W0 (2.2) 
 ud + m ≥ W1 
where 𝑑 and 𝑚 are the amount of stock and the riskless asset the investors' demand, 
respectively. 𝑃(𝑆∗) is the stock price given that the manager decides to issue 𝑆∗ 
number of shares in period one, 𝐼 is the information set of the investor, 𝛿 > 0 is the 
risk aversion coefficient and 𝑢 = 𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏  is the random stock payoff that is realized 
in period three. 
                                                 
41
 We assume that  𝜆 is exogenous throughout our analysis: endogenous information acquisition is not 
studied in this paper. 
42
 If instead we use the other specification of the firm's objective function where the total number of 
shares outstanding is increasing in the number of new shares issued, then the per share stock payoff 
depends on the number of new shares issued, which makes the investors' problem more complicated. 
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 Investors are on the demand side for the firm's stock. The supply side consists of 
the firm and noise traders. Without noise traders, uninformed investors can extract the 
private signals of the informed investors from the equilibrium price, resulting in a 
fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium. Therefore, we assume that there is a 
random noisy supply of stock (per capita) in period two, 𝑥 ∼ 𝑁(𝑥 , 1/𝜂) with 𝑥 , 𝜂 > 0, 
in addition to the 𝑆∗ shares issued by the firm in the first period. Note here that the 
realization of this random variable, as well as all public and private signals are known 
by the firm in period one. 
 
2.2.3 Equilibrium 
 
We start with the definition of the equilibrium for this model. 
 
Definition 2.1 Given parameters (W0, λ,α, δ, κ, a, E, x , b , γ, ρ, η), the tuple (dI
∗, dU
∗ , S∗) 
and P(S∗) > 0 constitute a "two-period equilibrium" if, 
(i) dI
∗ (respectively dU
∗ ) solves informed agents' (uninformed agents') problems in the 
second period, (2.2), conditional on their information set and P(S∗), 
(ii) S∗ solves the firm's problem in the first period, (2.1), conditional on its information 
set, 
(iii) the stock market clears in the second period.  
 
 Since the players in this model take actions in turn, the firm in period one and 
investors in period two, we can show the existence of equilibrium period by period. It 
is more intuitive to start with period two. 
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2.2.3.1 Period 2 
 
In the beginning of period two, investors learn the realization of all public signals for 
𝑏, how many shares the firm is selling (𝑆∗), the total cost of the investment (𝐸) and the 
current value of the firm (𝑎). In addition to these, informed investors also receive their 
private signals. Note here that learning about 𝑆∗ and 𝐸 implies by (2.1) that investors 
know the realization of P(S∗). This does not provide investors with new information 
as they reach this equilibrium price after trading their shares in the market. The 
important point is that investors take P S∗  as given. 
 The combination of a CARA utility function with a normal distribution results in a 
neat use of the moment generating function for a normal distribution. The solution to 
(2.2) becomes, 
 𝑑|𝐼 =
𝐸 𝑢 𝐼 −𝑃 𝑆∗ 
𝛿𝑉𝑎𝑟  𝑢 𝐼 
 (2.3) 
The advantage of this stock demand function is that it does not depend on investors' 
wealths. Hence, our results are purely a consequence of differential information 
between investors. 
 The informed investors use both public and private signals to update their beliefs 
on 𝑏 . Since a normal distribution is conjugate to itself, the posterior of 𝑏 , after 
receiving all 𝐼2 signals is: 
 b I ∼ N 
b ρ+  ‍
I2
i=1 si γ
ρ+I2γ
,
1
ρ+I2γ
  (2.4) 
where 𝑏 𝐼 stands for the informed investors' posterior. Therefore, their demand for the 
risky asset is, 
  dI =
E+a+
b ρ+  ‍
I2
i=1
si γ
ρ+I2γ
−P S∗ 
δ 
1
ρ+I2γ
 
=
b ρ+  ‍
I2
i=1 si γ− P S
∗ −E−a  ρ+I2γ 
δ
  (2.5) 
 Uninformed investors have two sources of information to update their beliefs on 𝑏 ; 
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public information (𝐼1 public signals) and the equilibrium price function they 
conjecture: 
P(S∗) = c1(E + a) + c2b + c3  ‍
αI2
i=1 si + c4  ‍
I2
i=αI2+1
si − c5x + c6x − c7(
S∗
N
) (2.6) 
where 𝑐𝑖 's are coefficients to be determined after solving for equilibrium. 
 Uninformed investors create the signal 𝜃 from this function, 
 θ =
P(S∗)−(c1(E+a)+c2b +c3  ‍
α I2
i=1 si )+(c5−c6)x +c7(
S∗
N
)
c4(1−α)I2
 (2.7) 
 =
 ‍
I2
i=α I2+1
si
(1−α)I2
−
c5
c4(1−α)I2
(x − x ) 
 Using the right hand side of (2.7), it can be seen that 𝜃|𝑏 ∼ 𝑁(𝑏, 1/𝜌𝜃) where, 
 ρθ = [
1
γ(1−α)I2
+
1
(
c 4(1−α )I2
c 5
)2η
]−1 (2.8) 
 Applying Bayes rule twice - using 𝐼1 public signals and then 𝜃 - gives the posterior 
of uninformed investors as, 
 b U ∼ N(
b ρ+( ‍
α I2
i=1 si )γ+θρθ
ρ+αI2γ+ρθ
,
1
ρ+αI2γ+ρθ
) (2.9) 
 So their demand for the risky asset is, 
 dU =
E+a+
b ρ+( ‍
α I2
i=1
si )γ+θρθ
ρ+α I2γ+ρθ
−P(S∗)
δ(
1
ρ+α I2γ+ρθ
)
 (2.10) 
 =
b ρ+( ‍
α I2
i=1 si )γ+θρθ−(P(S
∗)−E−a)(ρ+αI2γ+ρθ )
δ
 
 Solving for the equilibrium from here involves equating stock demand to the stock 
supply. 
 
Proposition 2.2 A partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium exists in 
period two, with the following equilibrium price function: 
P(S∗) = c1(E + a) + c2b + c3  ‍
αI2
i=1
si + c4  ‍
I2
i=αI2+1
si − c5x + c6x − c7(
S∗
N
) 
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where 
c1 = 1, c2 =
ρ/δ
Den
> 0, c3 =
γ/δ
Den
> 0, c4 =
λγ
δ
+
(1−λ )ρθ
δ(1−α )I2
Den
> 0, c5 =
1+
(1−λ )ρθ
(1−α )I2
 
1
λγ
Den
> 0 
c6 =
 1−λ ρθ
 1−α I2
1
λγ
Den
> 0, c7 =
1
Den
> 0 
Den =
1
δ
[λ(ρ + γI2) + (1 − λ)(ρ + γαI2 + ρθ)] > 0 
ρθ = [
1
γ(1 − α)I2
+
1
(
λγ(1 − α)I2
δ )
2η
]−1 > 0 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
2.2.3.2 Period 1 
 
The manager of the firm can alter the stock price that arises in the second period by 
changing 𝑆 in the first period. Since the firm needs to raise a fixed amount of capital 
from the investors, there is a negative relation between the number of shares issued 
and the share price. The constraint in the firm's problem reflects this fact. 
 In order to solve its problem, the firm needs to know the equilibrium stock price 
that will arise in period two if it issues 𝑆 shares in period one. We assume that the 
investment bank has the necessary expertise and the experience to figure this out for 
the firm. It might be better to think of roadshows performed by the investment banks 
in the IPO or SEO process for justifying this assumption. 
 Given the price function 𝑃(𝑆), the firm's problem is to solve (1 − 𝜅)𝑃(𝑆)𝑆 = 𝐸 
while maximizing the objective function in (2.1). 
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Proposition 2.3 There exists a unique solution to the firm's problem in the first period, 
(2.1),  
 S∗ =
−B+ B2−4AC
2A
 
if, 
(a) B2 ≥ 4AC 
(b) S∗ < 1 
where  
A = −
c7
N
 
B = c1(E + a) + c2b + c3  ‍
αI2
i=1
si + c4  ‍
I2
i=αI2+1
si − c5x + c6x  
C = −
E
(1 − κ)
 
 Proof. See Appendix B. 
 In accordance with Definition 2.1, we can combine the results in Proposition 2.2 
and 2.3 to claim that an overall rational expectations equilibrium exists for the 
economy if the necessary conditions are satisfied. 
 
Proposition 2.4 A "two-period equilibrium" exists, provided that the conditions in 
Proposition 2.3 are satisfied.  
 
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.3. 
 
2.3 Extrinsic information asymmetry and financing decisions 
 
We completed the setup of our model in the previous section. As Proposition 2.4 
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shows, a two period equilibrium exists for this economy conditional on appropriate 
parameter values. We are now ready to examine the relation between extrinsic 
information asymmetry and the payoff to the firm from equity financing. 𝛼, the 
proportion of signals that are public, measures the extrinsic information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors. As 𝛼 goes up, informed investors receive 
fewer private signals about the net investment payoff, pushing their information set 
closer to uninformed investors'. Note here that a comparative static exercise with 𝛼 
keeps the total number of signals, 𝐼2, constant. This means that the total amount of 
information available to outside investors, hence the intrinsic information asymmetry 
between the firm and the outsiders, is the same. Difficulties arise when one tries 
finding proxies for extrinsic and intrinsic information asymmetries to test this 
prediction using data. 
 The firm's objective is to maximize the payoff to the existing shareholders. As 
long as the firm raises the required capital to finance the project, the old shareholders 
are better off by selling a small number of shares at a high price, as this maximizes the 
number of shares retained by them. The effect of extrinsic information asymmetry has 
its primary impact in period two, when the shares of the firm are traded in the market. 
Therefore, the crucial endogenous variable that should be followed is the equilibrium 
stock price. If extrinsic information asymmetry among investors depresses the 
equilibrium stock price in period two, then the firm has to issue more shares to raise 
the required amount. In this sense, our model very much resembles the one in Easley 
and O'Hara (2004). The authors' comparative static objective in this paper is to 
identify the parameters that alter the equilibrium cost of capital, which is basically the 
expected payoff minus the expected stock price. Their comparative static result also 
heavily depends on the equilibrium stock price. 
 Showing the effect of 𝛼 on the firm's objective function is simply a comparative 
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static exercise. Rather than performing this exercise for a particular economy in which 
the random signals have been realized, we show the effect of extrinsic information 
asymmetry on the expected payoff to the firm. This expected payoff could be 
interpreted as the payoff of the firm when this economy is repeated many times. Since 
our objective is to describe how firms' financing decisions change due to systematic 
differences in information, this choice seem to be more appropriate. To be more 
concrete, we state the firm's problem for this "average" economy as: 
Max E S ∈ℝ Π =  E + a + b  1 − E S   
 s. t  1 − κ E P S  E S = E (2.11) 
0 < 𝐸{S} < 1 
 The investors' problem is the same as in (2.2). Lemma 2.5 below proves that there 
exists a solution for this "average" economy. 
 
Lemma 2.5 There exists a unique solution to the firm's problem in (2.11),  
 E{S∗} =
(E+a+b −
x 
Den
)− (E+a+b −
x 
Den
)2−4
1
N (Den )
E
(1−κ )
2
1
N (Den )
 
if, 
(a) (E + a + b −
x 
Den
)2 > 4
1
N(Den )
E
(1−κ)
 
(b) 0 < 𝐸{S∗} < 1 
Proof. See Appendix B.    
 We are now ready to do comparative statics to show the effect of extrinsic 
information asymmetry on the firm's expected payoff. We also show in Proposition 
2.6 below how this expected payoff is affected by other parameters in the model. 
 
 
 78 
Proposition 2.6 If an equilibrium exists for the economy defined in (2.11), the firm's 
expected payoff is higher if, 
(i) The proportion of public signals, α, is higher 
(ii) The total number of signals, 𝐼2, is higher 
(iii) The number of investors in the economy, 𝑁, is higher 
(iv) The proportion of informed traders, 𝜆, is higher 
(v) The precision of signals, 𝛾, is higher 
(vi) The precision of the noisy supply, 𝜂, is higher 
(vii) The precision of the prior of the investment return, 𝜌, is higher 
(viii) The net value of the firm, 𝑎, is higher 
(ix) The mean of the prior of the investment return, 𝑏 , is higher 
(x) The mean of the noisy supply, 𝑥 , is lower 
(xi) The risk aversion coefficient of investors, 𝛿, is lower 
(xii) The investment bank commission rate, 𝜅, is lower.  
 
Proof. See Appendix B.    
 As this proposition shows, the firm is better off when there is less extrinsic 
information asymmetry among investors. To understand this result better, suppose that 
for a given economy one of the private signals available to informed investors 
becomes public information. Informed investors' stock demand is not affected by this 
change as they still possess superior information about the project payoff. However, 
uninformed investors' demand for stock changes. They still extract a portion of 
informed investors' private information through the equilibrium price, but now they 
know the realization of one of the signals that became public. Having a better 
assessment of the payoff distribution, uninformed investors demand more of the risky 
stock pushing the overall demand for stock higher and this results in an increase in the 
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stock price. A higher stock price is better for the firm, because it reduces the number 
of shares to be issued to finance the project. 
 An increase in the total number of signals raises the stock demands of both 
informed and uninformed investors, resulting in an increase in the expected stock 
price. The per capita supply of shares, 𝑆/𝑁 decreases in 𝑁, therefore an increase in the 
total number of investors reduces the supply of the stock, pushing the expected stock 
price higher. An increase in the proportion of informed traders in the market leads to a 
more informative equilibrium price for uninformed investors, leading to a higher 
equilibrium stock price. The interpretations of the remaining comparative static results 
are left for the reader. We provide the comparative statics results in Table 2.1 below. 
 
Table 2.1 
Comparative Statics 
Parameter 
The sign of the marginal effect of the 
parameter on firm’s expected payoff 
from equity financing 
α + 
I2 + 
N + 
λ + 
γ + 
η + 
ρ + 
𝑎 + 
𝑏  + 
𝑥 - 
δ - 
κ - 
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2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Our modelling choice for incorporating extrinsic information asymmetry 
 
There could be many ways to incorporate extrinsic information asymmetry in an 
economic model. In order to understand the reason as to why we chose this particular 
setup, we start with the MM model and extend it piece by piece. 
 The MM model assumes risk neutral and homogeneous investors, where each 
investor has the same information set. Furthermore, the state space is discrete rather 
than continuous. Extrinsic information asymmetry could be introduced in this simple 
model by assuming investors with heterogenous beliefs. If the state space consists of 
only the "good" and the "bad" state, each investor could have his own beliefs over 
these states. For example, an optimistic investor could think that the probability of a 
good state is 2/3, while a pessimistic investor could think that it is 1/3. With risk 
neutral investors that have no budget constraints, there would be no equilibrium in this 
model. At least one investor would think that the price is wrong, and would demand 
an infinite amount of stock. This particular investor would be the one whose belief is 
not incorporated in the stock price. We could potentially solve this problem by 
introducing wealth constraints, but then our results would depend on the magnitude of 
the wealth constraints. Another problem with heterogeneous beliefs (with common 
knowledge) is that all investors are aware of each others' beliefs. For example in the 
example above, the optimistic investor knows that the pessimistic investor thinks that 
the likelihood of the good state is 2/3. Similarly, the pessimistic investor knows about 
the optimistic investor's beliefs. In a sense, investors agree to disagree on the 
probability distribution over the two states: they do not update their own beliefs even 
if they perfectly know what others think. While this type of static beliefs could be 
appropriate for some cases, we believe that financial markets are better characterized 
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by investors who update their information after observing others' actions. If Warren 
Buffet's actions or beliefs were fully observable by investors in the market, then most 
investors would update their own beliefs rather than ignore them completely. 
 Because of these reasons, we need a non-static information updating model to 
show the effect of extrinsic information asymmetry on firm's financing policies. A 
candidate of this type of models is the one introduced in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). 
This type of model lets investors update their beliefs using the observables in the 
economy. This is the primary reason for our modelling choice. 
 On the other hand, our choice of modelling brings in several complexities that are 
not present in the simple MM model. Most importantly, the firm's investment decision 
is static unlike in the MM model. It is possible in their setup that a firm's decision to 
issue equity signals to the investors that the firm’s‍ prospects is not good (the bad 
state). This means that issuing equity reveals valuable information held by the firm to 
the investors. In our model, this is not easy to do. If the firm has the choice of 
undertaking the investment, i.e. the firm can choose to finance the project with equity 
or not undertake the project at all, then equity financing should reveal information on 
the realization of the net project payoff, 𝑏, to the investors. Since the state space is 
continuous, this brings a truncation of the priors held by the investors. Truncated 
normal distributions do not have appealing analytical solutions, which makes the 
model quite complicated. Therefore, our model prohibits investors learning from the 
actions of the firm. 
 
2.4.2 The relation between intrinsic and extrinsic information asymmetry 
 
As mentioned earlier, EIA is defined as the information asymmetry among outside 
investors while the IIA is defined as the information asymmetry between the firm and 
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the outside investors. As in our model, we assume that the firm always knows more 
than the outside investors: the firm learns about the realization of the random project 
payoff, while investors have their own priors for the distribution of the project payoff. 
With this assumption, it becomes clear that extrinsic information asymmetry is simply 
a general case of intrinsic information asymmetry. It is conceivable to question what 
this generalization adds to the MM model. After all, extrinsic information asymmetry 
could be incorporated in an intrinsic information asymmetry model by creating a 
representative investor whose beliefs reflect all of the existing beliefs in the economy. 
Then it would be enough to look at the intrinsic information asymmetry between the 
representative investor and the firm. 
 Even though this argument is consequentially correct, extrinsic information 
asymmetry brings fresh perspectives to the theory originated by Myers and Majluf 
(1984). It goes into the source of the information asymmetry concept and provides a 
more realistic depiction of it. It would be naive to assume that every investor in the 
market has the same information set. Some investors know more and some investors 
know less about firms' prospects. Market participants also learn from the actions of 
each other, constantly updating their information sets. It is important to include these 
facts into our models because they provide a better understanding of market 
mechanics, which is quite valuable for policy recommendations. Our model lets us 
measure the exact effect of extrinsic information asymmetry on the financing choices 
of firms. Firms with high extrinsic information asymmetry could take actions, such as 
improving their disclosure practices, to reduce this information asymmetry. If 
disclosure is costly, what is the optimal amount of disclosure? What is the point where 
marginal benefit of increased disclosure equals the marginal cost of increased 
disclosure? Our model could potentially be extended to answer these types of 
questions. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we present a modification of the MM model with investors having 
differential information on project payoffs. Uninformed investors know only about the 
public information while informed investors held extra private information in addition 
to the public information. We show that a partially revealing rational expectations 
equilibrium exists for this economy where uninformed investors rationally update their 
beliefs by using the equilibrium price they observe. On the other hand, the firm sells 
stock to these investors to finance a real project it faces. The objective of the firm is to 
maximize the wealth of its existing shareholders meaning that the firm prefers to sell a 
small number of shares at a higher price to minimize dilution. We show that when the 
EIA among investors is high, the trading price of the firm's equity is low. Therefore 
the firm needs to sell more shares at this depressed price to finance the project. This 
makes the existing shareholders worse off. 
 There are limitations to our model. The original MM model lets investors 
rationally update their beliefs by observing firm's investment or financing decisions. In 
a special MM model, the firm undertakes the investment only in bad states, so the act 
of investment signals to the investors that the state is bad. In our model, investors do 
not rationally update their beliefs when they observe the firm investing. If they do, 
their beliefs should follow the distribution of a truncated normal, and this makes the 
analytical solution quite complicated. 
 Our model could potentially be extended to analyze the relation between 
disclosure decisions of firms and their choice of financing. If the EIA between 
investors increases the cost of equity financing, then firms that need equity financing 
could disclose more information to reduce the EIA between investors.  
 84 
 
In other words, firms decide jointly on their disclosure and financing decisions. This 
would be an interesting empirical test of our model. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PAST STOCK PERFORMANCES OF THE MERGING FIRMS AND THE 
GAINS FROM TAKEOVERS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This paper aims to accomplish two goals. The first one is to show the matching 
characteristics of the merging firms in M&A deals based on their financial ratios. The 
second one is to pick a rather underemphasized variable among the set of such 
characteristics, past stock returns (psr43) of the merging firms, and examine its role in 
explaining their abnormal returns around the announcement of the merger to the 
public.  
 It is important to understand which types of acquirers match with what types of 
targets for two reasons. From the perspective of a merger arbitrageur, whose objective 
is to predict takeover targets and profit from buying their stock cheap before the 
merger announcement and selling them afterwards at a higher acquisition price, it 
might be an important piece of information to know the types of firms a buyer firm 
could possibly match with. Conditional upon making an acquisition, matching 
characteristics could reduce the set of possible targets the buyer can acquire, hence 
improve the prediction accuracy of the merger arbitrageur. Second, establishing the 
evidence on matching characteristics provides a strong incentive to understand 
endogenous matching models recently emerging in the finance literature. This strand 
of literature argues that the matching process inherent in markets could lead to severe 
                                                 
43
 As we discuss in Section 3.2, we measure psr as the stock returns in the year prior to the merger 
announcement date, in excess of the industry returns that the firm belongs to. We use Fama-French 49 
industry classifications in calculating abnormal returns.    
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estimation biases. For example, Sorensen (2007) argues that there are two components 
to estimating whether a private firm with a venture capital (VC) partner will end up 
doing an initial public offering (IPO). The first component is the direct effect of the 
experience of the VC on the IPO rate, and the second one is the fact that more 
experienced VC‟s tend to invest in better firms, hence the IPO rate is a natural cause 
of the quality of the firm. He argues that this matching process – experienced VC‟s 
investing in better firms – has a significant portion of the IPO rate. Our objective here 
is to show that such a matching process also takes place in the M&A markets. Buyer 
and target firms presumably match based on some characteristics which we aim to 
discover44. 
 Our analysis shows that financial characteristics of the merging firms are indeed 
highly correlated. Market caps, psr‟s, Tobin‟s Q ratios, cash flows, cash holdings of 
the merging firms are significantly and highly positively correlated. Firms tend to 
merge with firms that resemble themselves. Our deduction here is that the endogenous 
matching process between merging firms leads to a correlation between financial 
characteristics. If this matching process causes a correlation between such 
observables, it is very likely that there is a correlation between unobservables that are 
excluded from analysis.  
 Past stock returns of the merging firms is an important matching characteristic, 
which we explore intensively in this paper. It has been used in Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990) to analyze managerial incentives in making acquisitions, in Hayward 
and Hambrick (1997) to measure CEO hubris, and Rosen (2006) to distinguish firm 
specific momentum from industry momentum in explaining abnormal returns of the 
merging firms. Having established the relationship between psr‟s of the merging firms, 
                                                 
44
 The endogenous matching idea has been explored in at least two papers in the finance literature. 
Akkus (2008) analyzes the underpricing in IPO markets while Park (2008) analyzes M&A activity in 
the mutual fund industry.   
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our objective here is to consider both of the merging firm‟s psr‟s in explaining each 
firm‟s abnormal returns around the merger announcement date.   
 We consider several hypotheses to explain the effect of merging firms‟ psr‟s on 
their event day returns. For the buyer firm, the neoclassical hypothesis (labeled as 
H.A.1) predicts that value creating firms are more likely to spill their efficiencies to 
the firms that they acquire. Therefore, acquirers that performed well in the recent past 
should make better acquisitions, leading to positive stock price reactions at their 
merger announcement dates. On the other hand, loser firm managers demonstrate 
inability to run their firms efficiently as evidenced by their recent stock returns, hence 
their acquisition decisions should also be destroying value. The same line of reasoning 
is put forth by Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989), but their way of measuring 
managerial efficiency is based on Tobin‟s Q ratio rather than psr. Both measures have 
advantages over the other, but the main advantage of psr is that it is a flow variable 
rather than a stock variable like Tobin‟s Q, so it is a better measure of how the 
managers did just before the merger announcement. On the other hand, being a stock 
variable, Tobin‟s Q could potentially be polluted by corporate decisions made much 
earlier. 
 Roll‟s (1986) hubris hypothesis predicts just the opposite of the neoclassical 
hypothesis: managers could build hubris due to their superior performance and 
overestimate their abilities in running other businesses (H.A.2). This results in 
acquisitions that do not maximize shareholder value, causing a drop in the share value 
at the announcement date. For loser firm managers, stopping the losing streak is the 
priority for their survival, meaning that they should exert more effort to maximize 
shareholder value and merge with a partner that could turn the trend around.  
 The final hypothesis for acquirers works in the same direction as the hubris 
hypothesis, but for a different reason. The overvaluation hypothesis (H.A.3) claims 
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that when the stock prices of firms increases to unsustainable levels, such firms could 
decide to take advantage of their high valuations to acquire other companies. The 
relative acquisition price of other firms would significantly be lower when these 
overvalued firms use their stock as a currency to pay the target firm shareholders. 
Hence, overvalued buyer firms do not miss this opportunity and go for an acquisition 
not because the merger maximizes value but because targets are undervalued 
compared to the acquirers. Target firm managers are aware of this overvaluation but 
they accept it nevertheless, as buyer firm managers bribe them by extra compensation 
from the completion of the merger or continued employment at the acquired firm. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) discuss the details of this hypothesis in another context to 
explain why mergers happen in waves. Note here that this hypothesis assumes that 
markets are not always efficient: market values could deviate from their fundamental 
values significantly. 
  We do not find compelling evidence for the first two hypotheses. High psr 
acquirers do not experience significantly different returns from the low psr ones. Their 
payments to target firms also do not differ from each other. That is, premiums 
received by target firms do not depend on the psr‟s of the acquiring firms. However, 
our analysis supports the overvaluation hypothesis. High psr firms use stock more 
often as a payment, and experience lower abnormal returns at the merger 
announcement date.  
 The influence of target firm psr‟s on announcement day returns could be explained 
by two hypotheses. The financial distress hypothesis (H.T.1) predicts that financially 
distressed firms face significant uncertainty about the fate of their firms. Predicting a 
possible bankruptcy, the managers could avoid being involved in such a process by 
selling their firms to outsiders at a relative discount. Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) 
discusses direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy, and claim that such bankruptcy costs 
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could amount to significant proportions. In addition, there could be stand alone 
incentives for target firm managers to sell their firms to avoid being fired (Gilson 
(1989)), or receive bonus payments as a result of a successful acquisition (Hartzell, 
Ofek, Yermack (2004)). If low target firm psr is a measure that predicts financial 
distress, then we should observe a positive relation between target firm psr and 
abnormal returns around the event date.    
 The second hypothesis relates to the valuation of target firms (H.T.2). If for some 
reason, the market value of a firm‟s stock drops below its fundamental value, then 
acquiring this firm would result in long-run profits for the acquirer firm. If the 
undervaluation is common knowledge among the set of firms, then target firms with 
low psr‟s are more likely to be acquired. Since the undervaluation is common 
knowledge, competition among the set of bidders would raise the acquisition price 
well above the ongoing market price, meaning higher announcement day returns to the 
target firm stock. The valuation hypothesis could be related to the “dogs of the dow” 
investment strategy. Under this trading strategy, stocks with high dividend yields 
(dividend per share divided by the stock price) should have excess returns in the long 
run due to the conjecture that dividends paid by firms follow a more consistent path 
than the fluctuating stock prices, hence high dividend yields indicate a bottom stock 
price for the underlying security. Even though Hirschey (2003) provides counter 
evidence for the viability of this strategy, the “dogs of the dow” concept could be 
more pertinent in our context. Since our focus is on takeover markets where 
controlling shares of target firms are traded in chunks, the lack of arbitrage is a more 
relevant concept. It is much harder to replace an inefficient management through an 
acquisition than executing trades in the stock market to profit from a mispricing. 
Managers have anti-takeover tools such as poison pills, staggered boards or white 
knight options to deter a possible acquisition. In addition, acquirers should also factor 
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into account the direct and indirect costs of acquisition, such as investment bank fees, 
registration fees, possible takeover battles, lawsuits, etc. In summary, acquisition as a 
disciplining device for managers is a limited tool that can not remove inefficiencies 
completely: firms could be undervalued relative to their potential values due to their 
managers‟ inefficiencies.   
     Our evidence supports the valuation hypothesis above. Target firms that have high 
(low) psr‟s receive 26.2% (38.7%) premiums around the merger announcement date. 
Such low psr target firms get extra premiums when they are acquired by high psr 
buyer firms.  
 The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the dataset, explains the 
construction of variables used in the analysis and summarizes the data. In Section 3.3, 
we show the matching characteristics of the merging firms based on their financial 
data. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present the results of our regression models that link psr‟s 
and event date buyer and target firm abnormal returns, respectively. Section 3.6 
concludes the paper.    
 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Sample formation 
 
Sample formation is completed in two steps. In the first step, we identify the sample of 
firms that are involved in M&A activity by filtering through the SDC database with 
the following restrictions:  
 Date Announced is between 1/1/1980 and 12/31/2003; 
 Deal Value is greater than $10M; 
 Both the acquirer and target firms are public firms based in the United States; 
 The deal status is “completed”; 
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 Neither party to the merger is a financial firm or a utility; 
 The form of the transaction is either “merger” or “acquisition of majority interest”; 
 The target firm has not been involved in merger talks with other buyer firms in the  
 last three years before the merger announcement45. 
 In the second step, we match the sample from first step with the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT databases. We get the price 
data from the CRSP database and the accounting data of the merging firms from the 
COMPUSTAT database. Since there is not a perfect match between the three, the 
resulting sample after matching reduces in number to 749.  
 
3.2.2 Construction of variables 
 
We divide the set of variables into three groups; psr variables, event date return 
variables and deal and financial characteristics of the merging firms.  
 
3.2.2.1 Past stock return (psr) variables 
 
We estimate past stock returns of the merging firms one and two and a half years 
before the announcement of the merger. For the one year psr we calculate, 
𝑝𝑠𝑟i =   (1 + Ri,t)
−63
t=−315 − (1 + Rind ,t)
−63
t=−315   
where Ri,t is the daily return to firm i‟s stock at date t, and Rind,t is the daily return to 
the industry firm i belongs to. Calculation of returns starts roughly 15 months before 
(day -315) the merger announcement date and ends at three months (day -63) before. 
                                                 
45
 This paper analyzes the past stock returns of the merging firms. Having prior merger talks with other 
firms raise target firms‟ stock price in anticipation of a merger, hence results in an artificial high psr. To 
prevent such incorrect entries, we search through the whole SDC database for other attempted mergers 
three years before each merger and delete mergers in which the target firm is involved in such merger 
talks.   
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The three months period between day -63 and day 0, usually referred as the “run-up” 
is not included in the returns estimation. We use Fama-French 49 industry definitions 
and use corresponding daily returns that are available on Kenneth French‟s website46. 
For the two and a half year psr, we calculate returns between -756 and -63 days 
relative to the merger announcement. We do not calculate psr if the time series data in 
CRSP do not conform to the above specifications (i.e. if there is less than 252 daily 
returns available for calculating one year psr).  
 
3.2.2.2 Event date return variables 
 
We measure the impact of the merger announcement on the merging firm‟s stock price 
by finding the abnormal returns in excess of the expected returns. As in the previous 
section, we take the industry returns around the merger announcement as the expected 
returns for that firm. We choose an 11 day window size, and start accumulating 
abnormal returns five days before to five days after the announcement of the merger. 
Specifically, 
CARi
k =   ARi,t
k
t=−k   
ARi,t = Ri,t − Rind ,t   
where 2k+1 is the event window size (k=5). Different specifications of k yield similar 
results so they are not reported in the paper. Ri,t and Rind,t are defined as in the previous 
section.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
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3.2.2.3 Deal and financial variables 
 
Reactions to merger announcements have been extensively examined in the M&A 
literature, basically to assess the resulting wealth creation or transfers from mergers. 
Several firm and deal characteristics are shown to influence cross sections of abnormal 
returns which we discuss below. In Appendix C, we show the formulation of these 
variables.  
Method of Payment 
Travlos (1987) shows that buyer firm cumulative abnormal returns are negative if the 
buyer firm uses its stock as payment to the target firm, and are not significantly 
different from zero if it uses cash. The main explanation for this evidence comes from 
an asymmetric information hypothesis. As Myers and Majluf (1984) argue, an 
information asymmetry between managers and investors may cause a discount in the 
stock price of the firm. Good quality firms should therefore be reluctant to issue stock, 
as they know that their shares are undervalued in the market. Hence, there will be a 
negative reaction when a buyer firm announces a stock purchase of a target firm.  
Form of Acquisition 
As Jensen and Ruback (1983) shows, buyer firm CAR‟s are positive in tender offers 
and negative in mergers. For target firms, both tender and merger deals result in 
positive CAR‟s, but they are larger in tender offers than in mergers. A theory about the 
form of acquisition type is provided by Berkovitch and Khanna (1990), who shows in 
a theoretical model that high synergy bidders initiate tender offers as they are 
confident that they will win the auction process resulting from the tender offer, while 
low synergy bidders choose to merge with the target firm as this negotiating process 
will increase their chances of acquiring the target.  
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Asset Relatedness  
Diversification motives can have an impact on buyer firm CAR‟s, as shown by Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990). Buyer firm CAR‟s are positive when the merging firm 
assets are related (focusing mergers) and negative when they are not (diversifying 
mergers, a.k.a. conglomerates). Human capital risk, discussed in detail by Amihud and 
Lev (1981) for the M&A case, can provide incentives to buyer firm managers to 
acquire unrelated businesses as such actions will reduce their employment risk. In a 
perfect capital market, this managerial motive to acquire unrelated businesses does not 
apply to the shareholders of the firm. Therefore the announcement of a diversifying 
merger is perceived as a violation of managerial and shareholder alignment of 
interests.  
 Another managerial motive for conglomerate mergers is explained by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989). When poor performance threatens the employment of a manager, he 
has an incentive to enter into new businesses which he might be better at. Therefore 
managers may be willing to overpay for such targets at the expense of shareholders. 
Relative Size 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) is the first paper to show that the size of the target 
firm relative to the buyer has explanatory power for buyer and target firm CAR‟s. 
However, there is no agreement in the literature on the sign of this effect. Asquith, 
Bruner, and Mullins (1983) and Servaes (1991) find a positive relationship between 
buyer firm CAR‟s and relative size, while Travlos (1987) find the opposite. On the 
other hand, target firm CAR‟s have a positive relationship with relative size in 
Davidson and Cheng (1997) and negative in Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989). This 
disparity in the sign of the relative size is explained by Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002). For buyer firm CAR‟s, the relation is positive when the target is private and 
negative when the target is public. They continue to argue that public acquisitions tend 
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to be made using stock, and as explained in Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), 
downward sloping demand curves for stock result in a decline in prices. Therefore, as 
the size of the target firm increases, the stock payment and thus the stock issuance is 
getting larger, which causes a drop in the buyer firm‟s stock price.  
Buyer Firm Size 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) finds that larger buyer firms make worse 
acquisitions than smaller firms, in terms of CAR measured around the announcement 
day of the merger. They claim that managerial incentives are more aligned with 
shareholders‟ in smaller firms, as managerial stock ownership tends to be higher. 
Similarly, Roll (1986)‟s hubris hypothesis is more likely to hold in larger firms. To 
support their hypothesis, they show that larger firms tend to overpay for targets, and 
tend to complete deals more successfully.  
Buyer Firm Leverage  
Buyer firm leverage also explains cross sections of abnormal returns, as shown by 
Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993). Buyer firm CAR‟s are larger when buyer 
firm leverage is higher. Leverage can mitigate the problems between managers and 
shareholders
47
, therefore the quality of the acquisitions by levered firms will be higher.  
Tobin’s Q 
There are two papers that examine the effects of Tobin‟s Q on buyer and target firm 
abnormal returns. Using successful tender offers, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) 
shows that buyer firm CAR‟s increase when a high Q buyer acquires a low Q target. 
For all other matches, the effect on CAR is weak. Servaes (1991) expands this dataset 
to include both successful merger and tender offer deals and verifies that the CAR‟s 
are higher for high Q buyers than low Q buyers. For target firms, CAR‟s are higher 
                                                 
47
 Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) gives a summary of papers that explain how leverage mitigates such 
incentive problems. 
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when the target firm has lower Q ratios. Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) interprets 
Tobin‟s Q as the quality of the management of the firm. If the same resources are 
managed by higher quality managers, which lead to better use of target assets, then the 
gains will be larger from the acquisition.  
 
3.2.3 Data summary 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the variables used in the analysis (see Appendix C for variable 
definitions). Target firms enjoy on average, 28.9% returns around the merger 
announcement date while acquirer firm stocks do not appear to be affected by the 
merger announcement.  
 Target firms experience 2.2% lower returns compared to similar firms in their 
industry, one year before the merger announcement date. Due to positive outliers, the 
median psr is lower at -17.4% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicate that the median one 
year psr is statistically different than zero at the 1% level). On average, target firms are 
bad performers in the stock market, which could be an important factor from the 
shareholders perspective to decide to sell the company to another party. On the other 
hand, acquirers perform quite well in the stock market compared to their peers; the 
median psr one year before the merger is 3.9% while the median psr two and a half 
years before the merger is 22.2%.  
 Acquirers are much larger than target firms (median market capitalizations are 
$1,323M vs. $97M) and they have higher Tobin‟s Q ratios (medians 1.84 vs. 1.43, and 
a matched sign-rank test indicate that the medians are statistically different at 1% 
level). 
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Table 3.1 
Data Summary 
This table summarizes key variables used in the analysis. Return and psr variables are defined in Section 3.2.2, deal 
and financial characteristic variables are defined in Appendix C. The word “a” at the beginning of the variable 
name stands for the acquirer and “t” for the target firm. 
 
       
 
N mean median std dev min max 
Panel A. Return variables 
      t_CAR5 749 0.289 0.242 0.302 -1.025 2.561 
a_CAR5 749 0.001 -0.002 0.1 -0.38 0.486 
Panel B. psr variables 
      t_psr1 699 -0.022 -0.174 1.345 -1.403 27.412 
a_psr1 726 0.182 0.039 0.728 -1.169 10.548 
t_psr3 518 -0.0124 -0.333 1.724 -2.51 15.75 
a_psr3 634 0.651 0.222 2.658 -3.373 53.52 
Panel C. Deal variables 
      percentcash 749 0.351 0 0.444 0 1 
tender 749 0.295 0 0.456 0 1 
asset_related 749 0.59 1 0.492 0 1 
relative size 746 0.216 0.083 0.364 0 3.746 
unsolicited 749 0.019 0 0.136 0 1 
Panel D. Financial characteristics 
     a_tobinq 745 2.628 1.848 2.909 0.473 38.478 
a_book_leverage 745 0.46 0.451 0.23 0.006 2.173 
a_mvequity 746 10900.5 1323.9 34991.9 7.255 559162.4 
t_tobinq 724 2.045 1.433 2.112 0.153 28.395 
t_book_leverage 724 0.456 0.414 0.296 0.019 2.964 
t_mvequity 724 355.12 97.71 810.26 2.499 8505.9 
 
3.3 Matching characteristics of the merging firms 
 
The decision to acquire or sell a company is a very significant corporate event. In such 
important times, either side of the transaction, acquirers and target firms, consult with 
their investment banks and advisers to find the top match and structure the best deal 
for their companies. Even though there are many different reasons and motivations to 
acquire or sell a company, there could be common considerations while searching for 
a potential merger partner. We acknowledge that the merger process has financial, 
operational and economical aspects, however our goal here is to show how financial 
characteristics of the merging firms relate to each other. In Table 3.2 below, we list 
several financial characteristics and calculate the sample correlation between the 
acquirer and the target firm for that characteristic. Several financial characteristics, 
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such as market value of equity, cash holdings, liquidity ratios and R&D expenditures 
of the merging firms, are significantly correlated. The other financial variables, except 
one year sales growth and return on equity, are also significantly correlated to each 
other.  
 Most of these variables could capture the same underlying quality of the merging 
firms. For example, a firm having good investment opportunities would have high psr, 
Tobin‟s Q and sales growth. If this company is a mature and large firm, this good 
investment opportunity set could translate into high cash flows and low leverage. 
Therefore it may be natural to observe high correlations between these variables, as 
the underlying unobservable investment opportunities set is correlated. Nevertheless, 
our table clearly shows that there is a positive relation between financial 
characteristics of the merging firms. Firms match with firms that are similar to 
themselves. For example, a larger firm is more likely to acquire a larger firm, or a high 
psr target firm is more likely to be acquired by a high psr firm.  
 
Table 3.2 
Sample correlations of financial characteristics between merging firms 
This table depicts the sample correlations of several financial characteristics of the merging firms. psr variables are 
defined in Section 3.2.2.1, and the remaining variables are defined in Appendix C. Significance levels are denoted 
by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. 
 
Variable No of observations Sample correlation 
psr1 677 0.248*** 
psr3 456 0.257*** 
tobinq 720 0.281*** 
ln_mvequity 721 0.497*** 
book_leverage 720 0.23*** 
cash_flow 593 0.258*** 
sales_growth1 723 0.027 
cash holdings 724 0.446*** 
liquidity 724 0.571*** 
rd_exp 693 0.485*** 
cap_ex 707 0.405*** 
ROE 732 0.027 
 
 Table 3.2 shows the simple correlation between financial variables. We also run 
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multivariate regressions to obtain the partial correlations between variables, after 
controlling for other financial characteristics. We control for the size of the merging 
firms in these regressions, and obtain similar results.  
 Our point in this section is the following. As evidenced in Table 3.2, there is a 
significant correlation between the financial characteristics of the merging firms. The 
matching process between firms is not random; for example, large buyer firms tend to 
acquire large firms.  
 This suggests that unobserved variables (not observed by the econometrician) that 
have significant influence in the matching process could also be correlated. If so, we 
must correct our regressions for this endogenous matching, as discussed in Sorensen 
(2007).  
 
3.4 Matching characteristics based on psr 
 
We now explore the psr variable in more detail. Since psr is a continuous variable, 
categorizing it into discrete parts, such as top and bottom deciles could make the 
analysis easier. We take the 10
th
 and 90
th
 percentile of acquirer and target psr‟s and 
label firms as losers if their psr‟s are below the former and label them as winners if 
their psr‟s are above the latter. Then we create four other groups based on psr‟s of 
merging firms. Winner_winner is a dummy variable taking a value of one if both 
acquirer and target are winners, winner_loser is a dummy variable taking a value of 
one if the acquirer is a winner and the target is a loser, and so on. We list these 
variables in Panel A of Table 3.3 below.   
 An acquirer firm is classified as a winner if its psr exceeds 0.79, and classified as a 
loser if its psr falls behind -0.36. Given this classification, winner acquirers are 
superior firms, generating 165% abnormal returns in the year before the merger 
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announcement. On the other hand, acquirer losers fail to keep up with their industry 
and lose 56% in stock value compared to their peers. Winner and loser acquirers do 
not differ in terms of their stock price reactions to the merger announcement; their 
respective CAR‟s are 0.8% and 0.1%.  
 Winner and loser target firms are classified similarly; a winner target experiences 
57% returns above its industry average while a loser target stock price results in a 68% 
decline. In contrast to the acquirers, winner and loser target firms experience differing 
returns on the event date; winner targets receive 26.2% premiums on the merger 
announcement date while losers receive 38.7%.  
 It is also possible to do the same analysis with respect to double grouping, which 
results in four discrete groupings of firms with respect to their psr‟s. As could be 
guessed by the positive correlation between their psr‟s, it is much more common to 
observe matches within the same type of merging firms. There are 16 firms in the 
winner_winner and 19 firms in the loser_loser groups, while there are only three firms 
in the winner_loser and one firm in the loser_winner group. Acquirers‟ CAR in the 
winner_winner group is larger than that of in the loser_loser group (6.7% vs. 2.5%) 
while it is the reverse for target firms (30% vs. 41.5%).  
 To check whether our results are robust to the original definition of winners and 
losers, we also categorize firms using the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles of the 
corresponding psr variables and show them in Panel B of Table 3.3. The much larger 
sample size for winner and loser dummy variables confirms the results in Panel A. 
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Table 3.3 
Data summary with respect to past stock returns 
This table summarizes psr, CAR, percent cash and Tobin‟s Q measures of merging firms with respect to the past stock returns of the merging firms. The variable psr is defined 
in Section 3.2.2.1, CAR variable in Section 3.2.2.2, percent cash and Tobin‟s Q variables in Appendix C. Except the N column, the numbers represent the mean value of the 
variable for that subgroup.  
 
       
 
Definition N psr  CAR Percent cash Tobin's Q 
Panel A. Top and Bottom 10% 
  
acquirer target acquirer target 
 
acquirer target 
a_winner psr_a > 0.79 73 1.65 0.606 0.008 0.256 0.201 4.308 2.988 
a_loser psr_a < -0.36 73 -0.56 -0.437 0.001 0.315 0.283 2.004 1.734 
t_winner psr_a > 0.57 70 0.543 1.9 0.029 0.262 0.367 4.122 3.185 
t_loser psr_a < -0.68 70 -0.08 -0.87 -0.002 0.387 0.371 2.518 1.662 
winner_winner a_winner and t_winner 16 1.91 2.94 0.067 0.299 0.125 6.045 3.905 
winner_loser a_winner and t_loser 3 1.26 -0.81 0.061 0.714 0 4.149 1.403 
loser_winner a_loser and t_winner 1 -0.51 1.37 0.062 0.143 0 2.254 1.768 
loser_loser a_loser and t_loser 19 -0.62 -0.82 0.025 0.415 0.196 1.837 1.321 
Panel B. Top and Bottom 25% 
         a_winner psr_a > 0.33 186 0.95 0.194 0.001 0.277 0.235 3.513 2.361 
a_loser psr_a < -0.14 182 -0.36 -0.276 -0.004 0.278 0.337 2.029 1.937 
t_winner psr_a > 0.11 176 0.346 0.93 0.008 0.227 0.329 2.895 2.362 
t_loser psr_a < -0.44 177 -0.021 -0.68 -0.015 0.367 0.368 2.563 1.704 
winner_winner a_winner and t_winner 59 1 1.14 0.015 0.244 0.246 3.502 2.588 
winner_loser a_winner and t_loser 30 0.67 -0.66 -0.012 0.366 0.211 4.448 1.843 
loser_winner a_loser and t_winner 25 -0.3 0.65 0.004 0.225 0.283 1.837 2.061 
loser_loser a_loser and t_loser 67 -0.42 -0.7 -0.017 0.332 0.209 1.962 1.795 
1
0
2
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3.4.1 Announcement date returns for buyer firms  
 
To test the hypotheses explained in Section 3.1, we run two regressions with different 
dependent variables. In the first one, we directly include the continuous psr variables 
of the merging firms. In the second one, we use the four discrete groupings of the psr 
variables.  
 The coefficient of buyer firm psr is close to zero in regression (1) in Table 3.4, 
with no statistical significance. This means that there is no evidence for the 
neoclassical hypothesis. If it were true, winner acquirers, who create value should be 
making better acquisitions than loser firms. We also do not find supporting evidence 
for the hubris hypothesis; loser buyers are not bad acquirers. Since these forces work 
in the opposite direction, it may also be the case that their effects cancel each other, 
leading to insignificant regression coefficients overall. 
 The psr‟s of target firms have a significant explanatory power for the event day 
returns. In regression (1), target psr has a coefficient of 0.021, meaning that every 10% 
increase in psr of target firms result in a 0.21% increase in the event date returns for 
buyer firms (1,174.3% when compounded for an annual rate). In other words, buyer 
firms are better off acquiring firms that performed well in the recent past. 
 In regression (2), where discrete matching dummy variables are used, winner 
acquirer winner target matching results in a significant boost for the dependent 
variable. When a winner acquirer buys a winner target firm, buyer firms experience 
10% higher returns at the announcement date of the merger, compared to the base case 
(here the base case is the average buyer firm CAR‟s of all other discrete 
combinations). The other discrete matches have no effect on buyer firm CAR‟s. 
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Table 3.4 
Regression analysis for explaining buyer firm CAR‟s. 
This table summarizes regression results to explain buyer firm returns around the merger announcement date. The 
calculation of the dependent variable, a_CAR, is explained in Section 3.2.2.2, psr variables in Section 3.2.2.1, the 
matching variables (e.g. win_win_90_1) in Table 3.2, and the remaining deal and financial variables in Appendix 
C. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. t-values are reported in 
parenthesis, under the slope coefficients.  
 
 
(1) (2) 
   a_psr1 -0.002 
 
 
(-0.26) 
 t_psr1 0.021*** 
 
 
(3.92) 
 win_win_90_1 
 
0.107*** 
  
(4.12) 
win_los_90_1 
 
0.066 
  
(1.21) 
los_los_90_1 
 
0.02 
  
(0.87) 
los_win_90_1 
 
0.074 
  
(0.79) 
percentcash 0.005 0.007 
 
(0.43) (0.62) 
tender 0.03*** 0.031*** 
 
(2.86) (2.95) 
asset_related 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.25) (0.21) 
ln_relative_size -0.014*** -0.013*** 
 
(-4.46) (-4.28) 
a_tobinq 0 0 
 
(0.01) (0.14) 
ln_a_mvequity -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 
(-5.13) (-4.73) 
a_book_leverage 0.023 0.024 
 
-1.18 (1.22) 
a_cash (0.041) -0.048** 
 
(-1.85) (-2.15) 
t_tobinq 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.32) (0.69) 
Constant 0.057*** 0.045** 
  (2.89) (2.25) 
Observations 646 646 
R-squared 0.09 0.1 
 
 The evidence for the overvaluation hypothesis is provided by papers analyzing 
methods of payment in mergers and acquisitions, like Travlos (1987), Martins (1996), 
Faccio and Masulis (2005). In our dataset, we confirm these results. Panel A of Table 
3.3 shows that winner acquirers are more likely to pay with stock than in cash (20% 
vs. 28% cash payment). In the sample of mergers that are consummated with all cash, 
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the average psr of acquirers is 5.6%, while it is 24% for the sample of deals that are 
consummated with all stock. In all cash deals, the mean price reaction to the merger 
announcement for acquirer stock is 1.5% vs. -0.7% in all stock deals. This means that 
firms that experience recent stock price increases tend to make acquisitions with stock, 
which leads to negative price reaction at the merger announcement date. However, the 
effect of psr on event date returns is not significant once the method of payment is 
controlled for in our regressions in Table 3.4.  
 
3.4.2 Announcement date returns for target firms 
 
Regression results are shown in Table 3.5. As in the previous section, we run two 
regressions with differing methods of measuring the impact of psr‟s on the 
announcement day returns. Controlling for factors that are known to influence the 
dependent variable, psr‟s of merging firms have no effect on target firms‟ abnormal 
returns at the event date. Even though target firm CAR‟s increase with buyer firm 
psr‟s and decrease with their own psr, their effects are not statistically significant. 
 However in regression (2), loser target firms receive significantly larger premiums 
than other groups. If a winner buyer acquires a loser target, the target receives 42% 
higher premiums. When a loser target is acquired by a loser buyer, it receives 16.6% 
more premiums than the others. Both effects are significant at the 1% level 
significance level, with t statistics of 2.53 and 2.32, respectively. It is therefore 
apparent that loser target firms receive higher premiums, and the premium is even 
higher if the buyer is a winner.   
 Our empirical work provides no evidence for the financial distress hypothesis. The 
cash holdings of winner and loser targets are about the same (25% of total assets), and 
most importantly loser targets do not receive lower premiums than winner targets. In 
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contrast, our findings are consistent with the valuation hypothesis (H.T.2), which 
claims that target firms having a lower market valuation than their fundamental values 
could still get their intrinsic value in an acquisition. The primary mechanism for this 
result is probably due to competition in the takeover markets.  
 
Table 3.5 
Regression analysis for explaining target firm CAR‟s. 
This table summarizes regression results to explain target firm returns around the merger announcement date. The 
calculation of the dependent variable, t_CAR, is explained in Section 3.2.2.2, psr variables in Section 3.2.2.1, the 
matching variables (e.g. win_win_90_1) in Table 3.2, and the remaining deal and financial variables in Appendix 
C. Significance levels are denoted by an asterisk, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. t-values are reported in 
parenthesis, under the slope coefficients.  
  
 
(1) (2) 
   a_psr1 0.031 
 
 
(1.42) 
 t_psr_1 -0.016 
 
 
(-0.93) 
 win_win_90_1 
 
0.112 
  
(1.41) 
win_los_90_1 
 
0.423** 
  
(2.53) 
los_los_90_1 
 
0.166** 
  
(2.32) 
los_win_90_1 
 
-0.071 
  
(-0.25) 
percentcash 0.052 0.063 
 
(1.53) (1.87) 
tender 0.08** 0.075** 
 
(2.48) (2.34) 
asset_related 0.005 0.003 
 
(0.22) (0.13) 
ln_relative_size -0.043*** -0.039*** 
 
(-4.45) (-4.07) 
a_tobinq 0.005 0.006 
 
(0.79) (0.94) 
ln_a_mvequity -0.004 0 
 
(-0.41) (0.01) 
a_cash 0.125 0.114 
 
(1.79) (1.63) 
t_tobinq -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 
(-3.39) (-3.72) 
t_cash 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.05) (0.06) 
Constant 0.17*** 0.155*** 
  -3.13 (2.86) 
Observations 646 646 
R-squared 0.13 0.14 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
Our paper analyzes matching characteristics of firms based on their financial data. We 
find a positive relationship between acquirer and target firm characteristics: firms 
choose to merge with firms that resemble themselves. This means that the sample of 
mergers we observe in real life is a result of a matching process which could 
potentially embed correlated unobserved variables.  
 We also consider three hypotheses that link psr‟s of acquirer firms with their 
abnormal returns around the merger announcement date. We do not find evidence in 
favor of the neoclassical hypothesis (H.A.1) which claims that firms with superior 
performance are better value creators and hence their acquisition decisions are better 
than the others. There is also little evidence of the hubris hypothesis (H.A.2) which 
predicts worse acquisitions by winner acquirers due to the conjecture that their 
managers could be prone to overconfidence. We find evidence for the third hypothesis 
(H.A.3) like other papers in the literature, with well performing buyer firms using 
stock as a method of payment more often than the other acquirers.  
 Our analysis focuses on two claims on the target side. The first hypothesis is 
related to the effect of a possible financial distress on corporate decisions: loser firm 
managers could sell their companies at a discount to avoid such costs. Our analysis 
does not support this claim. On the contrary, we find that targets with low psr‟s 
receive higher premiums compared with others, which is consistent with our final 
hypothesis (H.T.2).  
 We should not forget that announcement day returns reflect two types of 
information: the gains from the takeover and the quality/state of the merging firms. 
The evidence presented in this paper should be evaluated keeping this fact in mind.  
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APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1 
 
A.1  Calculation of return variables 
 
We estimate market model parameters (α , β ) by running an OLS regression in the 
estimation period. 
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + εi,t   
where Ri,t is the return to firm i at day t, Rm,t are the returns to the value-weighted 
CRSP market portfolio at day t, and εi,t is the zero mean constant variance error term. 
Following Schwert (2000), we set the estimation period as (-316,-64) trading days 
relative to the announcement day of the merger (day 0). Then, abnormal returns in the 
event period are calculated as 
CARi
k =   ARi,t
k
t=−k   
ARi,t = Ri,t − (αi + βi
 Rm,t)  
where 2k+1 is the event window size, ARi,t  the abnormal returns to firm i on day t and 
CARi
k  is the cumulative abnormal returns to firm i in the event window. 
The bid premium is the abnormal returns in the target firm stock starting 63 
trading days before the event date and ending at the deal closing date, unless it 
exceeds +126. Specifically, we calculate the bid premium (bidpremium) as 
𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚i =   (1 + Ri,t)
min {+126,   closing }
t=−63 − (1 + Rm,t)
min {+126,   closing }
t=−63   
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A.2 Calculation of deal and financial variables 
 
The table below explains the construction of deal and financial variables used in this paper. Unless otherwise stated, deal and financial variables are calculated using the most 
recent annual balance sheets (at the financial year end prior to the merger announcement). The word “a” at the beginning of the variable name stands for the acquirer and “t” 
for the target firm.  
 
 VARIABLE NAME PROXY COMPUSTAT DATA ITEM 
PANEL A. DEAL VARIABLES       
Method of Payment percentcash percent of total payments to the target firm that is in cash  
Form of Acquisition tender 1 if tender offer  
Asset Relatedness asset_related 1 if 2-digit SIC codes of the merging firms match  
Hostility hostile 1 if the deal is classified as hostile  
 unsolicited 1 if the deal is classified as unsolicited   
Competition competition 1 if number of bidders publicly competing for the target is greater 
than 1 
 
Deal Completion completed 1 if the announced deal successfully closes  
Relative Size ln_rel_size (Log of) market value of equity of the target firm divided by that of 
the buyer firm, evaluated 60 days before the merger announcement  
 
Toehold toehold 1 if the percent of target shares held by the buyer firm at the time of 
the deal announcement is larger than 5% 
 
Termination Fees a_termfee termination fee for the target divided by the market value of equity 
of the target firm 
 
 t_termfee termination fee for the buyer divided by the market value of equity 
of the buyer firm 
 
Financial Seller financial_seller 1 if there is a financial sponsor on the sell side (intended to capture 
venture capital and private equity funds)  
 
Family Ownership family_seller 1 if there is a significant (more than 20%)  family ownership in the 
target firm 
 
 
    
    
    
1
1
1
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Appendix A.2 continued    
    
PANEL B. FINANCIAL 
VARIABLES48 
      
Tobin's Q a_tobinq, t_tobinq market value of assets divided by the book value of assets [(MV of assets)/ #6] 49 
Leverage a_book_lev, t_book_lev book value of debt divided by the book value of assets [(#181+#10-#35)/ #6] 
Cash Flow a_cashflow, t_cashflow operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes, 
preferred dividends and common dividends, normalized by the book 
value of assets 
[#13-#15-(#16-#∆35)- #19-#21]/#6 
Sales Growth a_salesgrowth, t_salesgrowth 1 year growth in the sales of the company [#12t-#12t-1]/#12t-1 
Size ln_a_mvequity, ln_t_mvequity (Log of) the inflation-adjusted market value of equity ln[#25*#199] 
Liquidity a_liquidity, t_liquidity current assets divided by book value of total assets #4/#6 
Cash Holdings t_cash Cash and short term investments divided by total assets #1/#6 
Current Ratio t_current Current assets divided by current liabilities  #4/#5 
Altman‟s Z Score t_Altmanz 1.2*(Working capital/T. Assets) + 1.4*(Retained earnings/T.Assets) 
+ 3.3*(EBIT/T.Assets) + 0.6*(MV Equity/BV Debt) + 
0.999*(Sales/T.Assets) 
1.2*[(#4-#5)/ #6] + 1.4*[#36/#6] + 
3.3*[(#170+#15)/ #6] + 
0.6*[#25*#199/#181] + 
0.999*[#12/#6] 
Price/Earnings a_PE, t_PE stock price divided by the earnings per share #24/#58 
Return on Equity a_ROE, t_ROE net income divided by last year‟s stockholder's equity #172t/#60t-1 
R&D Expenses a_R&D, t_R&D research and development expenditures divided by book value of 
total assets 
#46/#6 
Capital Expenditures a_capex, t_capex capital expenditures divided by book value of total assets #128/#6 
Dividend Ratio a_dividend, t_dividend dividend per share divided by stock price #26/#199 
 
 
                                                 
48
 Some of the financial variables are truncated to exclude outliers: a_salesgrowth at +10, t_salesgrowth at +5, t_PE at -100 and +100, a_PE at -200 and 
+200, a_ROE and t_ROE at -5 and +5. 
49
 MV of assets = [#181+#10-#35+(#25*#199)]. If #10 is not available, we use #56 instead. Calculations follow Fama and French (2002).  
1
1
2
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APPENDIX B 
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2 
 
Equating per capita demand to per capita supply, 
 𝜆𝑑𝐼 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑑𝑈 =
𝑆∗
𝑁
+ 𝑥  
 𝜆(
𝑏 𝜌+(  
𝐼2
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑖)𝛾−(𝑃(𝑆
∗)−𝐸−𝑎)(𝜌+𝐼2𝛾)
𝛿
) (B.1) 
 +(1 − 𝜆)
𝑏 𝜌+(  
𝛼𝐼2
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑖)𝛾+𝜃𝜌𝜃−(𝑃(𝑆
∗)−𝐸−𝑎)(𝜌+𝛼𝐼2𝛾+𝜌𝜃 )
𝛿
=
𝑆∗
𝑁
+ 𝑥 
 Combining the terms and substituting 𝜃 from the right hand side of (2.7) yields, 
 0 = −𝑃 𝑆∗  
𝜆
𝛿
 𝜌 + 𝐼2𝛾 +
1−𝜆
𝛿
 𝜌 + 𝛼𝐼2𝛾 + 𝜌𝜃  + (𝐸 + 𝑎)[
𝜆
𝛿
(𝜌 + 𝐼2𝛾) 
 +
1−𝜆
𝛿
(𝜌 + 𝛼𝐼2𝛾 + 𝜌𝜃)] + 𝑏 [
𝜆
𝛿
𝜌 +
1−𝜆
𝛿
𝜌] 
 +  𝛼𝐼2𝑖=1 𝑠𝑖  
𝜆
𝛿
𝛾 +
1−𝜆
𝛿
𝛾 +   𝐼2𝑖=𝛼𝐼2+1 𝑠𝑖  
𝜆
𝛿
𝛾 +
1−𝜆
𝛿
𝜌𝜃
 1−𝛼 𝐼2
  (B.2) 
−𝑥[1 +
1 − 𝜆
𝛿
𝜌𝜃𝑐5
𝑐4(1 − 𝛼)𝐼2
] + 𝑥 [
1 − 𝜆
𝛿
𝜌𝜃𝑐5
𝑐4(1 − 𝛼)𝐼2
] −
𝑆∗
𝑁
 
 Using the projected price function, 
 
𝑐4
𝑐5
=
𝜆
𝛿
𝛾+
1−𝜆
𝛿
𝜌𝜃
(1−𝛼)𝐼2
1+
1−𝜆
𝛿
𝜌𝜃 𝑐5
𝑐4(1−𝛼)𝐼2
⇒
𝑐4
𝑐5
=
𝜆𝛾
𝛿
 (B.3) 
 Plugging c4/c5 into ρθ, 
 𝜌𝜃 = [
1
𝛾(1−𝛼)𝐼2
+
1
(
𝜆𝛾 (1−𝛼)𝐼2
𝛿
)2𝜂
]−1 (B.4) 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3 
 
To find 𝑆∗, we solve, 
 𝑃(𝑆)𝑆 =
𝐸
(1−𝜅)
 (B.5) 
 𝑐1(𝐸 + 𝑎) + 𝑐2𝑏 + 𝑐3   
𝛼𝐼2
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑐4   
𝐼2
𝑖=𝛼𝐼2+1
𝑠𝑖 − 𝑐5𝑥 + 𝑐6𝑥 − 𝑐7(
𝑆
𝑁
)]𝑆 =
𝐸
(1−𝜅)
 
 − 
𝑐7
𝑁
 𝑆2 +  𝑐1 𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑐2𝑏 + 𝑐3   
𝛼𝐼2
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑐4   
𝐼2
𝑖=𝛼𝐼2+1
𝑠𝑖 − 𝑐5𝑥 + 𝑐6𝑥 𝑆 
−[
𝐸
(1 − 𝜅)
] = 0 
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 Renaming the terms, 
 𝐴 = −
𝑐7
𝑁
 (B.6) 
𝐵 = 𝑐1 𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑐2𝑏 + 𝑐3   
𝛼𝐼2
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑖 + 𝑐4   
𝐼2
𝑖=𝛼𝐼2+1
𝑠𝑖 − 𝑐5𝑥 + 𝑐6𝑥 
 𝐶 = −
𝐸
(1−𝜅)
 
 Inspection shows that 𝐴 < 0 and 𝐶 < 0. Since 𝑃(𝑆∗) > 0, we have 𝐵 > 0. The last 
line in (B.5) is a second order, one unknown equation that have two roots, 
 𝑆1
∗ =
−𝐵+ 𝐵2−4𝐴𝐶
2𝐴
; 𝑆2
∗ =
−𝐵− 𝐵2−4𝐴𝐶
2𝐴
 (B.7) 
 Our interest is in real roots, therefore 𝐵2 ≥ 4𝐴𝐶 must be satisfied. Furthermore, 
using the signs of 𝐴,𝐵 and 𝐶, we see that 0 < 𝑆1
∗ < 𝑆2
∗.The firm is better off selling 
small number of shares at a higher price, which means that 𝑆1
∗ is the solution to the 
manager's problem. 
 Part (b) follows from the second constraint of the manager's problem; 𝑆1
∗ < 1. 
 
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2.5 
 
The expected amount of stock issue in period 1, 𝐸{𝑆∗}, can be found by solving 
𝐸{𝑃(𝑆)}𝐸{𝑆} = 𝐸/(1 − 𝜅). Using the fact that 𝐸{𝑠𝑖} = 𝐸{𝐸{𝑠𝑖|𝑏}} = 𝐸{𝑏} = 𝑏 , 
𝐸{𝑃(𝑆)} can be written as, 
𝐸{𝑃(𝑆)} = 𝐸{𝑐1(𝐸 + 𝑎) + 𝑐2𝑏 + 𝑐3   
𝛼𝐼2
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑖 + 𝑐4   
𝐼2
𝑖=𝛼𝐼2+1
𝑠𝑖 − 𝑐5𝑥 + 𝑐6𝑥 − 𝑐7(
𝑆
𝑁
)} 
= 𝐸{𝐸 + 𝑎 +
𝜌
𝐷𝑒𝑛
𝑏 +
𝛾
𝐷𝑒𝑛
  
𝛼𝐼2
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑖 +
𝜆𝛾 +
 1 − 𝜆 𝜌𝜃
 1 − 𝛼 𝐼2
𝐷𝑒𝑛
  
𝐼2
𝑖=𝛼𝐼2+1
𝑠𝑖 −
𝛿 +
 1 − 𝜆 𝜌𝜃
 1 − 𝛼 𝐼2
𝛿
𝜆𝛾
𝐷𝑒𝑛
𝑥 
+
(1 − 𝜆)𝜌𝜃
(1 − 𝛼)𝐼2
𝛿
𝜆𝛾
𝐷𝑒𝑛
𝑥 −
1
𝐷𝑒𝑛
(
𝑆
𝑁
)} 
= 𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏 −
1
𝐷𝑒𝑛
(𝑥 +
𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁
)  (B.8) 
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where 𝐷𝑒𝑛 =
1
𝛿
[𝜆(𝜌 + 𝛾𝐼2) + (1 − 𝜆)(𝜌 + 𝛾𝛼𝐼2 + 𝜌𝜃)] and 𝜌𝜃 = [
1
𝛾(1−𝛼)𝐼2
+
1
(
𝜆𝛾 (1−𝛼)𝐼2
𝛿
)2𝜂
]−1. This means that 𝐸{𝑆∗} solves 
 𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏 −
1
𝐷𝑒𝑛
(𝑥 +
𝐸{𝑆∗}
𝑁
)]𝐸{𝑆∗} −
𝐸
(1−𝜅)
= 0 (B.9) 
 The solution to (B.9) is (taking the smaller root due to the firm's objective 
function), 
 𝐸{𝑆∗} =
(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)− (𝐸+𝑎+𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)2−4
1
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
𝐸
(1−𝜅)
2
1
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
 (B.10) 
which is the expression in the lemma. For a real root, we assume (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)2 − 4
1
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
𝐸
(1−𝜅)
≥ 0. To exclude double roots (to apply the Implicit Function 
Theorem in Proposition 2.6) we assume strict inequality, which gives condition (a). 
Condition (b) follows from the manager's problem. 
 
B.4  Proof of Proposition 2.6 
 
Before starting the proofs, note that we rule out the case where (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)2 −
4
1
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
𝐸
(1−𝜅)
= 0 which implies by (B.10), 
2𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
− (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
) = 0. 
Therefore assuming (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)2 − 4
1
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
𝐸
(1−𝜅)
> 0 as in Lemma 2.5(a), we 
see that 𝐸{𝑆} <
(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)
2
1
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
. This inequality is used frequently in the proof. Also 
remember by Proposition 2.2 that 𝐷𝑒𝑛 =
1
𝛿
[𝜆(𝜌 + 𝛾𝐼2) + (1 − 𝜆)(𝜌 + 𝛾𝛼𝐼2 + 𝜌𝜃)] 
and 𝜌𝜃 = [
1
𝛾(1−𝛼)𝐼2
+
1
(
𝜆𝛾 (1−𝛼)𝐼2
𝛿
)2𝜂
]−1 = [𝛾−1(1 − 𝛼)−1𝐼2
−1 + 𝛿2𝜆−2𝛾−2(1 −
𝛼)−2𝐼2
−2𝜂−1]−1. 
(i) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝛼
=
∂𝐸{(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑆)}
∂𝛼
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛼
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛼
, we apply the 
Implicit Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of 
(B.9) with respect to 𝛼, 
 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛼
=
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛼
𝐸{𝑆}
(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )2
[
𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁
+𝑥 ]
2𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
−(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)
 (B.11) 
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 By the note above, the denominator of (B.11) is always negative. Since the rest of 
the numerator is always positive, 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛼
 determines the sign of 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛼
.  
 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛼
=
(1−𝜆)
𝛿
(𝛾𝐼2 +
∂𝜌𝜃
∂𝛼
) (B.12) 
 In addition, 
 
∂𝜌𝜃
∂𝛼
= −𝛾𝐼2
1+2𝛿2𝜆−2𝛾−1(1−𝛼)−1𝐼2
−1𝜂−1
(1+𝛿2𝜆−2𝛾−1(1−𝛼)−1𝐼2
−1𝜂−1)2
 (B.13) 
𝛾𝐼2 +
∂𝜌𝜃
∂𝛼
= 𝛾𝐼2(1 + 𝛿
−2𝜆2𝛾(1 − 𝛼)𝐼2𝜂)
−2 > 0 
 
 This means that 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛼
> 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛼
< 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝛼
> 0. 
(ii) Same as (v). 
(iii) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝑁
=
∂𝐸{(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑆)}
∂𝑁
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑁
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑁
, we apply the 
Implicit Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of 
(B.9) with respect to 𝑁, 
 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑁
=
(𝐸{𝑆})2
(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )𝑁2
2𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
−(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)
 (B.14) 
By the note above, the denominator of (B.14) is always negative. Since the rest of the 
numerator is always positive, 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑁
< 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝑁
> 0. 
(iv) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝜆
=
∂𝐸{(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑆)}
∂𝜆
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜆
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜆
, we apply the 
Implicit Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of 
(B.9) with respect to 𝜆, 
 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜆
=
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜆
𝐸{𝑆}
(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )2
[
𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁
+𝑥 ]
2𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
−(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)
 (B.15) 
 The denominator of (B.15) is always negative. Since the rest of the numerator is 
always positive, 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜆
 determines the sign of 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜆
.  
 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜆
=
1
𝛿
[𝐼2𝛾(1 − 𝛼) + ((1 − 𝜆)
∂𝜌𝜃
∂𝜆
− 𝜌𝜃)] (B.16) 
 =
1
𝛿
[𝐼2𝛾(1 − 𝛼) + (
𝛿2𝜆−2𝛾−2(1−𝛼)−2𝐼2
−2𝜂−1(2(1−𝜆)𝜆−1−1)−𝛾−1(1−𝛼)−1𝐼2
−1
𝜌𝜃
−2 )] 
 =
1
𝛿
[
𝛿2𝜆−2𝛾−2(1−𝛼)−2𝐼2
−2𝜂−1(2(1−𝜆)𝜆−1+1)+𝛿4𝜆−4𝛾−3(1−𝛼)−3𝐼2
−3𝜂−2
𝜌𝜃
−2 ] > 0 
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 This means that 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜆
> 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜆
< 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝜆
> 0. 
(v) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝛾
=
∂𝐸{(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑆)}
∂𝛾
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛾
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛾
, we apply the 
Implicit Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of 
(B.9) with respect to 𝛾, 
 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛾
=
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛾
𝐸{𝑆}
(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )2
[
𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁
+𝑥 ]
2𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
−(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)
 (B.17) 
 The denominator of (B.17) is always negative. Since the rest of the numerator is 
always positive, 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛾
 determines the sign of 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛾
.  
 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛾
=
1
𝛿
[𝜆𝐼2 + (1 − 𝜆)(𝛼𝐼2 +
∂𝜌𝜃
∂𝛾
)] (B.18) 
 Also, 
 
∂𝜌𝜃
∂𝛾
= −
−𝛾−2(1−𝛼)−1𝐼2
−1−2𝛿2𝜆−2(1−𝛼)−2𝐼2
−2𝛾−3𝜂−1
[𝛾−1(1−𝛼)−1𝐼2
−1+𝛿2𝜆−2𝛾−2(1−𝛼)−2𝐼2
−2𝜂−1]2
> 0 (B.19) 
 This means that 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛾
> 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛾
< 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝛾
> 0. 
(vi) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝜂
=
∂𝐸{(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑆)}
∂𝜂
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜂
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜂
, we apply the 
Implicit Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of 
(B.9) with respect to 𝜂, 
 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜂
=
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜂
𝐸{𝑆}
(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )2
[
𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁
+𝑥 ]
2𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁(𝐷𝑒𝑛 )
−(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏 −
𝑥 
𝐷𝑒𝑛
)
 (B.20) 
 The denominator of (B.20) is always negative. Since the rest of the numerator is 
always positive, 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜂
 determines the sign of 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜂
.  
 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜂
=
(1−𝜆)
𝛿
∂𝜌𝜃
∂𝜂
 (B.21) 
 
∂ρθ
∂η
= −
−δ2λ−2(1−α)−2I2
−2γ−2η−2
[γ−1(1−α)−1I2
−1+δ2λ−2γ−2(1−α)−2I2
−2η−1]2
> 0 
 
 This means that 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜂
> 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜂
< 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝜂
> 0. 
(vii) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝜌
=
∂𝐸{(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑆)}
∂𝜌
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜌
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜌
, we apply the 
Implicit Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of 
(B.9) with respect to 𝜌, 
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∂E{S}
∂ρ
=
∂Den
∂ρ
E {S }
(Den )2
[
E {S }
N
+x ]
2E {S }
N (Den )
−(E+a+b −
x 
Den
)
 (B.22) 
 The denominator of (B.22) is always negative. Since the rest of the numerator is 
always positive, 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜌
 determines the sign of 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜌
.  
 
∂Den
∂ρ
=
1
δ
> 0 
 This means that 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝜌
> 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜌
< 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝜌
> 0. 
(viii) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝑎
= (1 − 𝐸{𝑆}) + (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑎
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑎
, we apply the Implicit 
Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of (B.9) with 
respect to 𝑎, 
 
∂E{S}
∂a
=
E{S}
2E {S }
N (Den )
−(E+a+b −
x 
Den
)
 (B.23) 
 The denominator of (B.23) is always negative. Since the numerator is always 
positive, 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑎
< 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝑎
> 0. 
(ix) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝑏 
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑏 
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑏 
, we apply the Implicit Function 
Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of (B.9) with respect 
to 𝑏 , 
 
∂E{S}
∂b 
=
E{S}
2E {S }
N (Den )
−(E+a+b −
x 
Den
)
 (B.24) 
 The denominator of (B.24) is always negative. Since the numerator is always 
positive, 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑏 
< 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝑏 
> 0. 
(x) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝑥 
=
∂𝐸{(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑆)}
∂𝑥 
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑥 
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑥 
, we apply the 
Implicit Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of 
(B.9) with respect to 𝑥 , 
 
∂E{S}
∂x 
=
−
E {S}
Den
2E {S }
N (Den )
−(E+a+b −
x 
Den
)
 (B.25) 
 The denominator of (B.25) is always negative. Since the numerator is always 
negative, 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝑥 
> 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝑥 
< 0. 
(xi) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝛿
=
∂𝐸{(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑆)}
∂𝛿
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛿
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛿
, we apply the 
Implicit Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of 
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(B.9) with respect to 𝛿, 
 
∂E{S}
∂δ
=
∂Den
∂δ
E {S }
(Den )2
[
E {S }
N
+x ]
2E {S }
N (Den )
−(E+a+b −
x 
Den
)
 (B.26) 
 The denominator of (B.26) is always negative. Since the rest of the numerator is 
always positive, 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛿
 determines the sign of 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛿
.  
 
∂Den
∂δ
= −
λ
δ2
(ρ + I2γ) −
1−λ
δ2
(ρ + αI2γ + ρθ) +
1−λ
δ
∂ρθ
∂δ
) (B.27) 
 Also, 
 
∂ρθ
∂δ
= −
2δλ−2γ−2(1−α)−2I2
−2η−1
[γ−1(1−α)−1I2
−1+δ2λ−2γ−2(1−α)−2I2
−2η−1]2
< 0 (B.28) 
 This means that 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛿
< 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝛿
> 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝛿
< 0. 
(xii) 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝜅
=
∂𝐸{(𝐸+𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑆)}
∂𝜅
= (𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏)(−
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜅
). To find 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜅
, we apply the 
Implicit Function Theorem in equation (B.9) in Lemma 2.5. Taking the derivative of 
(B.9) with respect to 𝜅, 
 
∂E{S}
∂κ
=
−
E
(1−κ )2
2E {S }
N (Den )
−(E+a+b −
x 
Den
)
 (B.29) 
 The denominator of (B.29) is always negative. Since the numerator is always 
negative, 
∂𝐸{𝑆}
∂𝜅
> 0 ⇒
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝜅
< 0. 
Graphical Solution 
Most of the comparative static results can be shown using a graph. The equilibrium 
quantity of stock sold by the manager in period one, 𝐸{𝑆∗}, can be found by solving 
(1 − 𝜅)𝐸{𝑃(𝑆∗)}𝐸{𝑆∗} = 𝐸, which is 𝐸{𝑃(𝑆∗)} =
𝐸
𝐸{𝑆∗}(1−𝜅)
. The right hand side 
(RHS) of the equation is a non-linear decreasing function of 𝐸{𝑆∗}, while the left hand 
side (LHS) is a linear decreasing function of 𝐸{𝑆∗} (see the last line in (B.8)). The 
graph below (part (a)) shows the equilibrium points, provided that these two curves 
intersect, i.e. an equilibrium exist. As mentioned in the proof of Lemma 2.5, the 
manager chooses 𝐸{𝑆1
∗} since the payoff to old shareholders is higher with low 
number of shares sold at a higher price.  
 120 
 
Figure B.1 
Graphical representation of comparative statics 
 Suppose for example that 𝛼 increases. RHS of the equation is not affected by this 
change. The LHS, which is 𝐸 + 𝑎 + 𝑏 −
1
𝐷𝑒𝑛
(𝑥 +
𝐸{𝑆}
𝑁
), is affected through 𝐷𝑒𝑛. As 
shown in the algebraic proof, 
∂𝐷𝑒𝑛
∂𝛼
> 0. This suggests that the intercept and the slope 
of the LHS increase. This leads to a shift in the line as shown in Figure B.1(b). As a 
result, 
∂𝐸{𝑆1
∗}
∂𝛼
< 0, which means that 
∂𝐸{Π}
∂𝛼
> 0. 
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APPENDIX C 
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
The table below explains the construction of deal and financial variables used in this paper. Unless otherwise stated, deal and financial variables are 
calculated using the most recent annual balance sheets (at the financial year end prior to the merger announcement). The word “a” at the beginning of the 
variable name stands for the acquirer and “t” for the target firm.  
 
 VARIABLE NAME PROXY COMPUSTAT DATA ITEM 
PANEL A. DEAL VARIABLES       
Method of Payment percentcash percent of total payments to the target firm that is in cash  
Form of Acquisition tender 1 if tender offer  
Asset Relatedness asset_related 1 if 2-digit SIC codes of the merging firms match  
Hostility unsolicited 1 if the deal is classified as unsolicited   
Relative Size ln_relative_size (Log of) market value of equity of the target firm divided by 
that of the buyer firm, evaluated 60 days before the merger 
announcement  
 
PANEL B. FINANCIAL 
VARIABLES 
      
Tobin's Q a_tobinq, t_tobinq market value of assets divided by the book value of assets [(MV of assets) / #6]
 50
 
Leverage a_book_leverage, 
t_book_leverage 
book value of debt divided by the book value of assets [(#181+#10-#35) / #6] 
Size ln_a_mvequity, 
ln_t_mvequity 
(Log of) the inflation-adjusted market value of equity ln[#25*#199] 
Cash Holdings a_cash, t_cash Cash holdings divided by the book value of assets #1 / #6 
Cash Flow a_cashflow, t_cashflow operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, 
taxes, preferred dividends and common dividends, 
normalized by the book value of assets 
[#13-#15-(#16-#∆35)- #19-#21]/#6 
    
                                                 
50
 MV of assets = [#181+#10-#35+(#25*#199)]. If #10 is not available, we use #56 instead. Calculations follow Fama and French (2002).  
1
2
1
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Appendix C continued    
    
Sales Growth a_salesgrowth, 
t_salesgrowth 
1 year growth in the sales of the company [#12t-#12t-1]/#12t-1 
Liquidity a_liquidity, t_liquidity current assets divided by book value of total assets #4/#6 
Return on Equity a_ROE, t_ROE net income divided by last year‟s stockholder's equity #172t/#60t-1 
R&D Expenditures a_rd_exp, t_rd_exp R&D expenditures divided by book value of total assets #46/#6 
Capital Expenditures a_cap_ex, t_cap_ex Capital expenditures divided by book value of total assets #128/#6 
    
 
 
 
 
1
2
2
 
 
